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Abstract
The political tensions between different feminisms, emerging virtually in tandem with
the  origins  of  'second  wave'  women's  movements  themselves,  continue  to  present
challenges for cooperation and collective action. If flourishing feminist solidarities are
to  be  forged,  it  is  imperative  to  attend  to  these  divisions,  requiring  a  robust
understanding of how they have developed. Though a growing body of research exists
on the emotions of feminism, alongside a much more expansive one on emotions and
social movements more generally, the emotions of specific feminist movements remain
relatively under-explored.  This  research  aims  to  generate  a  deeper  understanding of
radical  feminism through a  historical  examination  of  its  emotion  culture  during  the
crucial transition between the development of the ‘second wave’ of Women’s Liberation
in the 1970s and the emergence of the ‘third wave’ in the 1990s. It takes radical feminist
writings about the timely and controversial paradigms of medicine and psychoanalysis
as a window on the movement’s emotion culture in the 1980s.
Employing  archival  documentary  methods  and  a  case  study approach,  the  research
draws upon the pivotal radical feminist  magazine  Trouble and Strife as its  sole data
source. Exploring the text through literary ethnographic analysis and foregrounding a
historical lens, it surfaces radical feminism’s emotion culture and highlights the way
that its development was bound up with the specificities of its historical moment. The
movement’s emotion culture was fundamentally a relational one, constituted through its
specific political lens on the relationships in which radical feminists were entangled. As
the 'heady days' of 1970s radical social movements gave way to the British state's turn
to neoliberalism, the proliferating reach of its individualist ideological paradigm, and
deepening divisions between the evolving strands of the 'second wave', radical feminists
were confronted with an array of changing relationships to negotiate. Their uniquely
uncompromising  stance  toward  men,  their  long-established  tense  relationship  with
socialist and Marxist feminisms, and their critical view of ascending feminist uptake of
psychoanalysis gave rise to an emotion culture which centred around their relationships
with each of these.
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This research contributes to theories of emotions in social movements by focusing on
the historically and ideologically specific, rather than emphasising the more general
social movement strategic goals which are a common (though not universal) focus in
this area. It adds to a small body of work on background emotions, and shows one way
that they can be studied empirically. It also contributes to the growing body of work on
feminism  and  emotions,  and  particularly  to  research  which  aims  to  explain  the
contentions  between  feminisms,  as  feminist  researchers  move  away  from  the
outmoded view of these contentions as simplistic generational divides and seek out
explanations through the complex emotionality of feminist relationships.
Lay Summary
This thesis aims to explore the emotion culture of radical feminism in the 1980s. Its 
purpose is to explain how contemporary radical feminism came to work the way 
that it does emotionally be examining the development of the movement's 
emotions at an earlier, formative point in its history. The research asks a deliberately
open and flexible question: What was the emotion culture of British radical 
feminism in the 1980s? An emotion culture is the set of norms and guidelines within
a social movement which indicate to participants how they ought to feel about 
themselves, other groups of people in their social context, and dominant groups. 
These guidelines are then put into practice in movement participants' day-to-day 
thinking, feeling, and experiences, shaping their relationships with themselves and 
others.
The concept of emotion culture is productive for examining the emotions of radical 
feminism because a central aspect of what causes any social movement, including 
radical feminism, to work the way that it does emotionally are the relationships that
the movement group has with participants in their own movement and with 
different categories of others outside their group, including individuals as well as 
groups and institutions. Emotion cultures provide an emotional map of the social 
world for participants in a social movement, indicating who allies and enemies are 
and what various events, social structures, cultural paradigms, and experienced 
realities should signify to movement participants about the state of the world they 
inhabit and their place within it, and by extension, how they should feel about it.
The research involved analysis of Trouble and Strife, a radical feminist independent 
magazine which was published in print from 1983-2002. The study focused on the 
period from 1983-1991, beginning when the magazine commenced publication and 
ending just before the start of the 'third wave' of feminism. It examined radical 
feminist writings about topics relating to medical and psychiatric health and well-
being, which were intensely debated topics in radical feminism at the time as well as
a significant area of division between radical feminism and other strands of the 
Women's Liberation Movement. These roiling debates raised deep emotional 
relationships as well as fractures and fault lines, and were therefore a vivid lens 
through which to see the movement's emotional workings.
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The research found that relationships with different groups were at the core of the 
movement's emotion culture, and specifically that the character of these relationships 
depended upon the extent to which various individuals and groups were perceived to 
conform to radical feminism's political ideology. Medical and psychiatric practices and 
institutions were seen to be dominated by men and patriarchal thinking, which were 
the most distant possible opposite to radical feminism's political values, making these 
institutions the objects of a range of adverse emotions, including horror, fear, anger, 
and annoyance.
Strands of the Women's Liberation Movement outside of radical feminism drew less 
intense adverse emotions than did men and the institutions they were seen to 
dominate, but they nevertheless engaged in practices and subscribed to ideological 
tenets which were incompatible with radical feminism's own internal culture. 
Consequently, radical feminists maintained a relationship of antipathy toward these 
other strands of the women's movement, retaining an inclination to disagreement, 
rejection, and dislike which permeated their emotions toward them.
Finally, within radical feminism itself, participants in the movement sustained 
relationships of strong affinity. Radical feminists alone were seen to participate in the 
ideology and approach to women's liberation that radical feminists favoured, and their 
favourable emotions were therefore reserved for one another. That affinity was highly 
valued, and when it was breached, the reaction was immediate and strong, and 
participants in the movement censured violators of their intra-group affinity in order to
reject the violation and re-establish the affinity which had been undermined.
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At the time of this writing, it is 2018. Feminism is having a moment, and there is
some  disjointed  but  audible  talk  of  the  highly  visible  ongoing  surge  in  feminist
activism  and  discourse  proliferation  being  constitutive  of  a  'fourth  wave'  of
feminism.  As  is  always  the  case  during  a  feminist  'wave'  (and  between  them),
feminist  movements  are  lively,  energetic,  zealous,  and  a  formidable  threat  to
patriarchal complacency. As is also always true of feminisms, sub-strands within the
broad  and  never-unitary  movement  dubiously  swept  under  the  singular  banner
'feminism'  are  differentiated,  diverse,  internally  contradictory,  ambivalent,  and
sometimes fraught with heated disputes.  The prevailing narrative of  the 'second
wave', which saw its UK emergence in the 1970s, is that it eventually became too
deeply fractured by 'identity politics' to be sustained. Differences between women
and the challenges of uniting women under a single liberation movement across the
chasms of differences of positionality and experience bore more weight than the
movement could bear, and it disintegrated.
That narration has come under some scrutiny, and this thesis will endeavour
to contribute to the current outgrowth of historical re-evaluations of 20th century
feminisms. Problematic though the generally accepted narrative is, however, it  is
difficult to dispute that feminist movements do struggle with division, strife, and
controversy, and those divisions tend to amplify over time rather than recede. The
current surge in feminist activity shows a great deal of promise for meaningful social
change, but it also reflects patterns of conflict and misunderstanding which have
plagued feminism in the past, even if the generally accepted historical account of
that  process has been overly simplistic.  This  research aims to generate a  better
understanding of one feminist movement - radical feminism – at a crucial juncture in
its past, but my reason for undertaking the work is about feminism's present. This
research proceeds from questions about how feminism is shaped by feminists' own
historical  understandings  of  our  politics:  How  might  feminism  be  different  if
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feminists  across  different  feminist  movements  had  a  better,  deeper,  more
historically-rooted understanding of  feminist  liberation struggles? How might  the
relationships  between  different  feminist  movements  be  more  productive,
cooperative, and constructively critical  if  the ideologies and emotions of feminist
movements as they exist in the present were deeply, vividly, and richly understood
as products of their particular historical locations and developmental trajectories?
Though  these  questions  may  seem  to  skew  uncomfortably  near  a  plea  for
consonance and the cultivation of a 'happy sisterhood' which feminists have long
known to be untenable, this is not the intention here. Rather, I pose these questions
because any problem, including inter-feminism strife which siphons away energy
that could be better placed elsewhere, must first be understood if there is to be any
hope of  solving it.  While the solution here is  unlikely to come in the form of  a
blissful  family  of  universal  feminism,  deeper  inter-feminist  understanding  may
create greater space for feminists to work strategically  with our differences rather
than against them toward the collective aim of unravelling patriarchal hegemony.
It  has  never  been  a  secret  to  feminists  that  politics  are  emotional.  The
suffragist activists of the 'first wave' faced the anger of men in their own homes as
well  as  that  of  the  state,  and  exhibited  what  were  then,  and  still  largely  are,
considered quite unladylike emotions in their collective actions and agitations for
change. Emotionally intense divisions in the movement around questions of race
and slavery abolition were a prescient forecast of similarly heated feminist fractures
to come later, providing a clue to a fundamental aspect of the inner lives of feminist
movements which is at the heart of the findings of my research: that the emotions
of feminist movements are about relationships. Scholars of feminism have always
given  a  great  deal  of  attention  to  the  various  relationships  that  women  must
navigate,  because  relationships  are  where  the  power  dynamics  which  shape
women's lived realities are located. Women struggle through relationships with the
state, with family and partners (who, in times past, were effectively their owners
and keepers), with children and dependents, with non-state institutions, same-sex
and different-sex lovers, friends, and cutting across all of these, each other.
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Interestingly, however, the emotional lives of feminist  movements have not
received a great deal of scholarly attention. The emotions of feminist  movements
qua social movement call for further exploration. Feminist emotions have tended to
be explored  in  a  more general  way  which does  not  take  the  distinct  emotional
interiors of individual feminist sub-movements as a point of inquiry. Largely for this
reason, it did not occur to me at the outset of this work on radical feminism to look
at emotion, a focus which would come later. The earliest iteration of my research
project was not about emotion at all, but was instead intended to be an exploration
of  the  historical  origins  of  anti-transgender  thought in  radical  feminism  (an
idealogical  anomoly  which  substantially  distinguishes  it  from  other  feminist
movements). It was only by reading historical radical feminist literature, rife as it is
with emotion and layered thick with webs of relationships, that it became clear that
any  endeavour  to  understand  the  collective  ideologies  of  feminist  movements
required  a  specific  exploration  of  their  collective  emotions;  those  collective
emotions needed to be examined not only as emergent from common experiences
of womanhood, but of shared uptake of distinct narratives, meanings, and cultural
interpretations which pervade each sub-strand of feminism. My early explorations
of  radical  feminist  literature  revealed  that  the  movement's  emotions  were  not
merely the emotions of womanhood which had been dropped into a movement
called  'radical  feminism'  –  instead,  people  with  emotive  lived  experiences  of
womanhood chose radical feminism from amongst the other feminist movements
available because it  resonated with their  thinking and feeling in a  way that  the
others did not.
This project aims to answer one principal research question: What was the
collective emotion culture of British radical feminism in the 1980s? The question is
deliberately broad, allowing for all aspects of the emotional life of the movement to
emerge. It is also intended to take a holistic view of the emotions of the movement,
examining how emotions work in radical feminism in general, rather than how a
specific emotion or emotional dynamic manifests or operates. These sorts of holistic
studies  of  the  emotion  cultures  of  social  movements  have  only  rarely  been
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undertaken (though sometimes have been, e.g. Gould, 2009; Holmes, 2000), with
social  movement  emotions  research  more  often  taking  a  narrower  focus.  The
typically  more  targeted  frames  of  research  on  social  movement  emotions  have
enabled  scholars  to  generate  a  powerful  conceptual  toolkit  for  explaining  how
emotions move, and are moved by, politics and social movements. Recognising that
social movements necessarily involve both emotion and strategic decision making
(Ruiz-Junco, 2013), this body of work has surfaced the interplay between the two,
showing  how  movement  participants  use emotions  to  do  the  work  of  creating
political change. This literature is reflective of the historical trajectory of the subfield
of  social  movement  studies,  which  struggled  with  overly-emotional  accounts  of
social movement action and then moved to overly-cognitive ones, before eventually
uniting  the  two.  Much  of  the  sociology  of  emotions  and  social  movements
consequently examines the dynamic interplay between social  movement strategy
and emotion, being careful not to push either out of the frame.
An area that the subfield consequently leaves under-explored is the more
organic and less instrumental lens on social movement emotions. Social movement
actors do the work that  they do,  including emotional  work,  in  order to achieve
political  results,  but  that  is  not  the  only  reason.  They  are  also  complex  human
subjects embedded in messy arrays of relationships, historical  events,  structures,
cultures and subcultures, and communities, each generating distinct 'structures of
feeling' (Williams, 2013[1969]). The substantial focus on emotional strategies and
opportunities in the field of social movement emotions, shaped by the field's own
genealogy, has led to less exploration of social movement participation as a way of
being – an identity first and an approach to organised strategic action second. I do
not  propose  that  it  may be  a  mistake  to  research  the  emotions  of  movements
through the lens of strategic action, and as a vast body of work in this area has
shown, studies of this type yield highly productive analytic results. Rather, I aim to
contribute to an expansion of the borders of this subfield, exploring the way that
engaging with the social world as a radical feminist might shape the movement’s
emotion  culture,  even  independently  of  questions  of  social  movement  strategic
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action.
The research was always intended to intervene in the problematic discussed
above  –  that  of  helping  feminists  placed  in  different  sub-movements  to  better
understand one other's perspectives – but it later became about how to do this by
better understanding the emergence of those perspectives through the emotional
lives of movements in their particular historical locations. This is another aspect of
the  emotions  of  feminisms  that  can  benefit  from  further  sociological  attention.
Identity,  experience,  and positionality  have been central  to  research on feminist
ideology  and  culture,  and  while  historical  specificity  is  always  a  relevant
consideration, it tends to be placed in the background. This research is a historical
study, predicated on the observation that we are better equipped to understand the
dynamics of the present moment if we first figure out how we got here. Its lens
foregrounds the local and specific, digging narrowly but deeply into a small cross-
section of  the expansive  life  of  British  radical  feminism in  order  to unearth the
shaping of the movement's development as it was anchored in the many-layered,
local, and specific conditions with which radical feminists themselves would have
grappled as  they constructed their  collective  movement culture.  Moving beyond
acknowledging the relevance of socio-historical context, the research is about the
history of the movement itself, with a view to using the findings as a tool to better
understand present-day radical feminism only afterward.
There  is  some  scope  for  questioning  to  what  movement  and  associated
ideology the label  'radical  feminism'  refers.  In  addition to being spread across a
range  of  differing  local  contexts,  the  movement  included  differing  ideological
strands. What unites them is the premise that the oppression of women is primary
and cross-cuts all other axes of difference (Millett, 2000[1969]; McNeill, 1996: 53).
However, under the umbrella of that unifying claim, radical feminists have differed
with respect to what they see as the appropriate strategies for achieving women's
liberation,  and  what  those  strategic  preferences  imply  about  how  women's
oppression actually operates. (There is also a long-running assumption that radical
feminism is a relic of the 'second wave' period of the 1960s and '70s, though this
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has been sufficiently well refuted that I will not elaborate that debate here – see,
e.g., Mackay, 2015). The two broad camps into which radical feminism is generally
seen as having divided are radical libertarian feminism and radical cultural feminism.
Radical libertarian feminism held that masculinity and femininity are socially
and culturally  constructed,  and that  these arbitrary  divisions  between male  and
female  'natures'  ought  to  be  eschewed;  women  ought  instead  to  combine
characteristics and behaviours culturally coded masculine or feminine as they saw fit
(Millet, 2000[1969]) and women's oppression through reproductive service to men
and  patriarchal  society  ought  to  be  entirely  eradicated  (Firestone,  2015[1970]).
Alternatively,  cultural  approaches  to  radical  feminism held  that  there  was  some
merit to the idea of femininity or an essence of womanhood (though perhaps not to
the word femininity), and that women's essence was superior to masculinity (Daly,
1979). Rather than being inherently oppressive, the embodied experience of being a
woman was seen as having been made oppressive through men's violent control of
it (Rich, 1986[1976]). As I argue in the chapters that follow, a strong presence in
radical feminism as a whole was ambivalence, and ultimately this stark typology of
libertarian  versus  cultural  radical  feminism  is  difficult  to  rely  upon  empirically.
Trouble and Strife contains clear influences of both, and some of the negotiations
between authors  and  readers  (through  letters  to  the  editorial  collective)  reflect
efforts to come to a radical feminist consensus which do not bear out this partisan
binary. I wish to highlight, therefore, that though 'radical feminism' is represented
monolithically throughout the thesis, its representation as either unitary or divided
into  clear  ideological  camps  would  be  equally  dubious,  and  my  intention  is  to
illustrate  the complexity,  ambiguity,  and active negotiation that  necessarily  gives
shape to a movement's historical development.
The history of radical feminism is long, reaching back roughly as far as the
onset of the 'second wave' Women's Liberation Movement itself around 1970. Each
period of the movement's history has contributed to its development in particular
ways, and though each merits study in its own right, there was one time period in
particular  that recommended itself  for the purpose of addressing the underlying
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objective of the research in helping other types of contemporary feminists to better
understand  it:  the  1980s.  The  1970s  saw  the  rapid  growth  of  the  Women’s
Liberation  Movement  as  a  whole  and  its  early  fracturings.  The  postmodernism-
informed  'third  wave'  emerged  in  the  early  1990s,  unsettling  many  of  the
assumptions, premises, and social categories that structured feminist thought and
formed the logic of Women's Liberation Movement mobilisations and campaigns up
to that point. Between these two decades lay the 1980s, a period during which the
neoliberal  epoch took  hold and dramatically  transformed public  institutions  and
their underlying ideological logics. It was during the 1980s that the postmodern turn
took shape and gained traction, and the feverish radical social movement activity of
the 1970s largely gave way to still-consequential but less flashy forms of political
organising as the activists of the 1970s grew up, established careers, raised children,
and  became  preoccupied  with  the  immediacy  of  the  local  and  specific  policy
changes that the turn to neoliberal individualism had brought.
One  of  radical  feminism's  most  striking  characteristics  is  its  ideological
continuity, which somehow made it from the 1970s across the bridge of the 1980s
and  into  the  1990s  and  beyond  with  a  politics  which  demonstrates  remarkable
resilience.  The grip of neoliberal  individualism and postmodernism have radically
altered the social  and cultural landscape since their onset in the 1980s and '90s
respectively, but radical feminist thought has proven overwhelmingly impervious to
the influence of  these paradigm shifts.  The movement's  internal  culture when it
entered the 1990s, whatever its attributes, was of ironclad construction. That radical
feminists had built a culture that has withstood the dramatic shifts in its context
raises questions about what exactly it was that the movement had built, and that is
an underlying question which the findings of this thesis help to answer. Following in
the long-established sociological tradition of investigating that which appears not
quite as one might expect to find it, the project explores radical feminism's emotion
culture at the pivotal moment of the 1980s, when it shored up its defences against
the significant ideological turns of that decade and reinforced itself sufficiently well
to withstand the pull of the still further changes to come in the 1990s and after.
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Radical feminists, like other strands of the 'second wave' WLM, subscribed to
the view that 'the personal is political', and this was reflected in the political gaze
that they turned upon every aspect of their world and lives. This research focuses
specifically on one general area of the movement's thought which had raised some
of  the  most  ideologically  and  emotionally  complex  debates  and  textures  within
radical  feminism  and  between  the  movement  and  its  context:  medical  and
psychiatric  health  care.  The  research  employs  literary  ethnography,  examining
radical feminist writings in the flagship British radical feminist magazine Trouble and
Strife concerned with topics  in  this  area.  Trouble and Strife served as  a  sort  of
textual  home  for  the  movement,  and  the  nuanced  debates  and  multifaceted
emotions  that  surrounded  radical  feminists'  engagements  with  their  context
through their  engagements  with  medical  and psychiatric  care  were  unpacked in
illuminating detail in the magazine's pages.
The ensuing chapters draw upon a range of concepts and terms, some of
which will be explored in some depth. At the outset, there are some key issues of
terminology to note. The most significant concept in the thesis is 'emotion', which is
explored in chapter 2. By way of providing here some idea of how the thesis will use
the  concept  of  emotion,  I  draw  principally  on  theorisations  of  emotions  as
relational,  bearing out  the foundational  premise  of  the field  of  the sociology of
emotions  itself:  that  emotions  are  social,  and  that  they  can  therefore  only  be
understood through how they are constituted in and through social relations. Like
others who see emotions as relational (e.g., Ahmed, 2014[2004]; Burkitt, 2014a), I
recognise the significance of the bodily, the affective, the cognitive, and the socio-
cultural in the ‘complexes’ (Burkitt, 2014b) that comprise emotions. It is beyond the
scope of  this  thesis  to  explore  in  depth  all  of  these dimensions,  but  by  way of
introduction, this project takes as its emphasis the processes by which emotions
become collective, tied to social structures and cultural meanings, and constituted
in the relations between actors and their  contexts.  Where the term ‘emotion’ is
used, it refers to emotions as relational.
The complex emotions at issue in this research are those of British radical
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feminism, a sub-strand of the ‘second wave’ Women’s Liberation Movement (WLM).
In  the  interest  of  brevity  I  will  refer  to  it  simply  as  ‘radical  feminism’  or  ‘the
movement’, but it should be understood that this always refers to the British radical
feminist  movement unless  otherwise  specified (there is  a  case  to be made that
there may be significant commonality of this movement across other contexts, but
further  research  is  needed  to  explore  this  possibility).  I  will  also  refer  to  the
movement in the past tense,  and though its past extends farther back than the
1980s and continues past that period and up to the present, all references in this
thesis to radical feminism’s past refer to the period covered by the research unless a
different one is specified. I also regularly refer to the time period covered by this
study as ‘the 1980s’, though the dataset begins from 1983 and ends at 1991. By
terming  this  period  simply  ‘the  1980s’,  I  aim  to  acknowledge  that  the  defining
attributes of decades tend to take on the character of the ‘late and long’, taking a bit
of time to take shape after their onset and a bit to wrap up after their conclusion
(the way that researchers bracket periods of time are, in any case, always open to
interrogation and somewhat unduly drawn to the consonance of round numbers).
The key attributes of the decade of the ‘80s that I  highlight for purposes of this
research bled out of its edges, but are nevertheless strongly associated with it: the
establishment  of  the  Thatcherite  neoliberal  paradigm,  the  ‘gap’  between  the
‘second wave’ surge of the 1970s and the ‘third wave’ of the 1990s, the cultural turn
in British feminism, and the transition from modernist feminist political lenses that
largely dominated the 1970s to the postmodern turn in the early 1990s.
The research uses text-based data, but what constitutes ‘text’ is a wide area
of exploration unto itself. I use the term ‘text’ to refer in a general way to hard copy
material,  including words,  images,  and where relevant,  material  aspects  such as
paper, ink, and binding. Text can also include digital materials (and in fact some of
the  data  collection  for  this  project  was  done  by  this  means,  an  issue  which  is
explored in chapter 3), but I do not use the term to incorporate the digital except
where specified in discussions of methodology. There are meaningful specificities to
the production, circulation, and consumption of digital content which this historical
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research does not explore. The later-emerging digital dimension notwithstanding,
Trouble and Strife was originally published and read in hard copy format, and it is
the formation of the movement’s collective emotion culture through that hard-copy
text which this research examines (leaving the intriguing question of how it might
have been different if formed in the digital age for another project). Additionally,
references to ‘the text’ shall refer to the text of Trouble and Strife. There is a further
distinction to be made with respect to the textual genre of Trouble and Strife. The
periodical publications of the ‘second wave’ are sometimes referred to as journals,
though  they  included  magazines,  broadsheet-style  newspapers,  and  more
academically-oriented journals. Because my research is about how radical feminists
themselves constructed their emotion culture in and through  Trouble and Strife, I
have aimed to take on board their own understanding of what it was. The editorial
collective  referred  to  it  as  a  magazine,  so  I  have  adopted  this  characterisation;
debates  about  what  might  constitute  the difference between a  magazine and a
journal are not explored here.
Within the topical  frame of  the research are multiple components of the
broad  area  of  medical  and  psychiatric  health,  care,  and  well-being.  As  will  be
explored throughout this thesis, radical feminists saw physiological and psychiatric
health care as dominated by men and patriarchal ideology, and recognised a long
history of men using these ostensibly caring frameworks, institutions, and practices
to control and oppress women. Though a visit to a general practice doctor might be
seen as quite unrelated to participating in group therapy, the radical feminist lens
saw these as linked at a fundamental political level, and it is therefore helpful to
have a term to unite the entire structure of these care and well-being regimes. I
have  termed these ‘male-dominated regimes of  care’  (or  ‘MDRCs’),  denoting  all
institutions,  practices,  theoretical  frameworks,  and  practitioners  involved  in  the
infrastructure of medical and psychiatric research and practice. This term is used
where it is necessary to denote the broad patriarchal caring regime in general, and
the term is deliberately designed to incorporate radical feminists’ own lens on these
regimes as  inherently male-dominated (even where a particular  practitioner was
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female). 
It is sometimes necessary to refer to specific areas falling under this broad
umbrella as well. I term ‘medical care’ or ‘physiological medical/health care’ those
aspects which refer to general practice, gynaecology, and other areas of medicine
concerned with the bodily rather than the psychic. Where the psychic is concerned, I
will  generally  refer  to  psychoanalysis.  There  is  a  distinction  to  be  made  here
between psychoanalysis (the theoretical framework) and psychotherapy (or simply
‘therapy’, both referring to the clinical practice associated with the psychoanalytic
framework).  Radical  feminists  saw the practice  of  psychotherapy  as  problematic
largely (though not exclusively) because it was informed by a framework which they
contended had patriarchal assumptions, and sometimes overt misogyny, embedded
into  its  foundations.  I  refer  to  ‘psychoanalysis’  where  the  entirety  of  the
psychoanalytically-informed  lens  and  its  implementation  in  clinical  practice  is  at
issue. I refer to ‘psychotherapy’ or ‘therapy’ only where it is specifically the clinical
or practical dimension that is of concern.
As has been mentioned above, this research takes as one of its foundational
assumptions  the  idea  that  social  movements  are  founded  in  ideologies.  For
immediate purposes, I take ideology to mean frame (what is considered pertinent
and how those things ought to be understood) plus values (normative evaluations of
the consequences  of  the frame,  and how this  relates  to  a  broader  moral  logic)
(Ferree and Merrill, 2000: 458-59). Much of the process of producing, negotiating,
contesting,  and  (re)producing  radical  feminism's  emotion  culture  involved
questioning  its  frames  and  their  ideological  consequences.  The  radical  feminist
ideological  lens  to  which  I  frequently  allude  throughout  chapters  4,  5,  and  6
incorporates the movement's core ideological tenets, which were taken to be the
measure of 'good' radical feminist politics, and against which disputed norms and
claims were therefore measured. Discussions of framing, peppered throughout the
analysis, refer to places within the text of Trouble and Strife where the movement's
existing  frame  was  being  either  invoked  or  contested,  drawing  upon  collective
normative values embedded in the movement's ideology and sometimes suggesting
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that the frame might need to be altered in order to better fit with those values.
The  thesis  proceeds  in  a  total  of  seven chapters.  Chapter  2  provides  an
overview and discussion of the literatures in which this research is situated. The
project  is  situated  within  the  literature  on  emotions  in  social  movements,  and
specifically within work on emotion cultures of movements. The relational view of
emotion which I advocate has not had significant traction thus far in the study of
social  movements,  nor has  the concept of  emotion culture been widely used in
research on movements. Chapter 2 will explore the potentials for bringing these two
concepts into more application in the study of movement emotions. I argue that in
addition to possible benefits of employing these concepts in future research, there
is scope for re-reading the existing literature through the analytic lenses of relational
emotion and emotion culture, and though more research can and should be done to
build upon this, when viewed through a different lens, much of this work can be
seen to have been (inadvertently) done already.
The research methodology will  be covered in chapter 3. This incorporates
discussions  of  the  feminist  approach  employed  in  the  research,  the  literary
ethnographic  approach  used,  the  research  design,  archival  data  collection,  and
sampling,  and  the  analysis  of  the  data.  Literary  ethnography  is  a  surprisingly
uncommonly used method for the study of texts, but I argue that it is particularly
beneficial for research on emotions. Building on a small body of existing work on
this  method,  I  suggest that the epistemic assumptions which necessarily  go into
studying emotions in texts using literary ethnography are a natural complement to a
feminist epistemology, making this method ideal for feminist research on emotions
using textual data.
The thesis does not incorporate a chapter dedicated specifically to 'theory'
;  theory  on  emotions  is  discussed  in  chapter  2,  and  issues  of  text  and
epistemology are explored in chapter 3. The mid-range nature of emotion theory
has been reflected in the way this literature has been constructed, with emotion
theory  nearly  always  emerging  from  empirical  research.  Likewise,  issues  of
epistemology are inextricably intertwined with questions around the reading and
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interpretation of text. Theoretical questions have therefore been explored in these
two chapters.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 expound the analysis. They are divided into the three
key  relationships  in  radical  feminism's  emotion  culture.  Chapter  4  explores  the
movement's relationship with men, patriarchy, and the male-dominated institutions
and paradigms of medical and psychiatric care. Chapter 5 examines radical feminists'
engagements with other strands of the Women's Liberation Movement, surfacing
the  background  emotions  that  pervaded  these  challenging  relationships.  Finally,
chapter 6 delves into the relationships within radical feminism itself, highlighting the
distinctiveness of the emotional enclave of the movement and elaborating how it
was maintained, challenged, and ultimately repaired and reinforced.
There are two technical matters of note regarding extracts from the text of
Trouble  and  Strife.  Firstly,  a  number  of  the  extracts  include  quotations  within
quotations.  The text of  Trouble and Strife itself  was inconsistent with respect to
where  it  used  single  quotation  marks  and  where  double  ones,  in  some  cases
alternating between them within a single piece and without apparent reason. In the
interest of consistency, I use single quotes to indicate my quotations from the data,
and place any quotations within those extracts in double marks. It should be noted,
therefore, that this is one possible incongruity between how the original text of the
magazine appears and how I have represented it. Additionally, all extracts are cited
with the issue number of the magazine included. I have done this to give the reader
a  sense  of  the  order  in  which  different  pieces  and discussions  appeared in  the
magazine – quoting with the date only would obscure the ordering, because there
were multiple issues per year.
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Chapter 2
The Sociology of Emotions in Social Movements
2.1
Introduction
The sociology of emotions is considered a comparatively young subfield, but
its genealogy began with classical sociology. Emotions have only in roughly the past
50  years  become  an  overt  sociological  topic  in  their  own  right,  despite  the
discipline’s  reliance on  them for  some of  the early  accounts  of  the  relationship
between the individual  and the social.  Émile Durkheim’s work on the emotional
power  of  religious  ritual  (1995[1912])  and  the  social  determinants  of  suicide
(2002[1897]),  Karl  Marx’s  (1959[1844])  understanding  of  the  misery  of  workers
alienated from the products of their labour1, Georg Simmel’s (2002[1903]) account
of the blasé relations between residents of densely populated urban centres, and
Norbert Elias’s (2000[1939]) theory of the civilising process all elucidated the central
place  of  emotion  in  mediating  social  relations  and  giving  rise  to  social  actors’
experiences  of  and  responses  to  being  embedded  in  particular  types  of  social
structures  and  cultural  mileux.  However,  emotion  was  rather  paradoxically  left
behind  when  later  sociologists  picked  up  the  threads  laid  down  by  these
foundational  thinkers,  and emotion  was relegated  to  background noise  in  social
theory. Ironically, these forebears of the sociology of emotions would prove to have
been more successful at synthesising thought and feeling in their implied accounts
1
Marx’s alienation is an oft-cited example of emotion theory in classical sociology, but it is worth 
noting that alienation in Marx’s understanding was concerned with the nature of the relationship 
between workers and the products of their labour, rather than with a feeling of alienation in the 
social actor’s emotional life. That version of alienation would emerge later from Arlie 
Hochschild’s  (1983) analysis of the condition of workers under capitalism through alienated 
emotional labour. Though both Marx and Hochschild term this condition ‘alienation’ and link it to
capitalism and labour, what they each mean by ‘alienation’ differs.
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of the social subject than sociologists (including social movement scholars) would
come to be again for many decades.
The sociology of social movements has had a fluctuating relationship with
emotions  as  an  analytic  lens,  and  the  body  of  work  which  now  dominates
understandings of the place of emotions in movements has emerged only in recent
decades.  In  order  to  better  understand  what  currently  prevailing  theory  on
emotions in movements does, it is beneficial to have a clear view of the trajectory
by which the field has arrived at its present point.  Accordingly,  this chapter will
divide into three sections, first overviewing the history of the subfield of emotions in
social movements before laying out the work that this body of scholarship has come
to do. Section 2.2 will briefly overview the history of the study of emotions in social
movements, tracing how the study of movements has oscillated in the extent to
which it has engaged questions of emotion (and the alternative once taken to be
emotion’s opposite, instrumental rationality). After having moved through a series
of shifts in both its philosophical foundations and its mid-range theory, research on
emotions in movements has now landed decidedly in a constructivist ontology, and
section 2.3 will briefly discuss constructivism’s benefits for this field of study. The
chapter will then focus on the recent decades during which the body of research on
emotions and social movements as we now know it emerged, exploring two primary
explanatory functions of this area of scholarship: (1) social movement phases and
(2) emotion work2 (Hochschild, 1979). Section 2.4 will discuss research on emotions
in  the  progressive  phases  of  social  movements.  This  work  explores  the  role  of
emotion  in  the  emergence,  mobilisation,  sustenance,  attrition,  and  abeyance  of
movements. Intertwined with this phasing-oriented research is another aspect of
the field, which focuses on the emotion work done by and within movements. This
research will  be examined in section 2.5, showing how emotion work of various
2 ‘Emotion work’ is the active, reflexive effort to change what one feels in order to experience 
emotions that better conform to what is understood to be expected or appropriate in a given 
situation. The term derives from Arlie R. Hochschild’s (1979; 1983) dramaturgical account of 
emotions, which drew on Erving Goffman’s  (1973[1956]) conception of performative social 
interaction. Though some of the foundational assumptions of dramaturgical accounts of emotion 
have come under critique, the perspective remains popular in the study of emotions in social 
movements – some of the problematic conceptual issues at play will be explored in the sections 
that follow.
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types is at the heart of research on emotions in movements as we now recognise it.
As a component of and in relation to this emotion work perspective, section 2.5 also
explores  the relatively  small  body of  research on the emotion cultures  of  social
movements.  Though  not  a  great  deal  of  research  on  emotions  and  social
movements names emotion culture as its explanatory concept, I argue that emotion
culture is a much stronger presence in the literature on emotions in movements
than the infrequent appearance of the term might suggest. Looking for emotion
culture in research on emotions in movements which does not invoke the concept
explicitly,  it  can  be  seen  that  a  substantial  amount  of  existing  research  in  this
subfield  contributes  to  understandings  of  the  emotion  cultures  of  social
movements. It is to this considerable, but largely hidden, strand of scholarship that
my research contributes.
2.2
Emotions in the Sociology of Social Movements
The  study  of  social  movements  has  moved  through  three  fairly  distinct
phases. In its early iteration, the field was dominated by a crowd psychology model,
viewing protest movements (a term often elided with social  movements – I  will
return to this point below) as feverish outgrowths of intoxicating collective feeling.
Drawing  from  Durkheim’s  (1995[1912])  concept  of  collective  effervescence,  it
assumed that protest movement participants lost their ability to think and reason as
they were swept up in the emotional intensity (what we would now theorise as
affect) of a protest event. In addition to an obvious understatement of social actors’
reflexive  capacities,  such  a  model  has  been used to justify  coercive  and violent
policing aimed at bringing unruly protesters under control by any means necessary,
a consequence which has only recently begun to be rectified (see Gorringe et al,
2012). Underlying this understanding of social movement actions is the culturally
ubiquitous cultural precept that emotions are inherently irrational (Burkitt, 2014a:
44;  Ahmed,  2014[2004]):  3;  Lyman,  2004:  134-5;  Barbalet,  2001:  29-32).  The
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denigration  of  emotion  as  inferior  and  as  the  modus  operandi of  the  socially
subjugated  is  traceable  as  far  back  as  Hellenic  Greece  (Ost,  2004:  231),  and  it
continues to reverberate through social life and to haunt sociological scholarship. An
awareness emerged amongst sociologists of social movements that characterising
movement  participants  as  emotional  was  politically  problematic  as  well  as
conceptually  flawed,  and  scholars  turned  their  interests  to  other  ways  of
understanding protest.
The subfield then turned away from emotion altogether and saw movement
participants as being purely rational actors (Ruiz-Junco, 2013: 45-6). All protest and
movement actions, even where they appeared intensely emotional, were taken to
be the product of careful premeditation and rational cost/benefit calculation. When
the  emotionally  heated  social  movements  of  the  1960s  and  ‘70s  emerged,  the
sociology of  social  movements was permeated by positivism and unequipped to
theorise  them,  having  marginalised  the  necessary  constructivist  and  culturally-
oriented lenses (Ost, 2004: 233). Theorists during the middle of the 20th century had
recognised movement participants’  careful  attention to their  social  contexts  and
abilities  to  make  strategic  decisions  on  the  basis  of  what  effects  particular
approaches to collective  action  might  have,  but  in  so  doing,  had  forgotten that
feeling  did  not  stop  wherever  thinking  began.  Strategy  and  instrumentality  are
essential to theorising social movements (Jasper, 2004), but movement participants
are not reducible to their capacity for strategic calculations (Gould, 2002: 197). In
order  to  robustly  theorise  social  movements,  scholars  must  account  for  both
emotion and strategic decision-making (Jasper, 1998: 421).
The 1980s and ‘90s saw the cultural turn in the social sciences, and the study
of social movements began to take culture and the self more seriously; the cognitive
view of the interior of the self, however, persisted (Goodwin et al, 2000). Rumbling
under the surface of the sociology of social movements through the 1990s was the
growing impression that emotions needed to be returned to the analytic fold, and
research began to be done to theorise the way that  emotions and instrumental
rationality were used in tandem by social movement participants. This body of work
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began to appear in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and it is from that point to the
present that most of the research in this area has emerged. A vast array of different
types of movements have been studied, generating an expansive and productive
toolkit of concepts for explaining how emotions work in movements. Though there
are many different ways to categorise this research, a productive one is to see it as
divided  into  two  general  categories  (with  much  research  having  a  foot  in  both
camps). One is concerned with the effect of emotions on different phases of social
movements:  the conditions  under which they are able to emerge,  what  enables
them to generate emotional energy and collective action for specific mobilisation
events,  what  keeps  participants  committed  and  involved  in  order  to  sustain
movements over time, how emotions undermine the endurance of movements and
contribute to attrition, and how emotions keep movements smouldering under the
radar  during  periods  of  abeyance.  The  second broad branch addresses  emotion
work: what types of emotion-transforming efforts movement participants engage in
to elicit the emotions from themselves and relevant others (like policy makers or the
general public) needed to achieve movement goals. 
These two areas are substantially intertwined, as the emotion work required
in movements is often concerned with bringing about or advancing different phases
of a movement’s progression. The subfield of emotions in general, and emotions in
movements  in  particular,  is  brimming  over  with  typologies,  taxonomies,  and
categories largely because scholars have attempted to order and organise a body of
knowledge  which  stubbornly  resists  the  linear,  geometric,  and  discrete.  Some
researchers  have  been  left  wondering  whether  it  is  analytically  fruitful  (or
empirically justified) for us to generate myriad taxonomic systems when no two of
them  seem  to  align  (Berezin,  2002:  37),  a  curiosity  which  I  confess  to  sharing.
Different emotions bleed into one another, scholars default to colloquial definitions
of emotion words (Jasper, 2011: 286) and thereby potentially talk past one another
in  the literature,  and participants  in social  movements  remain entangled in vast
arrays  of  networks  and  relationships  which  confound  any  effort  to  isolate  the
emotional  dynamics rooted in movements themselves.  Clumsy and imperfect an
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enterprise though it may be, however, some order must be imposed on the complex
quagmire of emotions in social movements so that it can be talked about. I have
divided  the  scholarship  into  movement  phases  and  emotion  work  because  the
analytic  concepts  that  pertain  to  emotion  work  tend  to  be  different  to  those
concerned  with  movement  stages,  even  if  the  social  process  involved  are
inextricable. It is these two general strands of social movement emotion theory with
which sections 2.4 and 2.5 are concerned.
2.3
The Ontology of Emotions
Debates persist  about  what  precisely an emotion is.  There are a few key
attributes of emotion which define it and distinguish it from related concepts, such
as feeling and affect. Feelings involve physical sensations which can be involved in
emotion,  but  can  also  be  independent  of  emotion  and  concerned  with  other
functions  of  the  body  (such  as  hunger  or  sleepiness).  Emotions  involve  the
interpretation  of  these  feelings  and  the  attribution  of  relational  significance  to
them.
Norman K. Denzin (1984) provided a valuable foundation for this relational account
of emotion by highlighting that a key component of emotion is the feeling subject’s
awareness of and feeling toward the self. It is the self in relation to another, and the
understanding  that  this  signifies  something  about  that  relationship,  that  makes
feeling an emotion. These relations are necessarily always relations of power (even
if  not unequal power),  further highlighting the inevitably relational  in emotion –
how one feels about oneself can only emerge from how one is positioned in terms
of power in relation to others, and vice versa (Kemper, 1990; Heaney, 2011). Ian
Burkitt (2014a) has extended this view of emotions, theorising them as inherently
relational  and recognising that  emotions necessarily  bleed into one another and
involve  complex  entanglements  of  physical  sensations,  meanings  and
interpretations, and the attribution of emotional significance to these. Emotions are
also  understood  to  be  episodic,  having  a  start  and  end  point  and  lasting  a
comparatively short time (von Scheve, 2018: 2), though as I will argue in chapter 5,
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there may be scope to reconsider this component of the definition. 
All of these components of emotion rely upon the union of the embodied
with  the  social  and  the  cultural,  relating  to  how social  actors  are  positioned in
structures and cultures in relation to one another. Proceeding from this observation,
research on emotions in movements is virtually all firmly rooted in a constructivist
ontology, with differences being confined to emphases on culture (e.g., Reger, 2004;
Groves,  1997;  Taylor,  2000)  or  structure  (e.g.,  Whittier,  2001;  Goodwin,  1997;
Guenther, 2009). Where theorising social movement emotions from the perspective
of a realist  ontology is attempted (Mizen,  2015),  it  proceeds from the colloquial
elision  between  subjectivity  and  opinion,  arguing  that  movement  participants’
evaluations of the political  realities that they mobilise against  are objective, and
therefore  not  sullied  by  the  inferior  reliability  of  subjective  assessments.  This
emphasis on the ‘real’ follows the critical realist ontology from which the concept of
the  reflexive  internal  conversation  (Archer,  2003)  derives.  Reflexivity  is  an
indispensable  concept  for  understanding emotions  sociologically  (Holmes,  2010),
and Archer’s and Mizen’s concerns that constructivism minimises the causal (and
political) significance of emotions and reflexivity are not entirely unfounded; while it
does  not  follow  that  emotion’s  status  as  socially  constructed  makes  it  causally
insignificant, in the broader context in which academic knowledge is itself situated,
there  is  a  tendency  to  imbue the  immutably  real  with  greater  import  than  the
‘merely’ constructed. 
The constructivist  ontology,  however,  remains widely  accepted across  the
sociology of emotions (Clarke  et al, 2006) because it allows for the recognition of
the socio-cultural contingency of emotions themselves, as well as the conditions in
which emotions arise (Burkitt,  2014a; Williams, 2013[1961]; Reddy, 2001). This is
not tantamount to a suggestion that in a different sort of social  context,  people
might not have emotions or internal dialogic reflections at all (the implication which
appears to be at the heart of realists’ anxieties). What it does highlight is that social
structures and cultural  mileux shape what  emotions are available to be felt  and
within what social relations those emotions can be experienced – in effect, creating
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emotions  themselves,  not  merely  channelling  already-existing  emotions  into
constructed  structures  and  cultures.  As  the  research  on  emotions  in  social
movements shows, movement participants navigate matrices of social relations and
draw  on  cultural  toolkits  of  available  emotions  in  order  to  enable  their  own
collective actions, to transform their ways of relating emotionally to their realities,
and  to  influence  outsiders’  perceptions  of  the  political  issues  which  their
movements are meant to transform. The constructivist account of emotions enables
scholars to capture those processes.
2.4
Social Movement Through the Lens of Time: Emotions & Movement Phases
Different social movements run for different durations, with some emerging
seemingly unexpectedly, exhibiting significant activity, and then fading as quickly as
they appeared, while others subsist over many decades. There are some general
consistencies  in  the  way that  emotion  affects  the  phases  of  social  movements,
however,  and  which  enable  scholars  to  discern  the  emotional  conditions  of
possibility  for  a  movement  to  form,  mobilise,  persist,  and  ultimately  decline.
Particular  emotions  are  understood  to  be  generative  of  collective  action  (anger
features prominently here, but other emotions have come to be taken increasingly
seriously  as  sources  of  mobilisation),  while  others  lead  movements  to  lose
momentum and erode (like grief and alienation).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, anger is the emotion most commonly associated with
social movement activity, in spite of appearances of its inverse, joy, in some parts of
the  literature  (see,  e.g.,  Wettergren,  2009).  In  addition  to  common-sense
associations  between  social  movements  and  public  displays  of  anger  at  well-
publicised public protest demonstrations, social movements are intended to redress
grievances. Movement formation and mobilisation, therefore, rely upon anger and
discontentment3. The anger of oppressed and disadvantaged groups performs the
3 These emotions are sometimes termed ‘negative emotions’. The characterisation of some 
emotions as negative and others as positive does resonate with common-sense usage and 
emotional experience, but the distinction is potentially problematic, particularly within a literature
which substantially argues that emotions like anger and disaffection can be used to create a more 
just world. Whether any given instance of anger is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ is itself an evaluation 
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essential  function  of  bringing  to  light  injustices  which  those  in  more  privileged
positions might not otherwise be aware of at all (Lyman, 2004), and it is used by
movements  as  a  mechanism  of  demanding  accountability  (Holmes,  2004:  224).
There is political value to subjugated groups exhibiting emotion even independently
of to what purpose they put it: anger is generally conceived as the appropriate and
legitimate emotional purview of the powerful, and it becomes an act of resistance in
its  own right  for  the oppressed to lay  a  claim to the legitimate experience and
expression of anger (Flam, 2005: 26; Ost, 2004; Taylor, 1996; Gould, 2002; Hercus,
1999).  For these reasons,  it  serves a particular  function in the early period of  a
movement or a mobilisation (a specific collective action within the longer life of a
social movement) (Sampietro and Ordaz, 2015).
The  findings  of  this  research  have  sometimes  implied  that  particular
emotions are inherently motivating or immobilising, but it has become increasingly
clear  that  what  sort  of  effect  an emotion has  on  social  movement participants’
engagement or attrition depends largely on context. No emotion has meaning in
itself – an emotion emerges and signifies something to the person feeling it because
of  what  they  understand  to  be  arousing  it.  For  social  movement  participants,
inferences  about  the  causal  origins  of  emotional  experiences  are  sensitive  to
context, culture, and relations of power, pointing to the relational nature of emotion
(Burkitt, 2014a; Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005; Goodwin et al, 2000). In order for
grief to be mobilising in one instance and demobilising in another, the social actors
feeling  it  must  have  some  conception  of  what  their  grief  says  about  their
relationship  with  the  world.  That  grief  raises  questions  for  them  about  who  is
causing them to feel it, whether that feeling is one they want to embrace or escape
from,  and what  they ought  to then do about  it.  That  emotions  are not  interior
states, but modes of relationship which are necessarily bound up with narratives,
necessarily rooted in a particular perspective – even where there is consensus that the social 
change generated through anger is desirable, it is easier to see unpleasant emotions through rose 
coloured glasses when viewing them from a place of calm and distance (Holmes, 2004: 224). I 
will refer to what might otherwise be termed negative and positive emotions as adverse and 
favourable, respectively. Though it might seem preferable to eschew the distinction between good 
and bad emotions altogether, research on emotions and movements clearly demonstrates its 
analytic value, showing how movement participants use adverse and favourable emotions to 
divide up the world into allies and adversaries.
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discourse,  and  signification  was  key  to  shaping  the  emotion  culture  of  radical
feminism, and I will return to this in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
2.5
Using Emotions for Social Movement: Emotion Work
Emotions  are  an  invaluable  resource  for  social  movement  activity.  They
enable participants to identify with communities of others who share their political
interests (Hercus, 1999; Polletta and Jasper, 2001), to affectively bond with people
involved  in  their  movement  groups  (Jasper,  1998;  Taylor  and  Rupp,  2002),  to
transform their emotional relationships with themselves and their contexts in ways
which buoy their political values (King, 2006; Groves, 1995; Ryan, 2015), to motivate
and embolden them for action (Gould, 2002; 2009; Kleres and Wettergren, 2017;
Wettergren, 2009; Mizen, 2015; Yang, 2000), and to influence policy makers and the
public in order to achieve their aims (Coe and Schabel, 2011; Cadena-Roa, 2002; von
Scheve et al, 2016). Emotion work can be oriented inward, toward the social actor’s
self or the interior community of the social movement group, or can be directed
outward,  using  emotional  framing  to  persuade  others  to  sympathise  with  the
movement’s  claims  (and  sometimes  to  create  a  public  relations  conundrum  for
powerful elites which compels them toward a desired action).
Social  movements are  a powerful  topical  focus  for  the exploration of  the
concept  of  emotion  work.  Movements  must  engage  in  significant  emotional
reflexivity (King, 2006), evaluating their own emotions and those of relevant others,
and  then  act  upon  them  to  achieve  the  desired  results.  There  are  frequently
disparities between which emotions movement participants or their publics feel and
which ones it would be expedient for them to feel (and express), and the literature
on social movement emotion work consequently draws heavily on Arlie Hochschild’s
dramaturgical  perspective  on emotions.  In  her  wildly  influential  research on the
emotional labour of flight attendants, Hochschild (1983) argues that the job of a
flight attendant requires the expression of warm and conciliating emotions which
the workers with whom she researched often did not actually feel.  The friendly
emotional expression of flight attendants was a component of the experience that
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airlines  sold  to  their  customers,  effectively  commoditising  workers’  emotions.
Positioning this analysis  within a critique of the alienating effects of  paid labour
under  capitalism,  Hochschild  highlights  the  dissonance  between  what  flight
attendants ‘really’ felt and what emotions they were compelled by their employers
to perform. Her work distinguishes between ‘surface acting’ (the performance of
emotions which are not actually felt) and ‘deep acting’ (the endeavour to change
what one actually feels, so that the emotions that must be performed for the job
can be sincerely felt and honestly expressed, mitigating the alienation experienced
when the two are out of sync). She thereby generated two categories of emotion
work:  one  which  pertains  to  emotional  expression  alone  (surface  acting)  and
another capturing work upon feeling itself as well as its expression (deep acting).
Social  movement  scholars  have  rightly  seized  upon  the  traction  of  this
analysis for theorising situations faced by social movement participants (Maney et
al, 2009; Perry, 2002; Reger, 2004), who often have an instrumental need to feel and
express emotions that they do not (yet) feel, or at least do not feel with enough
intensity to meet the demands of their predicament, such as when emotional work
is needed to overcome the fear induced by violent protest scenes (see, e.g., Mizen,
2015; Kleres and Wettergren, 2017; Yang, 2000). However, Hochschild’s framework
hints at a psychological, rather than a sociological, view of the self, indicating that
there are true and false emotions, and accounting for the emotional dissonance felt
in emotional labour by reference to a disjuncture between the two (Wouters, 1989:
97). There is scope to reread the literature on emotion work in movements through
the lens of relational emotion rather than dramaturgy, seeing emotion work as the
transformation of  emotional  relationships rather than as a performance-oriented
exercise (performance, after all, can only be necessitated by the need for particular
types  of  relations  between  self  and  other).  In  the  remainder  of  this  section,  a
significant amount of material framed through dramaturgy will be discussed, but a
possible pivot on this research will also be suggested wherein we can reinterpret
dramaturgical emotional work as work upon relationships. As I will argue in later
chapters, it is this relationship-shaping emotional work that defined the emotion
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culture  of  radical  feminism (and,  I  would contend,  other  movements’  emotional
worlds which have been theorised through dramaturgy).
2.5.A
Working on the Emotions: Emotion Management & Emotional Channelling
Social  movements  are  emotionally  demanding.  They  require  motivation,
energy, commitment, courage, resilience, and passion, all of which can be difficult to
summon and sustain.  Additionally,  emotional  experiences are  shaped by context
and culture, and movement participants consequently often find themselves feeling
emotions which conform to the emotion rules of  the hegemonic culture around
them,  but  do  not  align  with  what  their  counter-hegemonic  values  indicate  they
ought to feel. A significant amount of emotional work happens in social movement
groups to address this disparity, enabling participants to cultivate the emotions that
they need to politically engage. It is obvious, then, why Hochschild’s dramaturgical
theory  is  so  pervasive  in  social  movement  emotions  literature.  Her  distinction
between  emotional  evocation  (arousing  or  inciting  a  desired  emotion  which  is
absent) and emotional suppression (attempting to contain an undesired one) (1979:
561) seems instructive for explaining what is done emotionally within movements.
The emotional work done in movements requires strategies which enable
participants to feel what they need to feel and move away from emotions which
impede  their  activities.  Social  movement  groups  are  pervaded  by  a  range  of
emotions  in  need of  this  sort  of  management,  and  some  of  them are  used  as
mechanisms for managing others. For example, Jochen Kleres and Asa Wettergren
(2017)  describe the use of  some emotions  as  mediators  of  others  in  the global
movement to resist climate change. Participants, they argue, used hope to mediate
fear, preventing fear from becoming immobilising and allowing it to be experienced
as a cue to a threat which demanded an organised response. The cultivation of hope
functioned  to  prevent  fear  from  becoming  too  overwhelming  to  be  used
productively. They also found that love was used to mediate anger, because activists
perceived some anger as productive, but too much as incompatible with the values
and character of their movement. The lineage from earlier social movement studies
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is  clear  here,  with  emotions  being  used  as  tools  by  activists  for  instrumentally
rational objectives.
Emotion  management  can  alternatively  take  a  more  passive  form,  with
prospective movement participants managing their exposure to experiences which
might elicit  emotions that they do not want to experience. In research on social
movement  non-participation,  Norgaard  found  that  people  who  were  not  yet
involved in movements and wanted to avoid feeling spurred to action would elect to
avoid exposure to information which might make them feel pressured to mobilise.
The  prospect  of  feelings  of  guilt,  hopelessness,  or  being  out  of  control  led
movement non-participants to eschew media messages which might rouse these
feelings. By not engaging with ideas that might be emotionally loaded with a moral
imperative  to  take  collective  action,  movement  non-participants  were  able  to
maintain their senses of self as good and righteous people in spite of their inaction.
Likewise, however, the endeavour to cultivate a particular self-identity can
lead to emotion management which drives movement action, and can explain how
activists are able to generate the emotions necessary for staggering acts of self-
sacrifice. Drawing on Hochschild’s emotion management perspective, Guobin Yang
(2000) proposes the concept of ‘emotional achievement’ to explain how activists in
the 1989 Chinese student movement were able to risk and sometimes lose their
lives without being deterred by fear.  When doing movement work becomes not
merely  instrumental,  but  a  form of  emotional  self-actualisation,  even otherwise
overwhelming levels of fear can give way to activists’ desire to have particular ‘self-
feelings’  (Denzin,  1984).  Activists’  emotional  investments  in  their  views  of
themselves,  then,  became means of  managing fear,  making risky and dangerous
collective actions possible.
Though  Hochschild’s  framework  remains  popular,  some  scholars  of
movement emotions have found it limiting. Mary Holmes (2004) argues that the
view of movement participants as performing emotions in conformity to emotional
rules or managing emotions for purposes of performance has some utility, but is
unable to account for feelings of ambivalence and tensions arising when different
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emotion rules come into conflict. Taking a different entry into the idea of emotion
work  than  emotion  management,  Debra  King  (2006)  explores  activists’  use  of
emotional  reflexivity  to  transform their  emotions.  Through research  on  multiple
activist  groups  in  Australia  which  engaged  in  the  practice  of  ‘re-evaluation
counselling’ (a psychoanalytically based approach to reflexive emotional work) King
describes  how  movement  participants  endeavoured to  break  free  of  oppressive
dominant  discourses  which  they  had come to  internalise.  Through re-evaluation
counselling,  activists  were  enabled  to  participate  in  the  emotions  of  their
movements, which ran counter to subjugating discourses.
Though these activists’  engagement with their  emotion work through the
framework of re-evaluation counselling brought psychoanalytic assumptions about
emotions into the practice of emotional reflexivity (an unnecessary approach which
‘second-wave’  feminists  avoided  by  employing  the  more  sociologically-minded
framework of consciousness raising), King’s research highlights that there is space to
re-conceive  dramaturgical  emotion  work  as  movement  participants’  use  of
reflexivity to transform their emotional relationships with themselves, other people,
institutions,  cultures,  and values.  Rather than seeing the emotion work done by
movement  participants  as  the  emotional  evocation  or  suppression  that  the
dramaturgical framework proposes, it can be understood as a wilful endeavour to
transform relationships through feeling. In his research on the British and Spanish
governments’  attempts  to  direct  the  public’s  emotional  responses  to  terrorist
attacks, Ian Burkitt (2005) found that resistance to the government’s authority took
the  form  of  the  subversive  direction  of  anger.  Rather  than  cooperating  with
governments’ framings, which encouraged anger toward the attackers, members of
the public directed their anger at government elites who had failed to keep London
and Madrid safe. Burkitt argues that the ‘potential revolutionary power of emotion
does  not  stem from its  irrationality,  but  rather  from  its  “relational  logic”  which
follows the pattern of people’s attachments to others, to symbols and ideals.’ (2005:
693).  Though  dramaturgical  accounts  recognise  the  rationality  of  emotion,  they
remain implicitly  rooted in the idea of  emotions being internal  states which are
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projected outward unidirectionally. The relational account captures what emotional
reflexivity  actually  entails,  revealing that  emotion work  is  not  about  summoning
emotions from nowhere. Rather, it is a matter of rethinking relationships with the
self, with particular other people, with institutions or collectives, and with cultures,
ideals, and values – a rethinking which leads to transformed feeling.
In spite of its wide popularity, some scholars of emotions in movements have
cast doubt on some of Hochschild’s claims. Even where the dramaturgical account is
critiqued, however, its assumptions sometimes prove persistent. Coe and Schabel’s
(2011) research on reproductive rights campaigning in Peru explores the emotion
work done by participants to enable them to engage with unreceptive policy makers
and a general public which stigmatises women’s exercise of reproductive agency.
They found that movement participants did engage in what might be considered
‘surface acting’, but they did not feel alienated (as Hochschild argues) by doing so
because these performances helped them to achieve desired objectives. Coe and
Schabel  highlight  that  coalitions  built  between  different  social  actors  through
emotional performance can be a valuable resource – an analysis which closely aligns
with Burkitt’s relational account. However, they continue to characterise emotional
performance as a tension between authentic and performed emotion, incorporating
Hochschild’s  distinction  between  the  ‘true’  and  ‘false’  self.  The  common-sense
language with which emotion is generally described makes it difficult to depart from
these  precepts,  but  an  interpretation  of  emotion  work  as  relationship  work
recognises conflicting feelings as ambivalence without getting mired in a dubious
distinction between authentic and inauthentic selves.
Another  concept  used  to  theorise  the  emotion  work  done  by  social
movement actors which leans nearer toward a relational understanding of emotion
is  emotional  channelling.  When the emotions  felt  by movement participants  are
inconsistent with their ideologies or inhibitive to their ability to engage in collective
action, they use emotional channelling to transform one emotion into another. This
concept began to appear in the late 1990s (Groves, 1997; Jasper, 1997; see also
Summers  Effler,  2010;  Reger,  2004),  but  the  most  widely-known  and  influential
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study using it is Deborah Gould’s (2002; 2009) research on the HIV/AIDS movement
group ACT UP. Gould highlights that the emotional realities of ACT UP were rooted
in the context  of  the AIDS crisis  to  which it  was  a  response,  foregrounding the
omnipresence of grief in the movement as members of ACT UP themselves became
infected with HIV. As a result, deeply-embedded members of this activist community
were confronted with the need to engage in the radical direct action protest tactics
of the movement while simultaneously being constantly afflicted with the grief of
losing their loved ones to the disease.
Gould argues that the emotions which would otherwise hinder activists from
remaining engaged in the movement, such as grief over their losses and the shame
associated with being gay or lesbian in a homophobic cultural context, had to be
channelled  into  other,  more  mobilising  emotions.  Activists  channelled  grief  into
anger in order to energise their militant street protests, and channelled the shame
of  homophobic  stigma  into  an  outward-oriented  shaming  (or  blaming)  of  the
government for its failure to intervene in the crisis. Emotional channelling avoids the
dramaturgical claim that emotions are evoked from no particular apparent source,
or suppressed to be contained in no clearly delineated place, coming nearer than do
other emotion work concepts to highlighting the inherent relationality of emotions.
In  order  to  channel  one  emotion  into  another,  movement  participants  need  to
reflect upon the situation they are mobilising about, place blame with those they
deem  responsible,  re-evaluate  their  relationship  with  those  responsible  (the
government is supposed to protect public health, but turns its back on the AIDS
crisis,  ergo  the  protective  relationship  between  government  and  polity  is  being
violated), and only as a result of that reflexive deliberation can the channelling of
emotion take place. 
That  emotion  is  necessarily  relational,  then,  is  implicit  in  much  of  the
research on emotions and social movements, though the concepts that dominate
the literature  on social  movement  emotion work  do not  acknowledge  it.  By re-
evaluating the literature through the lens of what we now understand about the
relationality  of  emotions  and  the  relationship-transforming  function  of  activists’
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emotional reflexivity, it becomes clear that the emotion work of social movements is
not a matter of evocation and suppression, but of changing relationships between
the  activist’s  self  and  the  people,  institutions,  and  cultural  paradigms  which
comprise their context. The dramaturgical perspective’s resonance with common-
sense experience of having to perform emotions to meet the demands of social
situations  has  contributed  to  its  wide  uptake  in  social  movement  studies,  but
dramaturgy  ultimately  falls  short  of  accounting  for  what  it  is  that  movement
participants  actually  do  in  order  to  fulfil  what  they  judge  to  be  the  emotional
demands of their movement activities. The relational view of emotions fills the gap,
offering  an  explanation for  how activists  can transform their  emotions  (through
reflexive  re-evaluations  of  relationships  and  their  normative  implications)  and
providing a more robustly sociological understanding which displaces emotion from
inside  the  social  actor  and  locating  it  in  the  social  relationships  with  which
movement participants are themselves concerned.
2.5.B
Working on Others’ Emotions: Emotional Framing
What social movement participants do to act upon their own emotions is
just one component of the emotion work of movements. The other crucial one is
the work  done  upon the  emotions  of  others.  Social  movements  must  persuade
relevant  actors  outside  of  their  own  movement  (such  as  policy  makers,  elites,
prospective movement participants, and the general public) that the movement’s
grievances are just and its demands should be met. They use framing to achieve
this,  drawing upon discourses and cultural  narratives which are  accepted by the
target  audience  of  the  frame  in  order  to  draw  their  support.  Social  movement
framing literature  took  shape  with  emotion  excluded  from its  lens,  but  work  is
emerging  which  recognises  framing as  a  strategic  approach to appealing to and
working upon the emotions of an audience.
The  concept  of  emotional  framing  draws  upon  Erving  Goffman’s  (1974)
Frame Analysis, and is concerned with the way that social movements can invoke
already-prevailing beliefs, understandings, and values to incite audiences to share in
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their emotions. Framing is central to movements’ emotional working on audiences,
because it establishes which ideas, actors, institutions, and events are related to one
another (Ferree and Merrill,  2000: 456). The intended consequence of emotional
framing is  the achievement of  frame resonance,  which establishes  a  connection
between what the audience already feels and the emotional messages articulated
by the movement (Ruiz-Junco, 2013: 49), generating their support. The extent to
which  a  frame  ‘resonates’  with  an  audience  varies  depending  upon  what
assumptions  and  values  audience  members  bring  to  their  interpretation  of  the
movement’s  messages (see Hall,  1973),  with frames which appeal to beliefs  and
values of greater importance to the audience achieving greater resonance (Benford
and Snow, 2000: 621; see also Walgrave and Verhulst, 2006). Proceeding from an
understanding  of  the  local  context  and  the  salience  of  different  values,  social
movements are able to make informed strategic decisions about what frames will
achieve the most resonance.
Emotional  framing  can  be  used  to  politicise  issues  which  prospective
movement  supporters  or  participants  would  be  otherwise  inclined  to  see
apolitically. Schrock et al (2004) found in their research with a transgender support
group that the emotional work done by members of the group to alleviate their
feelings  of  shame,  fear,  powerlessness,  alienation,  and  inauthenticity  was  not
adequate to resolve those emotions. Their continued emotional struggle enabled
transgender  rights  movement  organisations  to  draw  them  into  movement
participation by using ‘motivational framing’, promising them that activism would
provide them with the feelings of pride and righteousness that they needed to more
effectively resolve the emotions that the support group had not. This instance of
emotional framing recognised the audience’s distress, and promised that activism
itself would provide a solution, motivating the support group members to become
active in the movement.
Frequently,  however,  it  is  necessary for  social  movements  to  establish  or
reinforce an attribution of blame for a problem in order to achieve frame resonance.
The  emotional  framings  affect  to  whom  audiences  ascribe  blame,  with
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consequences for the actions they then take. When the frame ascribes blame to
willing actors, the audience’s ‘unpleasant emotions’ (such as anger or outrage) are
directed  toward  those  actors,  leading  to  collective  action  and  willingness  to
undertake risks to achieve change, whereas frames which blame abstract causes like
systems and ideologies result in anxiety, fear, uncertainty, and inaction (von Scheve
et al, 2016). In Jorge Cadena-Roa’s research on the movement for housing for the
poor  in  Mexico  City,  he  found  that  the  emotional  narratives  embedded  in  the
culturally ubiquitous sport of wrestling were drawn upon to energise mobilisation.
Actors participated in the movement as Superbarrio, a fictional superhero for the
movement who symbolised the narrative of unfairness and the righteous underdog
which is characteristic in wrestling, linking that narrative with the injustice of the
government’s inaction on the housing crisis and encouraging movement participants
to identify with the underdog. The government’s reaction against these unflattering
framings only served to buoy the narrative, and the movement went on to achieve
substantial gains in housing reform.
As with the literature on dramaturgical emotion work which might be seen
to  be  implicitly  about  relational  emotions,  the  literature  on  framing  in  social
movements  offers  some  insight  into  emotional  framing  even  where  framing
processes  are  not  theorised  in  terms  of  emotion.  This  is  particularly  salient  in
research on frame alignment: the ‘congruence between participants’ and organizers’
frames’ (Katelaars  et al, 2017: 341). Ruiz-Junco (2011) argues that activists in the
Spanish environmental  movement refashioned their  senses  of  self  to  bring their
narratives of their own biographies into line with the movement’s frame, but she
does not conceive of this in terms of emotion. This may be because research on
emotional framing tends to focus on specific mobilisation events or the growth of
movements,  rather  than on  the way the  frame permeates  participants’  ways  of
thinking  and  feeling  over  long  durations;  however,  drawing  in  the  relational
conception  of  emotion,  it  can  be  seen  that  this  work  of  refashioning
autobiographies  involves  reflexively  rethinking  and  transforming  relationships
between self and various others (people, structures, cultures, and values). Activists’
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pursuit of frame alignment between their own lives and the movement, then, is
necessarily  emotional.  Likewise,  Williams  (2016)  found  that  the  circulation  of
cookbooks embedded with women’s suffrage messages which encouraged readers
to see themselves as democratic citizens as well as traditionally feminine (cooking
within the home), enabling the two frames to align. She does not root the efficacy
of  this  strategy in emotion,  but  incorporating theory on emotional  framing,  it  is
apparent  that  readers’  emotional  investments  in  traditional  femininity  was  a
necessary  antecedent  to  the  resonance  of  the  ‘woman  as  citizen’  frame  in  the
context  of  cookbooks.  Something  similar  can  be  seen  in  Debra  King’s  (2006)
important  research  on  activist  reflexivity,  discussed  above:  activists’  efforts  to
‘liberate’  themselves  from internalised  oppressive  discourses  can  be  seen as  an
instance of emotional frame alignment aimed at bringing their understandings of
(and feelings about) who they are in relation to others into congruence with the
movement’s framing.
All of the different ways in which social movement participants endeavour to
alter their own or others’ emotions, then, hint at the same conclusions: emotions
are  not  internal  and unidirectionally  projected,  but  relational.  The literatures on
emotion work and emotional framing elaborate the ways that social movements use
emotions to achieve political goals, enabling movement action and making decision-
makers and broader publics receptive to their normative claims. However, this area
of research has drawn significantly from Hochschild’s dramaturgical perspective, and
a rethinking  of  emotion  work  as  relationship work  can  better  equip  scholars  of
emotions in movements to understand how emotion work and emotional framing
actually  operate  –  through  reflexivity  as  a  method  of  transforming  emotional
relationships.  Additionally,  reaching  backward  into  social  movement  studies  and
rereading the existing literatures through the lens of relational emotion provides a





The  literatures  on  emotion  work,  emotional  channelling,  and  emotional
framing are largely pervaded by one precept which has emerged from the subfield’s
historical  trajectory through frameworks of emotion and instrumental  rationality:
that social  movement emotions are instrumental.  Because social  movements are
intended to bring about change (and because the field’s conceptual struggles have
set up a debate between emotion and instrumental cognition), scholars examine the
emotions within them with an eye to the operation of emotion in helping to achieve
outcomes.  This  lens  has  come  under  criticism  on  the  basis  that  related  but
independent  objectives  such  as  engendering  human  relationships  within  a
movement group or articulating value positions may be more paramount intentions
for collective action than a social change outcome (Sa’di, 2015). Precisely because
movement participants are deeply emotionally invested in the issues around which
they organise, the emotions of the movement become a part of their own value
systems  and  ways  of  being  (Vestergren,  et  al,  2017;  Hercus,  1999),  and  social
movement emotions become intertwined with the emotional lives of participants
outside the activist setting.
The concept of emotion culture addresses this aspect of social movement
emotions. Moving beyond the immediately instrumental (though also allowing for
instrumental  utility),  a movement’s emotion culture provides ‘expectations about
how members should feel about themselves and about dominant groups, as well as
how  they  should  manage  and  express  the  feelings  evoked  by  their  day-to-day
encounters with dominant groups.’ (Taylor, 2000: 274). The concept recognises that
the  emotional  sense-making  that  social  movement  participants  do  continues
throughout their daily lives, shaping their emotional relationships with other people
and their wider context – this, in turn, better enables them to inhabit the desired
emotions within the context of movement participation. Again recalling Debra King’s
(2006)  work  on  activist  emotional  reflexivity,  it  can  be  seen  that  emotionally
assimilating into the ideological  world of  a social  movement requires a reflexive
transformation of the activist’s relationship with their self,  with others,  and with
institutions, structures, and cultures. 
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Given  how  powerful  a  concept  emotion  culture  is  for  illuminating  the
emotions of movements as they emerge from and within their local and historical
contexts, it  is  perhaps surprising that little research on social  movements names
emotion  culture  as  its  organising concept.  Verta Taylor’s  (1995)  research  on the
emotion  culture  of  women’s  organisations  pioneered the  concept,  showing how
women’s self-help groups helped to create the emotional vocabulary of postpartum
depression by rendering seemingly individual  emotional  experiences as collective
and systemic.  It  is  Taylor  and Rupp’s (2002)  research on the emotion culture  of
transnational  women’s  organisations,  however,  that  provided the most  thorough
empirical  development of  the  concept.  Aiming  to  understand how transnational
feminist  organisations  (in  the  period  from  1888-1945)  maintained  transnational
solidarity  in spite  of  the profound political  conflict  between the nation-states in
which  the  women  were  situated,  they  identified  three  different  aspects  of  the
process  of  building  emotion  culture:  (1)  the  development  and  performance  of
rituals of reconciliation which nourished links across national  boundaries, (2) the
fostering of transnational interpersonal relationships which could transcend national
borders, and (3) the collective invocation of the ideal of ‘mother love’ as the lens
through  which  women’s  relationships  would  be  understood  (not  unlike  the
‘sisterhood’ associated with ‘second wave’ feminism).
This research highlights all of the key aspects of the building of an emotion
culture,  showing  how  action  (ritual),  relationships,  and  cultural  ideals  are  all
incorporated, and revealing what a movement-specific emotion culture can do – in
this case, enabling the persistence of collective identity and solidarity against the
backdrop of powerful national narratives which pressured movement participants to
see  women  in  other  nations  as  enemies.  Contrary  to  emotion  culture  research
which  paradoxically  maintains  the  false  binary  between  cognition  and  emotion
(Kotchemidova,  2010),  Taylor  and  Rupp’s  deployment  of  emotion  culture  ties
together the different threads of social movement emotions, recognising how they
are  cultivated  through  emotionalised  (but  still  also  cognitive)  reflexivity  (see
Holmes,  2010)  and  how  they  are  enabled  or  constrained  by  the  ‘structures  of
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feeling’ (Williams, 2013[1961]; Koschut, 2017) of their historical contexts.
As I argued with respect to the relational nature of emotion, emotion culture
can be seen in much of the literature on emotions in social movements where the
concept is not actually used. In her research on ‘second wave’ feminism in New
Zealand, Mary Holmes (2000) found that racial and gender norms were contested by
feminists  in  their  ways  of  engaging  with  one  another,  such  as  ‘adopting  anger,
violence,  and  confrontation  as  female  (p.  238),  but  that  their  avenues  for
transforming the social order were constrained by its terms having been set largely
by men. The emotions of resistance were enabled and constrained by patriarchal
culture. While this is sometimes conceived through a structural lens as 'emotional
opportunity structures' (Whittier, 2001), it is also a matter of how feminists engaged
in relationships with one another and with men in ways which were informed by
their reflexivity and the cultural context in which they were situated. In other words,
emotional practices which are shaped by a desire to resist the pull of norms is a
culture-building process, and can be seen as an aspect of what it is for a movement
to create an emotion culture.
Other concepts are also used in place of emotion culture which function to
describe essentially the same processes. Deborah Gould (2002; 2009) argues that
the emotional ways of being that members of ACT UP cultivated in order to keep
their  movement  going,  to  be  responsive  to  the  oppressive  discourses  of  their
context,  and  to  maintain  emotional  cohesion  across  their  organisation  is  an
'emotional common sense'. Elsewhere, she argues that the movement's common
way of being emotionally was a collective emotional habitus, highlighting that once
it  had been established,  it  became habitual  and difficult  to  break  away from (a
reality to which she attributes the ultimate dissolution of the movement). Both of
these concepts – emotional common sense and emotional habitus – refer to much
the same process as emotion culture. A social movement group takes account of
their social and cultural context, their own situation in relation to more powerful
others, establishes shared interpretations, values, and goals, and develops a shared
set of emotional relationships to each of those elements which make their emotions
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collective and produce unity and coherence. 
It  can  be  seen,  then,  that  though  emotion  cultures  in  movements  are
comparatively  under-studied,  there  is  a  considerable  body  of  research  which
provides insight into the emotion cultures of movements, albeit by different names.
This talking past each other in the literature is a common recurrence, and leads to
the seemingly endless taxonomies and typologies mentioned above. Scholars in the
sociology  of  emotions  in  general  have  struggled  to  develop  a  coherent  and
consistent language for emotion, in spite of largely (though not universally) being
united with respect to the ontology of emotion and having a common favoured set
of conceptual tools (such as emotion work).
2.7
Conclusion
The field of the sociology of emotions is unduly young for its age. Some of
the earliest murmurings of the discipline exhibited a strong presence of emotion in
analysts' thinking, but the historical trends in which sociology was swept up drew its
attention away from feeling and toward instrumental rationality. The study of social
movements, taking shape before the emergence in the 1970s of the sociology of
emotions  in  its  presently  recognisable  form,  therefore  took  root  in  emotion's
absence, and the subfield's history in theories focused on instrumental rationality
continue to be a resonant presence. The culturally pervasive denigration of emotion
has affected research on social  movements as well  as the context in which that
research is done, and this has drawn researchers' attentions away from emotions
pursued  and  cultivated  in  movements  which  are  not  clearly  oriented  toward  a
discernible instrumental end. There must be instrumental reasons, it is assumed,
why social movement actors want to feel the emotions they feel.
There certainly are instrumental reasons, as would necessarily be the case in
social movements, which exist largely to achieve social change (though it is worth
troubling  even  that  narrative,  as  many  people  who  self-identify  with  social
movements, including feminism, have no expectation of  seeing substantial  social
change and may never participate in a collective action). A the subfield continues to
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proliferate alongside the growing field of affect studies, there will be more space for
scholars to explore where the idea of emotions as means to ends exhausts its utility
and the possibility of emotions and affective sensations as ends in themselves might
begin. Scholars in recent years (Wetherell 2012, Burkitt 2014a, Sointu 2016) have
been grappling with the question of how cultural meaning is intertwined with the
affective, and a small body of work asks questions about activism and biography;
this moves us toward the interdisciplinary explorations that will  help us to make
sense of social movement participants as fully-fledged social selves embroiled in the
complex array of relationships in which their emotions and affects are constituted.
What these increasingly hazy disciplinary borders signal for researchers of emotions
in  movements  is  that  the  question  on  sociologists'  minds  ought  not  only  be
concerned  with  what  a  social  movement  is  attempting  to  achieve.  Movement
participants do not check their human subjectivities at the door when they enter
into a social movement group, and the neglect of their emotional entanglements
across  the  boundaries  of  the  movement  group  can  obscure  what  aspects  of
relationship and of culture they bring into the movement with them.
Interestingly, Goodwin  et al (2000) highlight the cultural embeddedness of
researchers  themselves,  partially  crediting the increasing arrival  of  women (with
their  emotion-oriented  socialisation)  into  the  sociology  of  social  movements  for
having turned the field’s attention more to emotion. An emotional discipline, they
imply, is a feminised discipline. That raises intriguing questions about whether the
field was previously masculinist, a question which remains relevant today. The now
more emotionally-aware subfield of social movement studies remains transfixed by
instrumentality,  even  where  emotion  is  concerned.  As  will  be  explored  below,
research  which  synthesises  emotional  with  instrumental  rationality  accounts
overwhelmingly  focuses on emotion  work –  on how movement participants  use
emotions as means to ends, rather than seeing emotions as ends in themselves (this
latter being sometimes acknowledged, but generally relegated to footnote status).
As the concept of affect continues to gain increasing traction in the sociology of
emotions, the deeper question of to what extent emotions are means and where
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they might be ends will grow more pressing and offer new avenues for the subfield
of emotions in movements.
The hasty assumption that when movement participants experience (or try
to  experience)  an  emotion  in  a  movement  it  is  because  of  the  movement  is
accompanied by another eager conceptual gesture: the common (though again, not
universal) elision between social movements, social movement organisations, and
protest movements. A protest is a type of mobilisation (although it can take many
forms,  not  being  confined  only  to  the  newspaper  headline  street  protest  often
associated with the word), and being involved in a social movement might not ever
involve participating in what might be considered a protest. There are also questions
about at what point a group of people becomes a social movement 'organisation'.
This  conceptual  framing makes sense  in  reference  to work  on frame alignment,
where there are leaders and followers organised along a hierarchical organisational
structure. There is, of course, no problem with research on these groups, but there
is a presence in the literature of a tendency to jump from social movement to social
movement  organisation,  implying  an  equivalence  which  does  not  hold  well  in
relation to movements like radical feminism. The closest thing to an organisation
that many radical feminists might have ever belonged to would be a consciousness-
raising group of a handful of women – scarcely an organisation.
What these conceptual boundaries (or erasures of them) all do is confound
the  work  of  asking  the  right  questions  of  social  movements.  The  dramaturgical
account of emotions has had a tremendous amount of traction in social movement
studies because the subfield's emphasis on instrumental rationality always already
assumes that  there  is  a  movement-related goal  behind  the  pursuit  of  collective
emotions – the question then is what the goal is, how emotions might be used to
pursue it, and by what mechanisms movement participants manipulate their own or
others'  emotions  in  order  to  achieve  it.  What  gets  left  out  by  this  is  the  deep
entanglement  of  collective  movement  emotions  with  the  lives  of  movement
participants outside the movement (and for radical feminist readers of a magazine
like  Trouble and Strife, reading the magazine and writing letters to it might be the
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only point of contact they had with the movement).
Fortunately,  as  I  have  argued throughout  this  chapter,  there  is  a  strong,
though  often  unnamed,  presence  of  research  on  social  movement  participants'
efforts to transform relationships with and through feeling, and to cultivate emotion
cultures.  A  re-reading  of  these  literatures  surfaces  the  relationship  work  that
movements  do,  and  shows  that  what  have  otherwise  been  conceptualised  as
conformity to emotion rules or dramaturgical emotion work can be seen to be a
much more powerful mechanism of social change: the transformation of the social
world through emotionally reordering relationships. Radical feminism was a long-
running social movement, and the significant time and effort that they invested in
emotional framing and the back-stage work of cultivating an emotion culture would
make little sense if they needed to have an immediately identifiable instrumental
goal. If the value they placed on their relationships with themselves and key others,
and what these relationships suggested to them about the world and their place
within it, is foregrounded, however, their reasons for putting forward this exertion






This research asks a question about radical feminism’s emotion culture, rooted
in the view that  in  order  to make adequate sense of  this  social  movement in  the
present,  its  historical  development  must  first  be  understood.  There  are  pertinent
reasons why the research needed to use historically-oriented methods to achieve this
aim,  leading  to  its  use  of  historical  textual  data.  The  methodological  core  of  the
research  is  literary  ethnography,  a  comparatively  little-used  but  highly  productive
approach to the study of documentary data. Literary ethnography enabled aspects of
the emotion culture of a living movement at an earlier stage of its development to be
explored in a way and with a depth which could not have been accomplished with
human subjects  research4 carried out  in  the present,  and this  is  just  one amongst
several  advantages  to be explored in  this  chapter  which particularly  recommended
literary ethnography as  an ideal  strategy for  learning about  the emotion culture of
radical feminism. 
The  comparatively  minimal  uptake  of  literary  ethnography  and  its  under-
representation as a method in empirical research belies the diversity of approaches to
it that researchers take. While this study is a literary ethnography, it is not a literary
4
I differentiate ‘human subjects research’ from textual research following from work on ethics which 
distinguishes the ethical imperatives of work which never involves contact with people (including the
authors or users of texts) from research which does involve them. I do recognise, however, that all 
research affects human subjects, and I do not take the leave of ethical demands which this distinction 
is sometimes considered to allow.
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ethnography  ‘as  usual’,  and  there  are  particular  aspects  of  the  methodological
literature which suggest that there is no well-established ‘as usual’ to the method’s
application. There is room for debate as to what makes a literary ethnography what it is
rather  than  something  related  but  distinct,  like  a  discourse  analysis,  and  some
approaches more closely resemble discourse analysis or other analytic methods than
my research has done. This study has, I argue, taken the ‘ethnography’ component of
literary ethnography more seriously than the standard approaches to its usage urge,
and the chapter will explore the reasons why this was done. Though a thorough and
clear account of how to do literary ethnography has been laid out by Van de Poel-
Knotterus  and  Notterus  (1994),  their  approach  erases  emotion  from  the  research
process. A more recent accounting of the method from Benet Reid (2016), emerging
from his  research on emotions  (which has  not  been the object  of  study  for  other
authors on the method), better accounts for the role of emotions in research processes
in general. Reid’s iteration of literary ethnography is the most fitting methodological
framework for what my own research has involved, and it is upon his account of the
method that I principally draw. 
As Reid argues, and as I also found in this project, doing research specifically on
emotions  creates  a  compelling  need  to  emotionally  ‘live’  in  the  life  world  of  the
archive, whereas this might be avoided in other literary ethnographic research. I build
upon  Reid’s  account  through  a  deeper  exploration  of  researcher  positionality  in
relation to the object of study; my relationship with radical feminism is different than
was his with the medical discourses he studied. Departing a bit further from Van de
Poel-Knotterus and Notterus than does Reid, I will elaborate how this relationship with
the research topic adds an additional layer to the utility of the researcher’s emotions in
enabling  literary  ethnographic  analysis.  When  the  researcher  has  not  only  deep
knowledge  of  the  context,  but  a  vested  emotional  interest  in  the  transformative
consequences that the research may have after its completion, the use of emotion in
the research moves beyond simply providing the intimate,  felt  knowledge of  social
context  upon  which  all  textual  analysis  relies  (McKee,  2003:  chapter  3).  Far  from
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merely shaping the research questions to be asked (Hammersley, 2000) and equipping
the researcher to interpret the text, the emotional investment and values of a feminist
sociologist  studying  feminism fundamentally  affects  the  way  that  the  data  is  read,
yielding productive analytic results.
This research is feminist at every level: a piece of feminist sociology carried out
by  a  feminist-identified  researcher  about  a  feminist  movement.  It  was  a  priority
throughout  the entire research process to have feminist  principles guide the work,
from the formulation of the research question to the yet-awaited dissemination of the
findings. Many aspects of the project have been meaningfully affected by a feminist
research ethos. Following from feminist ethics and feminist epistemology, the reflexive
demands  of  this  project  have  been  extensive:  methodological,  epistemic,  ethical,
positional, and political reflexivities have pervaded the process. Research is a world-
making endeavour (Kempner et al, 2011; Becker, 1967), and knowledge always belongs
to an embodied and socially positioned actor rather than a ‘generic knower’ who ‘could
be anyone or everyone’ (Code, 2014: 150). The project has been carried out with these
considerations in mind, with the intention that it might help to advance the collective
political project of feminism, that it should be accessible to and replicable by others,
and that it  be robustly honest about its embeddedness in a historical  location and
enmeshed  with  particular  interests  and  ends.  These  aspects  of  the  work  will  be
explored in what follows.
This  chapter,  like  my  use  of  literary  ethnography,  will  take  a  slightly
unconventional approach. In section 3.2, the standard stages of a literary ethnography
will be briefly outlined, drawing principally from Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus
(1994).  The  section  will  then  discuss  Reid’s  (2016)  intervention  on  the  method,
highlighting  the  role  of  emotion  in  literary  ethnographic  research  and  the  key
differences between his  more ethnographically-oriented approach and the arguably
less-ethnographic  formulations  that  preceded it.  The remainder  of  the chapter  will
largely take the structure and form of a narration of the research process, highlighting
three crucial problematics as they arose throughout the work: How can this aspect of
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the research be brought into alignment with a feminist sociological approach? What
types of reflexivities must be used at this stage,  and to what ends? How does this
aspect  of  the  work  align  with  or  depart  from  prevailing  approaches  to  literary
ethnography? These questions pervaded the research and merit discussion in relation
to each stage of its progress, and consequently discussions around them will be found
where relevant in each section rather than there being distinct sections of the chapter
dedicated to them.
Section 3.3 will explore the question of feminist sociology as a way of doing
feminism. Its central focus will be an accounting of what I mean by referring to this
study as a piece of feminist sociology and what responsibilities I saw myself as taking
on board by approaching the work from this perspective.  The ways in which these
responsibilities were then fulfilled will emerge from the following sections. In section
3.4, the choice of archival textual methods will be discussed, along with the benefits
and limitations of this strategy for answering the research question. Section 3.5 will
address the case study approach. Archival research methods do not typically take a
single publication as a data source, not least due to the obvious limitations of case
studies. There were unique advantages to using a case study for research on radical
feminism’s emotion culture, however, and these will be explained. Also discussed in
section 3.5 are the use of  Trouble and Strife as the subject case and the subsequent
sampling within it: the 1980s as the targeted time period, and medical and psychiatric
health  and  well-being  as  the  topical  frame.  Each  of  these  opened  up  specific
potentialities for the exploration of the movement’s emotion culture, and though at a
glance the sample may seem narrow, it yielded ends which justified the slightly unusual
means. Section 3.6 will elaborate the selection of an archive in which to do the data
collection amongst the range of available options, the synthesis of brick-and-mortar
archive  research  with  analysis  of  digital  duplicates,  and  the  strategies  used  for
organising the data, phasing the analysis, and recording the analytic process. Finally,
section 3.7 will detail the way that the data was read and analysed, highlighting the
contrasts between literary ethnographic research in general and the specific demands
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of applying it to emotions research. In the conclusion, I return to Van de Poel-Knotterus
and Notterus’s  and Reid’s  respective accounts of  doing literary ethnography,  noting
how a feminist sociological study about the emotion culture of a feminist movement
has aligned with and departed from each, and offering some final reflections on the
benefits of a feminist sociological approach for literary ethnography.
3.2
Literary Ethnography: Documents as an Ethnographic Field Site
Literary  ethnography  seems  to  pick  up  where  other  methods  fall  short.  It
enables  inquiry  into  aspects  of  social  life  to  which  there  are  otherwise  practical,
epistemological,  or  ethical  barriers  of  access  (Van de  Poel-Knotterus  and Notterus,
1994: 68; Hodder, 1994; Ulsperger, 2009: 809). Following from sociological traditions
which take literature  seriously  as  a  source of  knowledge about  the social  world in
which  it  is  generated  (Lowenthal,  1989;  Griswold,  1992),  the  method  allows
researchers to peek behind the curtain to see what might be more difficult to get at
otherwise.  Though  literary  ethnography  is  a  little-used  approach  to  the  study  of
documents,  there  is  a  much  wider  general  acknowledgement  of  the  value  of
documents  of  life  for  the  study  of  social  worlds,  giving  rise  to  an  expansive
methodological engagement in this area (see, e.g., Plummer, 2001; Stanley, 2013; Prior,
2003)  which  places  the  premise  of  sociological  documents  of  life  research  rather
beyond  the  reach  of  dispute.  Literary  ethnography  is  distinct  from  other  textual
research methods, however, and its name raises interesting questions about what it is
that a literary ethnographer actually does: Can documents be an ethnographic field
site? And how is literary ethnographic analysis any different from other textual analysis
methods? 
This  section  will  begin  by  outlining  the  standard  six-stage  process  of  doing
literary ethnography laid out by Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus (1994). I  draw
from their account, as do Ulsperger (2009) and Reid (2016), because they lay out most
clearly and explicitly what the process of doing literary ethnography entails. I will then
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turn to Reid’s recent work on literary ethnographic method. Though he places his work
within the camp of literary ethnography, it constitutes a meaningful departure from
Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus’s understanding of it, and this proceeds principally
from his work having been about emotion. In Reid’s work, as in mine, the tried-and-
true approach to literary ethnography did not adequately account for what is necessary
to generate an analysis from the data, and finding emotion in text requires specific
strategies which cannot  be straightforwardly pulled from work on other topics and
dropped  into  emotions  research.  Literary  ethnographies  on  emotions  are,  I  argue,
more akin to field ethnography than are such studies on other topics, a consequence of
the unavoidably active and acknowledged engagement of the researcher’s emotions in
the process of reading and analysing the data. 
There are relevant differences even between Reid’s use of the method and my
own, however, and these will  also be explored. Reid drew upon his experience as a
practitioner  to  emotionally  enter  the  world  of  the  technical  medical  discourses  he
studied, using his emotions as a source of ethnographic expertise. I do likewise in this
research,  but  I  additionally  bring  to  it  a  feminist’s  deep  emotional  interest  in  the
outcome of the work and a biography of lived emotional participation in the broad
emotional culture of feminisms writ large (sharing in the anger, frustration, jubilation,
mirth,  and  other  emotions  that  emerge  from  moving  through  the  world  with  an
awakened feminist consciousness, and doing so in every sphere of my life). This placed
my positionality in relation to the data as not only a source of felt, emotive expertise,
but truly embedded participation in the emotional life of the feminist world (and the
patriarchal world to which the feminist one is a response). This had consequences for
the way I read and was able to ‘experience’ the discourse (Reid, 2016: 4).
Literary ethnography is an approach to the study of documentary data which,
like  field  ethnography,  is  oriented  to  the  inner  life  of  the  world  from  which  the
documents come. It involves deep immersion in the dataset and its intertextual milieu,
equipping the researcher to perceive subtleties,  subtextual hints and murmurs, and
vague emotional resonances which a more technical approach to analysing the text
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would  fail  to  capture.  It  is  upon this  last  point  that  it  most  differs  from discourse
analysis. Though discourse analysis casts a wide net under which an almost boundless
array of analytic approaches might be swept, it crucially focuses on the way that words,
phrases, and other signifiers are positioned (in a text or a context) in order to produce
certain associations, significations, and from these, experienced social realities (Brown
and Yule, 1983; see also Ahmed, 2014[2004]). While discourses are acknowledged to
be embedded in and deeply bound up with social context, the systems of signification
upon which discourse analyses focus are studied as something distinct from the world
of objects which discourses represent. 
Literary ethnography, conversely, does not draw as hard a distinction between
the social world and its representation in text, and in fact the underlying premise of
how texts are approached in a literary ethnography is that texts do not represent social
reality, but  are social reality. A text is taken to be one of the places where social life
happens, much the way that a school, a street,  a pub, or a football  pitch might be
(Reid, 2016: 4). Social life is lived in an array of places, and in literary ethnography, texts
– their writing,  reading,  circulation, what their content means, and what their very
existence means – are one such ‘place’.  Most discourse analysts would comfortably
agree with this premise, of course, but a key difference between discourse analysis and
literary ethnography is that discourse analysis  focuses significantly on the syntax of
discursive representation and its semantic consequences – where ideas, images, and
signifiers are positioned in relation to one another,  and to what discursive effect –
whereas literary ethnography is more phenomenologically-oriented, focusing on how a
text  is  experienced.  It  is  this  distinction  which  makes  Van  de  Poel-Knotterus  and
Notterus’s iteration of literary ethnography nearer to a type of discourse analysis than
is Reid’s, a point to which I will return below.
 Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus (1994) outline a six-step strategy for doing
a literary ethnography: (1) Define the scope of the sample (in accordance with a topical
frame which would have been selected in advance). (2) Read and interpret the texts,
likely reading many of them multiple times (this would follow a period of immersion in
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the text and intertext to gain the familiarity requisite for interpretation). (3) Identify
themes (an iterative process involving several phases and substantial moving back and
forth between texts). This prescriptive orientation toward thematic analysis raises key
questions  about  differences  between  their  approach  and  the  one  which  Reid  and
myself have employed – I will  return to this. (4) Classification of thematic elements
(particular attention to frequency of occurrence of a theme and the strength of its
presence across the archive are encouraged). (5) Development of analytical constructs,
which generate what they call a ‘composite portrait’ of the social world from which the
texts  have come –  it  is  at  this  stage that  the literary  ethnographer  moves  beyond
description and into sociological  inference. (6) Contextual  confirmation – taking the
final analysis back to the archive, the analyst re-reads substantial portions of the text to
ensure that the analytical  constructs seem fitting to the original  data. Van de Poel-
Knotterus and Notterus also suggest an optional  step which precedes this six-stage
process: an exploratory phase for gaining familiarity with the archive, developing and
refining research questions, and informing decisions about the topical frame.
There  are  many  respects  in  which  my own research  has  conformed to  this
template, but important others in which it has differed. The first stage for my research,
but an optional stage zero for Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus, was the exploratory
phase. They (echoed by Ulsperger, 2009) see the exploratory phase of the research as
beneficial but unnecessary, and it is taken to be a viable possibility that the researcher
would define the topical frame and develop the research questions prior to the onset
of  immersive  reading  of  the  texts  from which the dataset  will  be  drawn.  My own
research  was  highly  dependent  upon  the  exploratory  phase  in  a  range  of  ways.
Significantly,  this phase completely changed the research question. The archive was
approached  with  a  quite  distinct  question  about  the  relationship  between  radical
feminism and one of its oft-cited ideological nemeses, transgender liberation (Heyes,
2007). The research question in its first iteration was not about emotion at all,  but
rather a more general query about why anti-transgender sentiment subsists in radical
feminism. A reading of radical feminist literature quickly revealed a turf war ‘fraught
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with feeling’ (Hesford, 2013: 6), at which point the research question came to focus on
radical feminist emotions about the identity category ‘woman’ - who can and cannot
count as a woman, and why. Upon still further exploratory reading, however, it began
to appear that the transgender question was not isolated – radical feminists have a
different emotional response to an array of things than do feminists of various other
kinds. Some feminists express feelings of warmth and affection at transgender women
being welcomed into feminist spaces, but radical feminists respond with a deep sense
of  violation  (See  Raymond,  1979;  Hausman,  1995).  The  ‘riot  grrrl’  punk  rock  and
fuchsia lipstick that fills many ‘third wave’ feminists with exuberance and mirth draws
disappointment and frustration from radical feminists. The sex workers’ rights lobbying
that elicits respect and pride from postmodern feminists meets with radical feminist
dismay and anger. Something about the emotional infrastructure of radical feminism is
distinctive,  and  it  was  through  an  exploratory  immersion  in  their  writings  that  it
became  clear  that  in  order  to  understand  radical  feminist  emotions  about  any
particular  issue  or  controversy,  the  underlying  foundation  of  the  movement’s
emotional life needed to first be mapped. The exploratory phase was not an optional
aside, but provided indispensable insight into the emotional world of the movement
(something which, again, was not originally an object of intended attention at all), and
ultimately gave rise to the research question and the theoretical  focus on emotion
around which the research has centred.
The remainder of the research followed largely along the lines of Van de Poel-
Knotterus and Notterus’s framework. The details of these stages of the research will be
explored in the sections that follow, but there are two components which I wish to
expand  upon  here,  and  to  more  thoroughly  elaborate  with  the  benefit  of  Reid’s
contributions  to  literary  ethnographic  methodology.  The  first  is  the  reading  and
interpretation of the texts, and the second is the generation of themes.  It is at this
point  that  the  nature  of  the  texts  under  study,  the  theoretical  frame  (for  these
immediate  purposes,  emotion  versus  everything  else),  and  the  researcher’s
relationship with the archive and topic become consequential. Van de Poel-Knotterus
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and Notterus explicitly base their framework on the study of fictional texts written in
the realist  tradition,  and position  their  claims  about  the  viability  of  making  claims
about the social worlds in which those texts were written in relation to specifically that
type of text (1994: 68-70). Their premise is that the way the social world is represented
in  realist  stories  says  something  about  the  social  world  in  which  the  authors  and
intended readers were situated. 
Reid  (2016),  on  the  other  hand,  applies  literary  ethnography  to  technical
medical  discourse  on  ‘evidence-based health  care’.  His  intention  is  to  excavate  the
emotional world of ‘participants in’ these EB (evidence-based) discourses, a directive
which  hastily  leads  to  an  earnest  engagement  with  the  human  subjecthood  the
researcher:
‘EB-discourse  however  is  inescapably  human:  its
participants write creatively, passionately and whimsically
about  their  perceptions  of  the  powers  ascribed  to
quantitative Evidence [sic].  While the topic  of  evidence-
basedness  might  imply  a  striving  to  transcend  what  is
human, there is no escaping the humanity of EB-discourse;
and  the  social  analyst  of  EB-discourse  must  appreciate
that they too are human, and build this into their rationale
for research.’ (2016: 3)
Contrasting his own approach against that of Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus, Reid
highlights their emphasis on the systematic nature of literary ethnographic reading,
and  instead  foregrounds  the  less  technical  aspects  of  reading  which  make  literary
ethnography a strong alternative to discourse analysis when emotion is the object of
study.  Literary  ethnographic  ways  of  reading,  unlike  most  approaches  to  discourse
analysis,  ‘are  particularly  useful  for  accessing  emotional  currents  which  are  buried
deeply within rational-technical discourses’ (Reid, 2016: 1).
My own reading of Trouble and Strife was informed by similar concerns. Unlike
the rational-technical discourses studied by Reid, feminist writings are rife with open
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expressions  of  emotion,  which  would  seem  at  first  glance  to  make  the  study  of
emotion from such texts a much less hazy enterprise than the same with ostensibly
emotionally  agnostic  texts.  What  emerged from  the  reading  of  Trouble  and  Strife,
however, was that in spite of the ready availability of emotion on the text’s surface (in
the form of emotion words and quite overt allusions to feeling), the emotional aspects
which were of most interest and value to my research were often those ‘buried deeply
within’  the  text.  While  a  range  of  approaches  to  inferring  meaning  from  text  are
available  –  instruments  which can  be  applied  to  it,  standardised metre  sticks  with
which it can be measured – the convoluted embeddedness of texts in the social worlds
of which they are a part and their entanglement with living human subjectivities places
some of their content in the realm of the rather ethereal:
‘This  property  of  texts  is  something  which  one  cannot
perceive  without  “being  there”  in  an  embodied
ethnographic way. It is content buried deeply beneath the
structure of  texts as socially-produced documents,  such
that the analyst has to become a feeling participant in the
discourse if they are to perceive it.’ (Reid, 2016: 6)
The literary ethnographer who is reading for the implicit and subtextual, then, must
‘live’ in the text and come back out again to report what they experienced, rather than
looking at the text from outside and recording observations and associations. This is
not  autoethnographic  self-study,  but  an  approach  to  data  which  recognises  the
subjecthood  of  the  researcher  and  makes  no  apologies  for  instrumentalising  it  to
enable research which only a fully alive, thinking-feeling subject could do.
The necessity of approaching texts in this robustly ethnographic way when they
are being read for emotion (or at least when the investigation seeks emotion which is
under  the  surface  of  the  text)  leads  to  the  next  area  of  concern  in  Van  de  Poel-
Knotterus  and  Notterus’s  process:  the  generation  of  themes.  Because  their
methodological  approach  was  developed  to  meet  the  demands  of  reading  realist
fiction, in this area it skews a bit nearer to discourse analysis than does the deeply-
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embedded,  feeling-around  approach  that  Reid  and  myself  have  had  to  take.  Their
search for themes is built around, to put it simply, looking for what the text says rather
than what is happening in it. To return to the question of the ethnographic, it is as if
Van de  Poel-Knotterus  and Notterus  were field  ethnographers  who only  took  field
notes about what people at their field site said aloud, whereas Reid’s way of producing
themes more closely resembles what field ethnographers actually do – noting what is
said and by whom, but also more subtle subtextual implications, nervous or excited
energies in social space, the lived experience of being in that space (the fatigue of early
rising  times,  the  intimate  openness  of  communal  meals),  and  so  forth.  The  active
engagement  of  the  feeling  subjectivity  of  the  researcher  enables  a  much  more
ethnographic engagement with texts than does the more technical and emotionally
distanced  approach  which  Van  de  Poel-Knotterus  and  Notterus  advocate.  As  Reid
argues, Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus ‘conclude... by reassuring their reader of
the reliability and integrity of the ethnographic process, so that if properly executed, it
produces an  accurate portrait. Emphasis on reliability and accuracy carries a whiff of
the assertive  evidentialism to  which  the social  analyst  of  EBHC becomes sensitive’
(2016: 5, italics original). The social analyst of feminism, and especially the feminist
analyst, is similarly sensitised, and indeed any notion of an ‘accurate’ portrait of social
life is fundamentally inconsistent with a feminist epistemology (Hartstock, 1997). 
The generation of themes from an emotionally active participation in the text is
less a matter of identifying patterns in what texts  say than of perceiving patterns in
what  happens emotionally in the life-world of the data archive. The consequence of
this for analytic practice is that the researcher’s emotions must be actively engaged,
allowing for lines of analytic inquiry to be opened up by patterns in the researcher’s
own feeling as well as recurrences in textual representations. The two approaches to
producing  the  analysis  work  in  tandem,  so  that  the  researcher  is  not  bound  by
‘assertive evidentialism’ in the way that they read the text, and instead can feel around
it, actively inviting their own emotions to draw their attention in particular directions
and using that emotional draw as a starting point for deeper investigations. Though
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this is not at all specific to literary ethnography, it is a more ethnographic approach to
the reading of  text  than thematic  analyses  generally  are,  making more space than
other analytic methods for the researcher to reflect upon what it felt like to be in a
piece of writing or an archive than thematic coding typically does.
Literary  ethnography  therefore  varies  somewhat  in  the  extent  to  which  it
resembles  field  ethnography  and  in  the  nature  and  magnitude  of  its  points  of
departure from other ways of analysing discourse. I  have argued that Van de Poel-
Knotterus and Notterus offer a clear and productive outline of the literary ethnographic
process,  but that it  is  not entirely fit  for the study of  emotions.  Reid’s  approach is
better suited to enabling the researcher to access emotion in text, especially where
that emotion can only be found by being felt, and this strategy is a more meaningfully
ethnographic one than is the more technical and ‘accuracy’-oriented reading favoured
by  Van  de  Poel-Knotterus  and  Notterus.  I  have  also  argued  that  the  optional
exploratory phase is actually indispensable for equipping the researcher to feel things
out in the world of the text, and that in the case of this particular research, it was only
with that heightened sensitivity to emotional currents in the text that the theoretical
frame and research question were ultimately developed.
3.3
Doing  Sociology,  Doing  Feminism:  Accountability  &  Feminist  Research  Beyond
Gender
The story of  feminist  sociology is  unsurprisingly convoluted. Feminists acting
within the structures of academia have always positioned themselves uncomfortably in
tension between the hegemony of ‘traditional’ academic disciplines like sociology and
the transformative potential of subversion (Pollock, 2010: 26; Roseneil, 1995: 193-196).
When feminists first entered the academy in the 1970s, it was a radical enough notion
to  suggest  that  gender  ought  to  be  counted  amongst  widely  relevant  analytic
categories,  never  mind  meaningfully  transforming  the  way  academic  knowledge  is
produced, by whom, and to what ends. Some feminists entered research and teaching
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posts  without  PhD degrees,  and they  brought  with  them the  consciousness-raising
model of small group discussions which came to pervade feminist teaching practice
(David,  2016)  and,  later,  university  teaching  more  generally.  It  has  never  been  a
straightforward matter to delineate what is meant by calling academic research (or
teaching) ‘feminist’.
To paint with a perhaps dubiously broad brush, feminist sociological research
can  be  divided  into  two  general  categories:  research  which  advances  the  aims  of
feminism (generating knowledge about realities facing women, establishing a secure
space for gendered analysis in research, and thereby providing the basis for social and
political change to remedy women’s5 subordination) and research which is done in a
feminist  way  (drawing  upon  feminist  ethics,  epistemology,  and  broader  politics  to
inform decisions about the design and execution of research). My research falls into
the latter category. Based in the idea of feminist research, rather than gender research,
this project has been designed with the intention that it satisfy feminist standards. It is
not about gender, as feminist research need not be. Indeed, to suggest that feminist
research must be about gender might unintentionally reproduce the gendered othering
of  women  –  an  inextricable  association  between  ‘the  second  sex’  (De  Bouviour:
2009[1949])  and  gender,  such  that  men  act  (and  research)  as  human  beings,  but
women only ever as women. It may ring odd that a study about radical feminism – a
group necessarily comprised only of women – is not about gender. The distinction I
make is that gender is not a central concept in the work, and crucially, the project was
not undertaken to solve problems for women as a political class. It is not an example of
smashing the patriarchy with research using ‘the master’s tools’ (Lorde, 2007[1979]). It
is  (an  attempt  at)  sociology  done  feminist-ly:  ‘something  better,  comprehensible,
retaining a commitment to “theory as praxis”.  Storm the Bastille!  Merde!’  (Stanley,
5 I here refer to work which advances women’s interests as what constitutes feminist research, though I
acknowledge that queer and postcolonial feminisms have problematised the deployment of ‘women’ 
as the collective of feminist subjects. I do not at all contest these critiques; rather, I refer to feminist 
sociology in this manner here because a critical mass of feminist sociology has taken on board this 




I take feminism in its broadest conceptualisation in my approach to making the
research  feminist.  Though  at  earlier  points  in  its  development,  feminism  was
understood in relatively simple terms as a social movement to liberate women from
patriarchal oppression, interventions and developments from postmodernism, queer
theory,  Black  feminisms,  and  postcolonial  feminisms  have  made  that  hasty
generalisation untenable. I hesitate to use the term ‘intersectionality’ here due to its
having taken on the somewhat of the character of a buzzword (Davis, 2008), but what I
would draw from this general framework is that the decisions that have informed the
way this  research was done involved interrogating questions of  gender,  but also of
race, class, citizenship, dis/ability, and sexuality.
Drawing upon Liz Stanley and Sue Wise’s ‘feminist fractured foundationalism’
(2006), I developed a set of three feminist objectives that the research would aim to
fulfil: (1) that it take a robust approach to ethics, exceeding the mandatory minimums
of institutional ethics review and taking seriously any ethical grey area encountered; (2)
that  it  be  fully  replicable  by  other  feminists,  including  the  use  of  retrievable  data
(Stanley and Wise, 2006: 1.6; 2.6) which could be readily and comfortably accessed by
feminists across a range of positionalities; and (3) that the results of the research be
widely accessible, both financially and in terms of its readability for academic and non-
academic readerships. Of course no piece of research can satisfy feminist standards so
unambiguously that it is closed to critique of its feminist credentials, and this research
is  no  exception.  These  three  objectives  were  not  intended  to  place  the  research
beyond  reproach,  but  instead  to  engage  in  the  practice  of  feminist  accountability
(emphasising practice – the recognition that any such attempt is necessarily imperfect
and part of an ongoing striving to do it better the next time).
The sections that follow will elaborate where appropriate upon how each of the
three objectives has been approached, but it would be beneficial here to expand on
what they entail and highlight the key points at which each has confronted this project.
The use of published documentary data may seem like an easy back-door escape on
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the question of ethics, but if the context of the research is taken into account, this
illusion quickly dissipates. While there were no human subjects involved in the project,
Trouble and Strife’s authors were and are people, and radical feminism is a movement
which has a great deal of value to them and to many others. Though I am not myself a
radical feminist, undertaking a study on it placed power over the narrative of its history
in my hands, and I was conscious throughout the research of the significant debts that I
as a woman owe to my feminist forebears, including the authors of Trouble and Strife.
In a somewhat ironic twist, many of the contributing authors to Trouble and Strife have
themselves  gone  on  to  illustrious  careers  in  British  academia  –  some  of  them  in
sociology – which in turn gives them some potential power over me. I have the power
to affect the way that their movement is understood and remembered, and they may
well  at  some  point  have  the  power  to  decide  whether  I  get  a  job.  The  power
relationship runs in both directions, with both myself and radical feminists having some
power over one another, and owing some responsibility to one another in the way we
exercise that power.
At the heart of the ethics of the project, therefore, was not so much the project
itself, but the world-making that its dissemination might effect. My engagement with
ethics  has  been  less  about  protecting  participants  than  about  taking  seriously  the
effect that  the research might  have on the relationship between radical  and other
feminisms. Contentions between feminist movements run deep and hot, and though
the future can never be predicted, taking seriously the responsibility to produce a piece
of  work  which  will  enable  feminists  to  better  understand  one  another  and  make
intractable  divisions  better  rather  than  worse  has  often  been a  productive  tool  in
keeping me accountable and emotionally reflexive in the research process. It  is this
emphasis that has made the ethics of the project feminist, moving it beyond the box-
ticking exercise that research ethics can sometimes be and into serious consideration
of what kind of world the work is intended to help bring about.
In  addition  to  ethical  research  practice,  a  key  aspect  of  feminist  sociology  is
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accountability to readers and facilitation of their critical evaluation of the work. The
ideal  of  fully  replicable research does not quite reconcile with the nature of  either
social realities or the researchers who study them, but the paramount consideration in
feminist  fractured  foundationalism  –  that  of  accountability  –  is  indispensable  to
feminist  research.  As  Stanley and Wise  argue,  it  is  hardly  feminist  to  demand that
readers of the work merely take the researcher’s word on things, especially when the
people  writing  research  skew  structurally  privileged  on  every  available  axis.  The
specifics of the retrievable data used in this research will be detailed in sections 3.5
and 3.6 but what I wish to briefly highlight here is that the research was intended to be
replicable in two ways which proceed from the specific nature of this study. Firstly and
more familiarly, the data needed to be retrievable by others. Readers would need to be
able  to  access  the  data  without  hindrance  from  hard  barriers,  like  paywalls,
institutional  affiliations,  or  inaccessible  spaces  (e.g.,  buildings  which  cannot  be
navigated by people with movement disabilities). 
Secondly, as I emphasised in section 3.2, perceiving the emotional content of
the text required emotional participation in its discourses. This places something of a
condition on the replicability of the analysis – whether another researcher will  see
what I have seen in the data will depend upon their emotional engagement with it, and
a range of interpretations are possible other than the one I advance in this project.
Again following Stanley and Wise (2006: 2.14), however, I contend that this is not an
indication that my analysis is purely subjective in the ‘this is just my opinion’ sense, but
rather that social reality and the positionalities within it of different knowers are always
complicated,  messy,  and a site of  contestation and dispute.  By making the analysis
accountable  through  replicability,  I  invite  alternate  readings  of  the  data  without
conceding that any possible reading is  equally  ‘right’.  The analytic  openness of  the
research dissolves the illusion of an opaque barrier between the researcher and the
reader,  enabling  the  wrestling  over  meanings  and  interpretations  which  allow  for
knowledge processes to be truly collective, communal, and non-exclusionary, and so to
align with a rigorous understanding of feminist sociology.
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The final feminist aspect of the research, and the one which has, for the most
part, not yet been carried out, is ensuring the accessibility of the research outputs. This
will  involve a significant deal  of consideration, as there are many different types of
barriers to accessibility. I will not elaborate on these at length because they concern
aspects  of  the  process  which  are  yet  to  be  undertaken,  but  my  intention  is  to
disseminate the results of the work in academic and non-academic venues, to ensure
that all outputs are available in some form without a paywall, to produce versions of
the research outputs which are comprehensible for non-academic audiences, and to
consider dis/ability issues in relation to the outputs so that people who cannot read
text from a screen can access the material. The entire project has been designed to
enact feminist principles in the research process, and to do so in a way which reaches
across  time  –  it  draws  data  from  feminism’s  past  in  order  to  transform  feminist
relations in the present, to cultivate practices of feminist accountability in the process
and real-world consequences of the work, and to hopefully help to engender a more
feminist future within and outside of sociology.
3.4
Texts as a Window on Emotion Culture: Studying Feminist Emotions in the Archival
Turn
The most basic methodological quandary of this project confronted me many
times when I told colleagues what my planned research was about:
‘My PhD is about the emotions of radical feminism – I’m
trying to figure out why radical feminism is the way it is
emotionally.’
‘So you’re going to interview radical feminists, then?’
Drawing  from  my  admittedly  anecdotal  experience,  it  would  almost  appear  that
qualitative research is interview research until proven guilty of being something else.
Human  subjects  methods  such  as  interviews  or  ethnography  would  certainly  be  a
legitimate way to study radical feminist emotion culture, and these methods were both
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considered  during  the  design  stages  of  the  research.  Ultimately,  documents  were
selected as the data source, and within this, published, historical, periodical texts from
a single-publication case study. In this section, I will elaborate the rationale for the use
of  documentary  archival  research  for  answering  the  research  question,  and  the
advantages and limitations of this approach. The case study approach, case selection,
and sampling will be discussed in the next section.
The emotions of social movements have now generated a considerable body of
research, but little of this uses documentary data. Those studies, like this one, are led
to the methods they use by the specific  demands of  their  research questions.  The
research question for  this  project  led to the archive.  The general  substance of  the
question need not have done so – the question ‘What is the emotion culture of radical
feminism?’  could  be  answered  in  some  way  with  almost  any  qualitative  research
method. The deciding factor in this case was the question behind the question. The
reason the research asks the question that it does is with a view to understanding how
radical feminism became the way that it is emotionally. Embedded in that underlying
question is an orientation to longitudinal process and change (or stasis) which would
be difficult to capture with another method. Another possible way of articulating that
secondary  question  might  be,  ‘What  has  been  the  trajectory  by  which  radical
feminism’s emotion culture has arrived at the place it is in today?’ While the principal
research question, on its face, does not obviously lead to archival research methods,
these secondary driving questions do.
A fuller view of the question which accounts for the other question behind it
leads  to  a  study  of  the  movement’s  past,  but  this  still  does  not  go  as  far  as  to
necessitate historical  or documentary research.  The oft-repeated query -  ‘So you’re
going to interview radical feminists, then?’ - still stands, and with it, the need to parse
out the relative merits of documentary and human subjects methods.  The drive to
unearth the past of a movement which was comprised of participants who are still
around to be interviewed allows dubious assumptions about the relationship between
the past and its contemporary remembrance to quickly arise. This research intended to
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explore radical feminism’s ‘real’ past, not the way it is remembered or narrated today –
a knee-jerk reaction rooted in an unjustified distrust of memory and trust of texts. A
distinction between documents which hold records of the movement’s ‘real’ past and
the presumed unreliability of participants’  memories easily  unravels  under scrutiny.
What radical feminists in the past wrote down, what they wrote for publication (versus
for private use), for whose reading they intended their writings, and other aspects of
what went into constituting radical  feminist published writings place those texts as
much in the realm of embeddedness in the emotional, contextual, and political ebbs
and flows of a particular moment in time as are the memories of those same women
today. Studying historical radical feminist writings does not unearth the movement’s
‘real’ past, but simply changes which factors have gone into shaping the stories that
emerge from the data.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of memory and narrative research which made
historical textual methods better fit for this research than interviews would have been.
Interview research would have,  at  its  heart,  been a study in memory – in  what  is
remembered  and  how,  and  in  what  sorts  of  stories  radical  feminists  now  tell
themselves  about  the  past  that  they  lived  in  light  of  what  has  happened to  their
movement, their world, and their lives since then. That does not make those memories
less ‘accurate’ than what can be interpreted from text, however; rather than turning to
textual research for increased reliability, methods which do not involve human subjects
were used on the basis of a recognition that ‘memory is not the past itself, but rather,
how the past is understood, both by individuals and by communities or social groups’
(Oakley, 2016: 1). It is crucial to note that the archive is not the past itself, either, but it
is a different kind of record of the past than contemporary memory narratives would
be. Interviews are a social  and relational  interaction in which memories are not so
much retrieved as  they  are  constructed in  the interactive  process  of  dialogue and
recollection  (Jedlowski,  2001),  whereas  the  interactive  process  in  play  in  the
production of  a  publication like  Trouble and Strife was concerned with interactions
between radical feminists in their place and time. It was those interactive constructions
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of emotions and meaning with which the research was concerned.
Though the emotions of social movements are not often studied using archival
textual methods, there are some notable exceptions6 which I wish to highlight here, as
well  as  one  which  explores  emotions  and  politics  more  generally.  These  include
Deborah  Gould’s  Moving  Politics (2009)  and  Victoria  Hesford’s  Feeling  Women’s
Liberation (2013),  as  well  as  Sara Ahmed’s  (2004)  The Cultural  Politics  of  Emotion.
These studies are notable as they relate methodologically to my own research, and
there are a few key parallels and contrasts worth noting in relation to them. Firstly,
Gould’s  study is  much more ethnographic  than are the other two,  which are quite
straightforward discourse analyses. Crucially, Gould was a participant in the movement
she  studied,  and  she  used  archival  textual  methods  in  addition  to  interviews  and
participant observation. She alone amongst the three (and she is distinctive amongst
textual researchers of emotions and social movements in this way) engaged with the
texts  she  read  in  much  the  way  described  in  section  one  of  this  chapter  –  she
experienced the text emotionally, with much of that experience being a reliving of her
own emotions during her involvement in ACT UP.
Hesford  and Ahmed approach their  texts  in  a  more  discourse  analytic  way,
paying  attention  to  the  way  that  signs,  signifiers,  and  cultural  narratives  are
orchestrated within the text in order to culturally produce particular types of social
subjects. Hesford’s research is more closely aligned to my project in its focus on a social
movement, whereas Ahmed’s attends to the emotional life of a ‘society’ more broadly;
notably, however, Hesford’s research is not about the emotional life of the WLM itself,
but rather about how feminists were constituted as the objects of particular emotions
through  their  representation  in  the  mainstream  press,  a  focus  similar  to  Ahmed’s
account  of  the  mainstream  media.  These  emotion-focused  studies  add  something
essential  to  our  understanding  of  how  discourse,  emotion,  and  politics  cooperate,
6 One other which might be counted here is Joshua Gamson’s (1995) periodical-based research on gay 
and lesbian identity, and some sociologists of emotion do treat it as a study on emotion (see Jasper, 
2011). However, though Gamson’s data is rich with emotion and he remarks on its emotionality, 
emotion is not an analytic focus of the research. It therefore does not shed light on the methodological
issues of studying emotions through text.
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filling  a  void  left  by  other  research  on  the  way  that  collectives  such  as  women’s
liberationists are represented in mainstream media outlets (see, e.g., Mendes, 2011).
Nevertheless, even with these important additions to the literature on emotions and
politics,  it  remains uncommon to explore the emotions of a social  movement itself
through  textual  data,  and  there  has  consequently  been  little  development  of
methodological tools for doing this.
The  dearth of  text-based research  on movement emotions  seems a  strange
omission,  and  archival  research  on  social  movement  emotions  offers  fruitful
opportunities which will hopefully be taken up more widely in the future. Studying a
movement’s emotional interior through text is the only (ethical) way to undertake such
research without involving the researcher-participant social dynamics which inevitably
change  what  the  researcher  finds.  Textual  research  places  a  researcher  in  direct
conversation with a movement through its texts, making them a sort of fly on the wall.
This affects the emotional dynamics, stories,  communications, energies, resonances,
and flows that they are able to observe and participate in, and creates opportunities
for  inference which  cannot  be replicated within  the  constraints  of  human subjects
research.  This  is  not  a  reason  to  substitute  archival  research  for  human  subjects
methods  in  the  study  of  social  movement  emotions,  but  it  does  make  a  valuable
addition to the methodological toolkit which scholars in this subfield can use in our
collective enterprise to better understand the emotions of movements.
3.5
Delimiting a Social Movement in Documents: Case Study Research in the Archive
In spite of their frequent appearance in human subjects research on emotions
and social movements, case studies are not generally used in documentary studies of
movements (though again it is worth noting that documentary studies of movements
are few and far between). Gould and Hesford both draw upon expansive archives for
their  research,  and though there  are  more narrowly circumscribed case studies on
individual publications within sociological  studies of movements, including feminism
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(see, e.g., Withers, 2011), such research generally draws upon diverse archives of texts
from a range of different authors and publishers, and often across different types of
periodical  and  one-off  publications.  Though  there  are  obvious  benefits  to  this
approach, there are also unique advantages to a single-periodical case study, and the
advantages and limitations of this approach will  be explored in this section. Within
Trouble and Strife,  there was additional  sampling done,  limiting the dataset  to the
1980s and narrowing the topical frame to focus on medical and psychiatric health and
care, and this section will also explain the rationales for these entry points.
The value of case studies for understanding the emotions of social movements
is well  established in research on the topic,  and the field abounds with analytically
fruitful cases which take this approach (e.g., Cadena-Roa, 2002; Gould, 2009; Flam and
King, 2005; Flam, 2013; Goodwin, 1997; Schrock et al, 2004). In practical terms, to do
human subjects research on the emotions of a movement seems almost bound to take
this approach, as a researcher can only do interviews, ethnography, focus groups, or
other types of qualitative research with so many people and groups within the scope of
a single study. The implicit epistemological claim of case studies in emotions and social
movements  is  that  there  is  something  that  can  be  learned  about  the  emotional
workings of a movement from the study of one group or organisation within it and
about emotions in movements in general from the study of a single movement; the
ideologies,  worldviews,  positionalities  and  identities,  and  sense  of  community  and
collective feeling that constitute a movement are understood to be a presence within
each group, such that they can be accessed (albeit within limitations) through a given
exemplar case.
Textual research tends to be seen differently. The epistemological realities of
text-based research are taken to be subject to more extensive constraints than are
human subjects studies. On one level this makes perfect sense – unlike human beings,
texts cannot be queried for clarification, elaboration, or their own interpretations. The
researcher must produce an interpretation solely on the basis of what they find on the
page, and this can leave loose ends and unanswered questions which leave the analysis
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open to serious interrogation.  The interpretative work done by interview researchers,
however, may not be as different to the interpretation involved in textual analysis as it
may superficially seem, and it is worth asking questions about whether documentary
research is being regarded with a somewhat exaggerated degree of suspicion. While
human  subjects  research  is  often  treated  as  having  quite  a  high  degree  of
generalisability,  documentary  studies  are  often  at  least  implicitly  seen  as  being
representative  of  little  other  than  the  specific  texts  under  question.  Texts,  it  is
assumed, are so beset by their own specificities – the particular biographies of their
authors, the purposes for which and readers for whom they were written, the political
economic forces that shaped their ideological content, conditions of production, and
circulation, and the conventions of genre and materiality that shaped their form and
content  –  that  it  is  unjustified  to  make  general  claims  about  social  life  from
documentary data unless such an extensive and diverse archive of texts is drawn upon
that scepticism about analytic inference must yield to the volume of the evidence.
While  these  issues  of  specificity  and  generalisation  are  well-justified  and
essential for researchers to engage with (a point to which I will return below), I contend
that case studies in documentary research can have more epistemic reach than they
are sometimes understood to do, and if the epistemological insights of human subjects
research on emotions and social movements are extended to textual studies of the
same,  productive  opportunities  open  up  for  explorations  of  the  emotions  of
movements that are more difficult to achieve with broader datasets. As it would have
done  with  a  human  subjects  study,  this  research  began  its  investigation  of  the
emotions of radical feminism with a search for some subset of radical feminists to take
as a point of entry. Rather than simply assume that a large and diverse dataset ought to
be assembled,  however,  consideration was given to the particular  demands of  this
study in light of its research question. Taking into consideration recent theorising on
emotions themselves (particularly their conceptualisation as relational – see Burkitt,
2014a; Ahmed, 2014[2004]), the research design was oriented toward capturing the in-
betweenness  of  emotions  at  every  level,  from  the  most  micro-social  to  the  most
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macro. The sample would need to reflect the playing out of interpersonal relationships
(not  just  their  representation or  narration,  but  their  unfolding and evolving in  and
through text itself – I refer here again to texts as a site of social life), as well as intra-
movement  emotional  dynamics  and  collective  emotions,  relations  between  radical
feminism  and  other  social  movements  (including  other  strands  of  the  WLM),  and
radical feminists’ emotional engagements with their broader socio-historical context. 
A periodical  case study is an ideal  answer to all  of  these requirements.  The
regular recurrence of issues of a magazine allow for a temporally measured timeline of
change  across  time,  enabling  longitudinal  effects  of  all  of  the  social  levels  of  the
movement’s  emotional  life  to  be  traced.  The  relatively  insular  (but  not  altogether
closed)  group  of  editors  and  authors  (including  authors  of  letters  to  the  editor)
provided a level of community continuity that made space for interpersonal dynamics
to emerge – not only would radical feminist collective emotions in general appear in
the magazine,  but affinities,  conflicts,  and negotiations between specific  individuals
would sometimes be a visible presence.  The breadth of  the research question was
intended to allow for precisely this sort of open-endedness in the analysis. It was not
clear before the research began what would come up as most significant, so a research
design  which  would reflect  emotional  dynamics  and engagements  of  all  kinds  was
necessary  in  order  to  allow  the  data  to  speak  to  any  aspect  around  which  the
movement’s  emotion  culture  might  actually  be  centred.  Perhaps  somewhat
counterintuitively, the narrowness of a case study was needed to make the analysis less
constrained.
Trouble and Strife was selected as the case after a survey of feminist writings
from across genres and sub-movements. There was some degree of risk of reproducing
the independent press ‘canon’ in the research by studying one of the handful of most
famous and often-researched publications, so care was taken to explore options which
might  be  lesser-known.  Internet  searches  were  of  key  benefit  in  identifying
independent  feminist  publications,  most  valuably  the  Grassroots  Feminism  website
(ND),  which hosts an extensive index of independent social  movement publications
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along with brief descriptions of each. This approach turned up many more results than
could have been found in any given brick-and-mortar archive, and allowed for a more
extensive selection of publications amongst which to select for the case study. Though
other feminist periodicals from around the same time were read in the course of the
research,  including  during  this  exploratory  phase,  Trouble  and  Strife stood  out  as
uniquely valuable for a study of British radical feminism.
The  most  important  feature  that  recommended  Trouble  and  Strife was  its
explicit and strongly-held positioning as a radical feminist publication. Other periodicals
exhibited  meaningful  overlap  with  radical  feminist  thought  and  politics  (Sappho,  a
lesbian feminist magazine, stands out amongst these), but Trouble and Strife was a sort
of  flagship  periodical  for  radical  feminism  within  the  UK.  The  editorial  collective’s
identification of the magazine as a radical  feminist  one is  made explicit  in the first
issue,  and  their  editorial  comment  there  contained  a  pithy  and  recognisable
encapsulation of the political premise of radical feminism as a movement:
‘We  believe  that  men  as  a  group  benefit  from  the
oppression and exploitation of women as a group. We do
not see women’s oppression as secondary in importance
to  class  or  any  other  oppression;  nor  do  we  see  it  as
produced by or maintained because of class or any other
oppression.  Although  we  recognise  that  women
experience  additional  oppressions,  particularly  through
race,  ethnic  origin,  age,  disability,  class,  and that  these
additional oppressions may benefit and be contributed to
by  women  who  do  not  share  them,  all women  are
oppressed as women.’ (Trouble and Strife Collective, 1983,
issue 1: 2; italics original)
Though in the same editorial the collective notes that they intend to publish content by
authors who do not self-identify as radical feminists and some with which they do not
necessarily  agree,  the  political  thrust  of  the  content  of  the  magazine  across  its
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publication run was, more than any other long-running feminist periodical of the time,
consistent with radical feminist thought in general. 
Some reader letters specifically attend to radical feminism as a movement: defining it,
negotiating its boundaries and relationships with other movements, and deliberating
what  self-identifying  radical  feminists  want  their  movement  to  be.  The  editorial
collective’s  openness  to  material  which  was  not  overtly  radical  feminist
notwithstanding,  then,  there  was  a  clear  presence  across  the  publication  that  its
authors and readers saw it as a textual home for radical feminist thought, making it a
viable textual site for empirically investigating the movement.
Trouble and Strife presents rather a double-edged sword for  researchers.  Its
content is diverse and varied, both in genre of textual forms represented and topics
addressed.  This  breadth  provides  a  wide  and  clear  window  through  which  to  see
radical  feminist  culture  and  politics.  The  material  in  the  magazine  addresses  an
enormous range of feminist issues, debates, and concerns: sexuality and lesbianism,
race and colonialism,  legislation  and the state,  patriarchy  as  a  system,  fat  and the
politics of the body, dis/ability, transnational solidarities, reproductive health, abortion,
women’s  events  and  conferences,  social  class,  psychotherapy,  feminist  movements,
and more. To get such a wide array of topics to speak to one another in a cohesive way
would require elaboration of  the specific  debates, events,  and context pertinent to
every one of these things – without such elaboration, a reader of the research would
be at a loss to understand it unless they came to the reading with their own extensive
knowledge of feminist historiography and debates. The magazine’s richness therefore
presented challenges as well as opportunities, and it was consequently necessary to
narrow the topical frame in order to bring the pieces within the sample into reasonably
cohesive conversation with one another.
The criteria for the topical frame of the research were that the topic be well-
represented within the content of the magazine, span a range of genres of writing,
demonstrate a variety of different types of emotional  engagement (emotions being
present in the text through emotion words, tone and timbre, and more subtly and
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implicitly), and be the locus of substantial debate (so that negotiation and deliberation,
rather than less instructive uncontested consensus, would be present). There were two
topic areas which robustly fulfilled all of these criteria: (1) race and coloniality, and (2)
medical  and  psychiatric  health  and  well-being.  Both  of  these  could  have  been
productive points of entry to the movement’s emotion culture, and indeed some of the
richest and most complex debates centred around issues of race. What the health and
well-being debates offered that was more difficult to get at in the race and coloniality
material  was  deeply  ambivalent  turmoil.  Radical  feminists  are  often  faulted  for  a
historical failure to account for and include racially othered women and their political
realities  within  the  movement,  and  while  there  is  a  presence  of  this  issue  in  the
magazine which can provide valuable insight into some aspects of the emotion culture,
radical  feminists were generally agreed upon the question of racism. There was no
debate to be had about  whether  racism really  existed,  was a  genuine problem,  or
demanded accountability and reflexivity on the part of feminists;  the debates were
around the enactment of these principles. Conversely, medical and psychiatric health
and well-being were seen as open to some degree of legitimate debate about ideology
as well as praxis. The question was not simply how to put radical feminist principles
into practice, but what some of those principles ought to be. 
The medial and psychiatric care debates surfaced some of the haziest and most
porous  edges  of  radical  feminist  ideology,  demanding  highly  reflexive,  emotionally-
engaged  debate  amongst  radical  feminists  which  drew  upon  their  own  lived
experiences as well as their shared political lens. The movement’s ideological stance
sometimes grated against women’s feelings with respect to their own lives, giving rise
to confusion, misunderstanding, ambivalence, and sometimes conflict. There was also,
meanwhile,  a  considerable  amount  of  agreement,  produced  by  radical  feminists’
shared  lens  on  gendered  history  and  the  use  of  medicine  and  psychotherapy  as
instruments of patriarchal control. These points of agreement gave the movement a
shared set of meanings and interpretations around which collective emotions could be
organised.  Medicine  and  psychotherapy,  then,  offer  insight  into  the  collectivity  of
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radical feminist emotion and open up explorations of their fracturing, providing the
most  widely-open  window  on  the  movement’s  emotion  culture  and  avoiding  the
inadvertent foreclosure  of  aspects which might be obscured within  a  topical  frame
around which there was universal consensus or a uniform lack thereof.
A  final  important  benefit  of  the  medial  and  psychiatric  care  frame  is  that
debates  around  these  topics  were  amongst  the  points  of  most  stark  divergence
between radical feminism and other feminisms. Radical feminism is distinctive in its
adversarial lens on men – every other strand of the WLM in the UK exhibited more
willingness  to  cooperate,  to  at  least  some  limited  degree,  with  men  in  political
organising. Medical and psychiatric care, like all other social institutions, were under
the principal control of men, unavoidably making them a site of confrontation with the
enemy for radical feminists, whereas this was at least less straightforward for other
strands of the WLM. Radical feminist analysis of medicine and psychotherapy, as will be
explored in the following chapters, reflects this lens, and foregrounds what is unique
about radical feminism’s emotion culture. This distinctiveness enabled the research to
zero in on what is specific to radical feminism.
The  differences  between  radical  and  other  feminisms  around  medical  and
psychiatric  care  led  to  the  next  and  final  sampling  issue:  time.  Trouble  and  Strife
commenced publication  in  1983,  around  the  same time that  feminist  cultural  and
psychoanalytic theory was gaining significant traction in feminist scholarly thought and
social movement practices. The historical moment of the 1980s saw a deepening of the
fractures between strands of the WLM, with radical feminists doubling down on their
ideology  as  the  feminist  turn  to  culture  and  psychoanalysis  bloomed  (see,  e.g.,
Brennan, 1989). The increasing tension between the cultural turn and radical feminists’
sense of  urgency to retain the feminist  gains made during the mobilisations of the
1970s gave rise to heated debates and emotionally-laden reflections. If this research
were  preoccupied  with  a  question  about  how  emotional  (or  unemotional)  radical
feminism was (a question which, in any case, does not reconcile with contemporary
sociological theorising on emotion), then focusing on the 1980s might misrepresent it –
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such  an  emotionally  charged  moment  might  make  the  movement  appear  ‘more
emotional’  than  it  would  at  a  different  time  (or  less  so,  depending  upon  which
emotions were taken account of). However, the research was qualitatively rather than
quantitatively oriented, and for that purpose, the temporal and topical convergence of
medical  and psychiatric care in the riven 1980s was beneficial.  The relevant radical
feminist  debates  ploughed  up  the  ground  of  the  emotion  culture  and  enabled  an
investigation of both what was on its surface and what was concealed underneath it.
This consideration set the start point of the temporal frame at the onset of the
magazine’s publication in 1983, but there remained a question about where to end it.
Medical and psychiatric care dwindled as a presence in the magazine’s content toward
the end of the 1980s, and more or less disappeared from 1991. With the generally
agreed starting point of the ‘third wave’ emerging in 1992, it is unsurprising that radical
feminists turned their attention largely to other things around this time. Because it was
fortuitously  also  the  underlying  intention  of  this  project  to  map radical  feminism’s
emotion culture as it existed just before the movement travelled into the ‘third wave’
period, the obvious cut-off point of 1991 and the point at which pieces on medical and
psychiatric care disappeared from the magazine coincided in that year.
The case study of Trouble and Strife, bracketed from 1983 to 1991 and centring
on medical and psychiatric health and well-being, enabled a thorough investigation of
radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture.  In  this  section,  I  have  argued  that  periodical
publication case studies, if executed with sufficient methodological reflexivity, can be a
viable and productive way to study the emotion cultures of social movements. Drawing
on the orientation to inference and generalisation at  work  in human subjects  case
studies and incorporating recent developments in theorising on emotion into research
design,  documentary  case  studies  can  add  a  valuable  strategy  to  existing
methodologies  for  studying  movement  emotions.  Trouble  and  Strife,  as  a  de facto
flagship periodical publication for radical feminism, was a strong case for investigation,
and the roiling intra- and inter-feminism contestations of the 1980s around medicine
and  psychotherapy  offer  a  clear  point  of  entry  on  the  interplay  between  radical
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feminist political  thought and emotions,  highlighting collective consensus as well  as
processes of negotiation and change.
3.6
Finding the Text: The Epistemology & Politics of Multiply-Archived Documents
Archival research always presents an array of inscrutable mysteries to a researcher, and
the demands of doing archival research in a feminist way, and about feminism, add to
the load of quandaries to be resolved. In this section, I will detail the approach taken to
working with the archive. This includes the selection of an archive amongst a range of
them which hold similar content, the synthesis of physical archive and digital archive
methods  which  was  employed  in  the  research,  and  the  reflexive  demands  and
challenges  that  the  archive  component  of  a  feminist  sociological  project  about
feminism presented. Each of these entails both epistemic and political issues, and the
feminist ethos of the research guided both.
The UK is a good place to be a feminist archival researcher. The country hosts a
range  of  archives  of  feminist  materials,  including  but  not  limited  to  the  Glasgow
Women’s Library (Glasgow), the Feminist Archive North and Feminist Archive South
(Leeds and Bristol, respectively), and the the Women's Library at the London School of
Economics (London),  amongst others.  Many of the same materials  can be found in
several different archival locations, which raises questions about which one to use. It
may seem that only pragmatic considerations would go into this decision, and indeed it
did turn out that the best choice was also the most pragmatic, but a feminist archival
project  must  also  take  the  politics  of  the  archive  into  consideration.  There  are
questions  about  physical  and  financial  accessibility,  democratic  governance,  who
wields the power of gatekeeping and to what ends, and the emotional politics of the
archival space, and these were all examined in the process of selecting an archive.
The most immediate feminist consideration in the work was selecting an archive
that anyone could go into without obtaining an institutionally-issued ID card, being a
student  or  staff  member  at  a  university  or  other  organisation,  or  registering  their
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details with a security desk. These are all exclusionary factors which might bar entry to
some and grant it to others, and while none of these would be barriers for me, an
important aspect of doing feminist research is doing work that could have been done
by any other feminist (or could be retraced by them afterwards). A related but distinct
issue is that of the physical and emotional accessibility of an archive location. Whether
the  building  where  the  archive  is  located  is  physically  accessible  to  those  with
movement disabilities, and how welcoming or intimidating a space it is for a range of
different people, speak to the feminist credentials of the archive and its fitness for use
in a piece of feminist research7. I aimed for an archive that did not require ascent of
stairs, and which maintained a community-oriented environment which would not be
too  imposing  for  people  of  varied  gender,  racial,  religious,  class,  sexuality,  and
dis/ability  positionalities  to  comfortably  enter.  It  fortuitously  happened  that  the
Glasgow Women’s Library (GWL), the feminist archive nearest my base in Edinburgh,
answered all  of  these requirements. They hold a full  archive of  Trouble and Strife’s
publication  run,  in  addition  to  an  array  of  other  feminist  periodicals  and  a  wide
selection of feminist books, are in a ground floor location, and are easily accessible by
public transport.
In  addition  to  the  accessibility  of  the  archive  space  itself  and  the
appropriateness of  its  contents,  the broader structural  situation of  the archive was
considered. Even an archive which is openly and comfortably accessible to everyone is
situated within an array of power relations (Eichhorn,  2013).  Every physical  archive
(and digital one, a point I will return to below) has operating costs and must draw its
funding from somewhere. There are, in many cases, profits to be made in operating
them,  and the  people  who work  in  them are  providing  labour  which  benefits  the
researchers who use them and those who economically profit from their existence and
7 I would add here that many archival materials are not as widely available as those that this research 
used, and while it is optimal for feminist research to take all of the issues mentioned in this section 
into consideration, their satisfactory resolution is not always possible. I would not contend that a 
piece of research is not feminist if it did not encounter the ease of fulfilling feminist ideals that I had 
the good fortune to meet with during this project, though I would hope that all feminist researchers 
would see this as an impediment to feminist research rather than an irrelevancy.
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maintenance. The GWL is a charitably-funded body and the only registered women’s
history museum in Scotland. They do not charge fees for entry or to obtain a library
card, and do not charge late fees for delayed return of borrowed books. They actively
engage their local community of Bridgeton, Glasgow (a working class neighbourhood),
and specifically reach out to minority ethnic members of the community for part-time
paid work in the library. It is therefore an ideal fit for a piece of feminist research which
is meant to be replicable by any feminist who takes an interest and to avoid, as well as
possible, entanglement with ethically dubious corporate interests.
The politics of the GWL are ideal for feminist research, but as with any archive,
there are inevitably some practical constraints on the ease of its use for research. The
principal one for my purposes was that it would be substantially time-consuming to
scan all of the magazine pages of  Trouble and Strife’s print run. As the sampling was
done through an iterative process after the archival visits took place, it would have
been necessary to scan every page of every issue of the magazine, and GWL has no
scanner on site, leaving researchers to carry out their scanning with hand-held devices
that they bring with them. Trouble and Strife, conveniently, exists in full text digitised
format, and could be accessed in that way without the need to scan it all anew in the
GWL.  This  raised a few issues  which are  worth elaborating.  The first  is  that  digital
duplicates,  like  hard copy originals,  are  kept  somewhere (online)  by  someone who
controls  how they  are  accessed,  for  which  reason there  is  a  politics  to  the  digital
archive  just  as  there  is  to  the  brick-and-mortar  one.  The  second  issue  is  that  the
digitised version of a text is distinct from its original, and that needs to be taken into
consideration when the research is  done – I  was able to get a lot  from the digital
duplicates  of  the  data  that  I  could  also  get  from the  hard  copy  originals,  but  not
everything  about  a  text  can  be  captured  and  translated  digitally,  and  indeed  the
document becomes a distinct and different one in certain respects when it is digitally
duplicated. Thirdly, there is the question of reading the text, and whether reading and
analysing  a  digital  duplicate  can  yield  the  same findings  as  reading  the  hard  copy
original. I will address each of these matters in turn.
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Trouble  and  Strife is  available  in  full  text  PDF  (portable  document  format)
online. This is increasingly becoming true of a range of feminist periodicals in the UK,
and Spare Rib and off our backs are now also available online in full text. This raises
crucial questions for a feminist sociologist: Who has done the labour of digitising these
materials? Who has control over whether, how, and by whom they can be accessed? Is
anyone profiting economically from their online availability, and if so, who? What is the
relationship between the holders and gatekeepers of  the digital  duplicates and the
original  publications? As with GWL as  the physical  archive site,  Trouble and Strife’s
online archive was ideal to satisfactorily answer all of these questions. While Spare Rib
is kept online by the British Library, and off our backs is kept with JSTOR, Trouble and
Strife’s  digital  archive  is  on  their  own  website,  having  been  picked  up  by  a  new
generation  of  Trouble  and  Strife radical  feminist  editorial  collective  members.  The
website also features new content, speaking to how central this publication is to the
intellectual and political life of the British radical feminist movement. The collective
themselves  control  access  to  the  digital  duplicates,  which  are  freely  available  for
download (enabling viewing without an internet connection after the download), and
no website registration is required for this.  Again here, then, what was most in the
interest of making the research process a feminist one and what was most convenient
for the research happened to coincide.
The  empirical  aspect  of  the  research  proceeded in  two  phases,  one  in  the
physical archive and one using the downloaded scans of the magazine. The process was
ordered in such a way as to ensure that the magazine was read as multi-modally as
possible, but allowing for practical convenience where appropriate. What this meant in
practice was that the physical archive was visited before the digital copies were ever
accessed. I considered it important that my first encounter with the text be with the
physical  magazine  itself.  The  materiality  of  a  publication  conveys  clues  about  its
positionality  within  an  intertextual  milieu,  a  reality  which  comes  to  the  fore  in  a
physical periodical archive. What sort of paper a periodical is printed on, whether it is
in colour or black and white (or a combination of the two), how large or small the
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magazine is (in length, but also the dimensions of the pages it is printed on), how each
magazine is bound (some periodicals were bound with staples, others with colourful
yarn,  and still  other periodicals  were merely  folded together with no binding),  and
crucially,  how each  of  these  features  compares  to  other  periodicals  in  the  archive
speaks  volumes  about  the  resources  that  were  available  to  the  producers  of  the
magazine, what political values may have gone into their production processes, what
sorts of other publications they were positioning their own as being similar to, and
which they were more distanced from.
Trouble and Strife was printed on standard printer paper and roughly standard
(A4) page size. The printing was black and white throughout, but the outside page on
which the cover was printed was a glossier paper and brightly coloured. The scanned
copies  appear  fully  in  black  and white,  and the  colourfulness  of  the  covers  is  not
discernible there. This feature might seem inconsequential, and perhaps more a matter
of making the magazine look enticing than of positioning it intertextually (indeed, there
is a risk of ascribing too much meaning to every aspect of an archival  document –
sometimes editors may simply want the page to look a bit more interesting and give
the matter no deeper consideration than that). However, it is noteworthy what other
publications Trouble and Strife resembles in this way and which it is dissimilar to. The
periodical  that  most  physically  resembles  Trouble  and  Strife is  Sappho,  a  lesbian
feminist magazine (which is printed on smaller paper, but is otherwise like Trouble and
Strife in appearance). The Marxist and socialist feminist publications tended toward a
broadsheet newspaper style, while liberal feminist magazines like  Spare Rib had the
appearance of a much more professional output, with high production quality, glossy
paper, professional photography, and full-colour printing.
The time spent in the physical archive, then, was focused on exploring Trouble
and Strife’s position within its intertextual milieu, and helped to indicate where the
editors  wanted  the  magazine  to  be  placed  politically  through  its  similarities  and
dissimilarities to other publications. Time was spent comparing it to other publications
(in its material aspects, but also in others), as well as gaining a general familiarity with
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its contents. Beyond this, however, it would not have been feasible to carry out the
analysis in the archive itself. The archival original copies of Trouble and Strife could not
be written on or taken away from the GWL, and so scanned copies were needed for
analysis to be carried out. Rather than take original scans of the magazine by hand,
which would have been a time-consuming endeavour and would merely reproduce the
labour already done by the Trouble and Strife collective themselves, I downloaded the
digital duplicates from Trouble and Strife’s website, and then went back to the archive
to  compare  these  to  the hard  copy  originals  to ensure that  all  of  the  pages  were
present.
Digital duplicates are not, of course, simply mirror images of the originals. The
scanned  copies  are  kept  on  a  website  rather  than  in  a  physical  archive,  and  are
accessible  from  anywhere  with  an  open  internet  connection  (whereas  a  physical
archive must be visited in person). The digital copies of Trouble and Strife are part of a
different leg of the magazine’s history – rather than being a historical document, they
are a living part of a significant feminist periodical which has been taken up again many
years after it ceased publication and begun a new round of production as a website.
This places it in a fundamentally different narrative than the one it left off with when it
ceased print publication in 2002 (Dampier, 2008). Reading digital copies of Trouble and
Strife from the website, then, is taking up a resource which has been made available by
a committed group of radical feminists to continue the tradition of specifically radical
feminist writing in a moment in feminist history when radical feminism continues to
come under heavy critique from postmodern, queer, and libertarian feminisms. The
continuity and persistence of radical feminist ideology which gave rise to this research
is embodied in the resumed production and self-digitisation of Trouble and Strife. The
significance of this development comes through even more sharply when compared
with other now-digitised feminist periodicals of the ‘second wave’, which are kept in
online  archives  by  large,  wealthy  institutions  (with  no  overt  feminist  affiliation  or
identification)  such  as  the  British  Library  and  JSTOR.  These  latter  are  historical
artefacts, digitised for wider accessibility than can be achieved with physical archives,
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and are available for readers interested in seeing remnants of the textual legacy of the
‘second wave’. It is implied by the way that these documents are archived, by whom,
and  for  what  sorts  of  purposes  they  are  assumed  to  be  accessed  that  archived
periodicals belong to the past. Trouble and Strife, on the other hand, digitally archived
by its own collective, housed on its own website and under its own control, kept strictly
in  the  hands  of  radical  feminists  themselves,  and  housed  online  alongside  newly
written content places Trouble and Strife’s history within a living present.
The use of  Trouble and Strife’s online archive therefore served two purposes.
One was that it resolved the practical issue of producing digital copies and provided the
necessary  hard  copy  material  for  the  analysis.  The  second  and  more  significant,
however, was that it extended the feminist sociological ethos of the data collection,
which began with using a physical archive which is held in a publicly funded and widely
accessible women’s history museum. The physical data collection phase was followed
by use of a digital archive which is held and operated by radical feminists themselves
without  control  having  been  ceded  to  bureaucratic,  elite  knowledge  institutions.
Commencing the research in the physical archive ensured that the initial impression of
the magazine incorporated its  material  aspects,  so that  the magazine’s  intertextual
positioning would remain a present idea throughout the research (which might have
been difficult to achieve if my first encounter with the text had been on a screen).
Finally, the use of digital duplicates allowed for printing of paper copies which could be
read in a manner similar to how the original magazine would be read – on paper. The
ability to read within and across pieces, to do so in a manner befitting the pace and
process of analysis, and to allow me to write on the text was crucial to the analytic
process. This enabled me to do analytic thinking in the research which would have
been difficult to accomplish had the data been confined to a screen or been read from
an archival original which could not be written on.
The feminist sociological concerns outlined above preceded a more convoluted
one about what it means to undertake feminist archival research as a feminist studying
feminism. Archives are spaces that have been heavily romanticised,  and this  is  not
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surprising given the potentials that they hold. Knowledge produced from archival data
reaches into the past and rewrites it,  changing the history from which the present
proceeds and opening and foreclosing different ways of imagining what future should
and can follow (Hemmings, 2011). All sociological knowledge production comes with
the  responsibilities  that  attend  the  world-making  that  it  entails,  and  approaching
historical  archival  research  from  a  feminist  perspective  comes  with  additional
accountabilities.  The power that  a  shared understanding of  the past  has  to shape,
frame, narrate, and define the present and future is a significant one for a researcher
to wield, and one which must be taken seriously in the research process. This research
about radical feminism was intended from its outset to open up new feminist futures
through a revisitation of the past, so this was a consideration which was returned to
regularly  throughout  the  process.  In  addition  to  the  epistemic  opportunities  and
limitations  of  doing  archival  documentary  research  on  emotions  (which  will  be
addressed in the next section), there were relationships to consider: between myself as
the researcher and the movement I was researching, between generations of feminists
and different feminist ideological camps, and most crucially, between the past and the
present.
This research was undertaken with a view toward helping to solve a problem,
which  might  better  be  solved  if  more  deeply  understood.  It  was  my  intention,
therefore, to make sense of how aspects of present-day radical feminism which I see as
a problem came to be through a historical  trajectory.  Such a stance on the radical
feminism of today draws toward a reading of the archive against its grain. Conversely, a
deep understanding of any social  movement emotion culture relies upon seeing its
archive  on its  own terms,  demanding  a  reading with the grain  of  the text  and an
interpretative  social  scientific  approach.  This  tension  was  present  throughout  the
research, and resulted in a moving back and forth between reading with and against
the grain of the text. Though the reading process often felt deeply ambivalent as a
result of this, the against-the-grain critical sense-making process operating alongside
the with-the-grain sympathetic reading raised the more subterranean textures of the
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text to the surface and allowed for the exploration of radical feminism’s own internal
ambivalences.  It  is  important  to recognise  and acknowledge my own position with
respect to radical feminist politics and ideology and the ways in which this pulled upon
my reading of the data, but likewise the push and pull of a critical view of some aspects
of  radical  feminist  thought  alongside  a  sense  of  urgency  that  it  be  authentically
understood, rather than hastily dismissed, enabled a lively wrestling with the text. This
produced a deeper reading of it than might have happened otherwise. It also provided
a regular mechanism of checking the analytic process against the standard of feminist
sociological  practice,  keeping  the  reading  oriented  toward  understanding  the  text’s
intended meaning while also remaining accountable to the present and future that the
research was helping to create.
A distinctly feminist challenge of doing the research was the sense of debt to
earlier  feminists that those of my own generation owe. To render radical  feminism
critically seems a gesture of ingratitude from a feminist whose ability to be placed in a
university doing a PhD about emotions and feminism (to say nothing of the myriad
other  feminism-shaped  aspects  of  my  daily  lived  reality)  is  so  substantially  a
consequence  of  the  labours  of  the  very  women  whose  writing  was  my  object  of
analysis. At a number of points, I felt a hesitation to be critical of radical feminism,
conscious that by doing so I was contributing to the reproduction of a self-defeating
(and, on examination, largely unfounded) intergenerational animosity within the milieu
of  feminisms (Mackay,  2014).  There were certainly  points at  which this  seemed an
insurmountable barrier to the production of a robust piece of research – to critique
radical  feminism  would  reproduce  precisely  the  inter-feminist  hostilities  that  the
project  was  meant  to  help  resolve,  and  to  withhold  from  doing  so  would  be
epistemically dishonest and more a reflection of my own feelings of gratitude toward
feminists of the ‘second wave’ than of my sociological analysis.
Ultimately, this was a difficult but highly productive predicament in the thinking
process  that  wove  throughout  the  research.  The  perfect  balance  between
interpretative  and critical  approaches remains elusive,  but  the endeavour  to find a
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route out of this tension led me to the analysis that ultimately resulted. The questions
which were brought to the analytic process were around why feminists placed in this
particular moment (the 1980s), with the view and interpretation of history up to that
point that they subscribed to, enmeshed in the structural and cultural shifts that they
were, embedded in the unique array of relationships of power, affinity, and anomie in
which they found themselves, would come to have the emotion culture that they did.
This, of course, was essentially the question from the outset, and some would argue
that this is the difference between normative bias and social ‘science’. However, no
research proceeds from a suspended reality outside of time, space, and relationships,
and it required this emotional journey of navigating the feminist responsibilities of the
research to bring the resulting analysis to the fore. It was the feminist aim of producing
research that would enable more productive feminist futures that formed the basis of
the analytic approach. As discussed in chapter 2, this type of analysis is not prevalent in
studies of emotions and social movements, and so had not arisen as an obvious lens to
take to the work until the demands of balancing my indebtedness to other feminists
and my world-making responsibilities as a knowledge producer eventually led to it.
3.7
Reading Emotion Culture from Text: Literary Ethnography & a Historical Lens
The  process  of  interpreting  and analysing  textual  data  is  different  for  every
combination of researcher and dataset. No two researchers can really carry out the
same piece of research, even with the same question and on the same dataset, though
they may largely come to the same sorts of conclusions. Following from the framework
of  feminist  fractured  foundationalism  outlined  above,  this  section  will  provide  an
account of how the data involved in this project was read and analysed. The purpose of
this detailed account is to make the findings and inferential process by which they were
generated accountable and open to scrutiny by the reader, though I  simultaneously
acknowledge  that  all  knowledge  generated  through  research  is  anchored  in  the
positionality and subjectivity of the researcher. Accountability is not, as Van de Poel-
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Knotterus and Knotterus suggest,  a way of creating accuracy of the sort that might
guarantee that another researcher will generate exactly the same results if they follow
the  process  I  outline,  but  rather  a  way  of  laying  open  to  evaluation  the  way  the
knowledge  was  generated,  so  that  the  process,  as  well  as  the  findings,  can  be
interrogated.
Though  this  was  covered  earlier  in  the  chapter,  I  highlight  again  here  the
significance of the exploratory phase of the research in the analysis. The reading of
radical  feminist  literature  such  as  manifestos,  essays,  academic  writings,  and
consciousness-raising  guides  was  used  for  two  purposes.  Firstly,  it  provided  the
intertextual familiarity requisite for all textual analysis. Secondly, it served as a sort of
affective training ground, in which I as the researcher attuned my feeling self as an
affective and emotional instrument for reading and analysing radical feminist writings. I
am not  suggesting  that  anyone who extensively  reads  radical  feminist  writings  will
somehow become assimilated into radical feminist subjectivity (whatever that might
be), and therefore that this is a fully replicable component of the research. However,
because  my  ability  to  carry  out  this  research  was  augmented  by  emotionally-
embedded positionalities as a feminist and a woman, and my motivation for doing the
work was an earnest desire to resolve what are perhaps needlessly exaggerated and
destructive rifts in the broader feminist movement, my reading of the radical feminist
canon enabled me to see radical feminist ideology and ideas on the movement’s own
terms, and to cultivate in myself to the greatest extent possible the ability to see things
through the movement’s lens – in other words, to empathise with radical feminists.
Though some accounts of research methodology would regard this as an indulgent and
unnecessary way of describing the research process, I follow Benet Reid in maintaining
that only by becoming a living participant in the world of the text was I able to provide
an analysis of the movement’s emotion culture from it. My own emotions were not
data,  but  they  were  a  vital  research  instrument,  and  that  instrument  required
calibration, which the exploratory phase of the work provided (I will detail how this
was then instrumentalised below).
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Following the exploratory phase, the case selection and sampling described in
section 3.5 was carried out, followed by several rounds of reading of the data. As with
the  exploratory  phase,  the  initial  reading  was  intended  solely  for  the  purpose  of
gaining familiarity with the content of all of the pieces included in the sample, and to
get  a  sense  of  what  was  happening  emotionally  in  it.  The  analysis  approach
incorporated two key elements: multimodality and feeling-led ethnographic reading.
The  multimodal  approach  adopted  was  that  outlined  by  Roland  Barthes  (1977)
focusing on how text and images were read separately and in combination, and how
the space of the page was used to contribute to the overall messages in the text. The
ethnographic component of the reading attended to the ‘personal account’ of how the
text works emotionally to which Benet referred, and served as the starting point for
explorations of the relationship between text and context. 
This  initial  stage  of  the  research  began  what  would  become  a  somewhat
unexpected  excavation  process.  Unlike  the  purportedly  unemotional  technical
discourses which Benet Reid studied, the text of Trouble and Strife is rife with explicit
references to emotions. It is clearly denoted in emotion words, overtly alluded to in
images and cartoons, and unambiguously evoked in the reader. It was this surface-level
emotion to which the analysis  initially  turned,  precisely because it  leaps off  of  the
page. However, the study of emotion culture presents unique challenges for textual
analysis. Though there is a lot of emotion on the surface of the text, focusing on this
largely  pulled  the  analysis  away from the  movement’s  broad emotion  culture.  The
emotion  culture  is  occupied  with  emotions  as culture  –  a  nexus  between  the
movement’s  historical  and  sociopolitical  location,  its  ideological  lens,  and  the
emotional ways of being that prevailed in the movement. It was therefore often the
implicit and subtextual emotion that was most relevant to the analysis, and an analytic
approach which  focused on  emotion  language  and the  explicit  would  have missed
much of this. As the initial reading and re-reading of the data and early attempts at
analysis unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the material in the text that was
often of interest for answering the research question escaped the analytic capture of a
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surface-oriented reading of the text.
It was at this point that the phenemenological, affectively-led reading approach
advocated by Benet Reid in his work came to the fore. It was common in my reading of
the text for me to find that a given passage resonated emotionally but did not explicate
emotion – I would sense anger, frustration, affection, or mirth in the text, but could not
readily identify the word or phrase that had conveyed it. To borrow Reid’s phrasing, I
initially found it ‘difficult to codify’ where the apparent emotion in the text was coming
from. This observation then informed the way that the analysis was done. There were
three  key  analytic  tools  used:  the  overt  instrumentalisation  of  the  researcher’s
emotions  and  emotional  reflexivity  in  the  analysis,  placing  me  as  a  ‘living  subject
within’ the material; the interpretation of emotional resonances and currents in the
text  through  the  postulate  of  emotions  as  relational  (Burkitt,  2014a;  Ahmed,
2014[2004]), which made it possible to analytically explain the emotion I felt in the
text; and the historical orientation of the research, which explained emotions in the
text  by  reference  to  the  historical  moment  in  which  1980s  radical  feminism  was
situated. The remainder of this section will elaborate each of these three aspects of the
analysis approach.
In order to surface emotion culture in the text, it was necessary to analytically
account for emotions which were subtle, implicit,  and subtextual, and to link these
with the movement’s ideology and historical location. It was not sufficient to identify
what emotions were commonly expressed in the text – instead, there was a need to
generate an account of how emotions work in the movement and to explain how its
emotional life was related to the meanings, ideas, ideologies, and world views from
which radical  feminists’  emotional  responses  to people and events would proceed,
whatever specific emotions they might be. What it  means to read implicit  emotion
from text  is  difficult  to  elaborate abstractly,  but the following example will  provide
some idea of what such reading entails, and will make clearer why having the research
done by an appropriately emotionally ‘calibrated’ researcher is a practical necessity.
The following extract comes from Sophie Laws’s conference report about the
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Women’s International Tribunal and Meeting on Reproductive Rights in Amsterdam in
1984. The general emotional impression of this piece as a whole is one of affection,
warmth,  and affinity between women (though there are other emotional dynamics
within it as well). There are two analytic difficulties here, one being that it is difficult to
convincingly represent the overall emotional tone of a piece without quoting it in its
entirety, and the other being that these emotional resonances in the text are largely
implicit. I here quote a highly illustrative (if also rather lengthy) excerpt from early in
the piece:
‘First a kind of list – to give you some idea of the context
of  the  discussions,  of  the  range  of  women  present.  A
Tamil woman speaks of the persecution of her people in
Sri Lanka, of girls selling their bodies to earn a passage to
India; a Portuguese woman tells about the fight to legalise
abortion there; a woman from Curacao [sic] is working on
a quarterly feminist magazine. A Yugoslavian speaks about
the problem of women there using abortion as their only
form  of  contraception;  Chilean  women  speak  about
women  being  paid  a  monthly  benefit  when  they  are
pregnant  which may equal  the family’s  total  income. A
Spanish woman is  on  trial  for  performing abortions;  in
Zimbabwe,  still,  young girls  abandon babies  when they
have  given  birth  outside  of  marriage.  A  Dutch  lesbian
doctor reads a statement from the women in Amsterdam
jail  about their  demand for a woman doctor;  an Indian
woman  protests  at  routine  police  rape.  Costa  Rican
women talk about pills being given out like sweets while
there  is  not  one  diaphragm  in  the  whole  country;  a
Brazilian reports that IUD strings are often cut off so that
women  cannot  remove  them.  A  Nicaraguan  woman
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reports on the progress the Sandinistas are making with
health care. Women from many countries report that half
the cases in gynaecology wards are of women suffering
the effects  of  dangerous and illegal  abortions.  A Dutch
woman tells of her struggles as the daughter of a mother
who  took  DES,  an  oestrogen  prescribed  to  prevent
miscarriage which has produced cancers in many of the
children  born  after  this  treatment.  Black  South  African
women speak  of  Black  women being  sterilised  without
their  knowledge  while  undergoing  other  abdominal
surgery. They fear for Black women if South Africa follows
Britain  and licenses  Depo Provera.  A  statement is  read
from Vanuatu,  a  newly independent  Pacific  island state
which has recently banned Depo Provera; a British Black
woman speaks for the rights of women with sickle cell to
bear children. A health education worker is present from
the Union of  Peasant Women of  Ecuador;  a number of
British  and  Dutch  women  with  disabilities  speak  about
how they are discouraged from having children. Women
from  many  countries  are  campaigning  against  drug
companies’  exploitative  practices,  and  there  has  been
some success in the work against the selling of powdered
milk. A Thai  lesbian talks about her acute isolation in a
country, like so many, where making an independent life
as a woman is highly dangerous. A Puerto Rican woman
talks  about  how  oestrogens  in  meat  are  causing
“precocious  sexual  development”  in  many  children,
mostly girls. An Indian woman warns that “Third World”
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women will soon be being used as surrogate mothers by
wealthy western couples.
After dinner one night,  some African women tell
us how in their countries if a girl-child is born, the women
give five cheers, if a boy-child, seven: feminists give eight
cheers for a girl. They show us how it’s done.’ (Laws, 1985,
issue 5: 34-35)
The long first paragraph provided an account of the women at the conference and the
issues  that  they  brought  for  discussion,  but  more importantly  for  purposes  of  this
research, it gave an impression of the scale and magnitude of women’s oppression. The
way that Laws chose to represent this, in the form of a long, point-by-point list, was
structured so as to be emotionally evocative as well as descriptively informative for a
radical feminist reader of Trouble and Strife, who would be going to the magazine with
a pre-existing emotional  orientation toward women’s oppression.  Any analyst  could
have arrived at this inference, but the first time I read this piece, I felt despondent by
the  end  of  that  paragraph  (and  the  more  so  out  of  consciousness  that  in  many
respects,  things  have not  much improved since the time of  writing).  As  a  feminist
analyst,  and  one  whose  own  lived  experience  is  that  of  a  woman,  I  was  more
emotionally moved by the text than some other researchers might have been. 
This was significant due to what came next. The small paragraph at the end of
the passage, marked out as distinct from the rest by the paragraph break, closed this
otherwise demoralising introduction on a note of  hope and affection.  She not only
highlighted that there were feminists enacting resistance in spite of the overwhelming
scale  of  women’s  global  oppression,  but she selected an example  which illustrated
resistance through the expression of  joy,  and added an admiring remark about the
example  that  those  women  set  for  other  feminists.  I  felt  the  warmth,  hope,  and
affectionate admiration in that passage in part because it came at the end of such a
bleak preceding section. I am emotionally invested in resistance to patriarchy, and I,
like participants in radical feminism’s emotion culture, need hope and the emotional
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sustenance  of  solidarity  between  women  in  order  to  cope  with  my  own  social
positioning as a woman and a feminist. This is in one sense a type of emotive expertise,
but it also ensured that I had an emotional reaction to the text that was in line with the
emotional  culture  of  the  movement  with  which  it  was  associated.  Indeed,  the
nourishing power of relationships between women is a strong theme in radical feminist
writings, and my exploratory immersion in the radical feminist canon sent me into the
data analysis with a less forgiving and more exasperated and angry attitude toward
male oppressors than my postmodern, ‘third wave’ background had engendered me
with. It is not impossible that a non-feminist or male researcher might perceive the
implicit affection and warmth that I did in the final paragraph of that passage, but my
socio-emotional  situatedness as  a  feminist  woman and my emotionally ‘calibrating’
exploratory research  were powerful  tools  in  better  enabling  me to  perceive  it  and
greatly increasing the likelihood that I would. Having had that emotional response to
the text,  it  was then possible for  me to probe where my reaction had come from,
enabling me to connect the demoralising bleakness of the first paragraph with radical
feminism’s ideological conviction that women’s oppression by men was omnipresent,
systematic,  and  deliberate,  to  relate  the  last  paragraph  with  the  movement’s
occupation with women’s separatism and caring relationships between women, and to
note the considerable emotional impact of the juxtaposition of the two in the structure
of the text.
Those factors that I have just identified highlight the significance of emotion
theory in methodologies for studying emotion in text. Reid argues that the emotional
currents in a text which are only perceptible to an ethnographically embedded reader
are difficult to clearly account for. That is true, and the spectral presence of emotions
in text do not always lend themselves to explication in the form of academic writing,
which is the form in which the analyst is expected to represent their findings. With that
being acknowledged, however, there is a possibility of accounting for the implicit and
subtextual  emotion  perhaps  more  instrumentally  than  Reid  seems  to  suggest,  by
recognising  emotional  currents  and  reverberations  as  shifts,  negotiations,  and
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transformations  of  relationships.  If  recent  theorising  on  emotion  as  relational  is
brought  into  the methodology  of  reading  emotion from text  in  this  way,  then the
implicit emotion that the analyst feels in the text can be seen differently. Rather than
the vague emotional timbres and resonances which Reid suggests may not be possible
to explain except to say that ‘you had to be there’, emotion indirectly and implicitly
represented in text can be understood as emotion represented as its relationality. 
Relationships are not only between subjects, of course, and this is important to
note  if  the  representation  of  radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture  in  text  is  to  be
accessible through analysis. Radical feminists had relationships with individual people
as well as collectives, groups, and categories of them, but they also had relationships
with  ideas,  paradigms,  and  values,  and  those  relationships  were  as  subject  to
negotiation, transformation, and sometimes struggle as any that they had with other
people.  Accounts  of  emotion  as  relational  often  (and  rightly)  emphasise  the
intersubjective,  but  the other  side  of  a  relationship need not  always  be a subject.
Laws’s conference report showed that she had relationships (albeit brief ones) with the
other women at the conference,  but she also had a relationship with the ideas of
women as a collectively oppressed group and of feminists as members of the same
political team. When she stated that the African women who cheered at the births of
girls ‘show us how it’s done’, and positioned that statement within her longer narrative
of  women’s  overwhelming  oppression  being  counteracted  by  resilient  and  joyful
resistance, she implicitly (re)produced the abstract but emotionally meaningful idea of
feminists as a group warmly bonded to one another through belief in one another’s
value. It is that latter relationship – with the idea, rather than the specific people – with
which that passage of the text emotionally reverberates.
In spite of the preceding discussion, it may seem that a reading of the latter
paragraph of the excerpt from Laws’s piece as resonating with warmth and affection is
a  bit  of  an  over-reading.  There  are  two  final  components  of  the  interpretation  of
Trouble and Strife which are needed to explain how the analysis has worked, and to
show why the emotion that I have interpreted from the text has not merely been a
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superimposition of my own emotional interior: texts as units of analysis, and emotions
as produced within historical locations. The extract above does not appear in Trouble
and Strife the way it does in this thesis, as an abstraction positioned within a piece of
academic writing, and it was not originally authored or intended to be read decades
away from its time of writing (though the authors would be well aware, and would
likely hope, that the text would remain extant for many years). Both of these factors
have directly contributed to my reading of the text, and I will conclude this section by
elaborating briefly on each.
A recurrent challenge in producing the analysis here is that because much of
the emotion in the text is implicit, and all of it deeply intertwined with its historical
location and context, it is impossible to adequately show, within a piece of academic
writing, the emotion I have found through the analysis. The extracts appearing in the
chapters that follow come from pieces of writing which cannot be exhibited here in
their entirety, and some meaning is always lost when a part of a piece is cut away from
the whole. Even if a whole piece could be reproduced within the text of this thesis,
each piece in Trouble and Strife was part of a larger issue, had other pieces positioned
before and after it, and the issue as a whole had other issues around it within the
longer overall run of the magazine. Though I have just argued that implicit emotion in
text  can be better  accounted for  than Reid seems to  suggest,  I  return  here  to his
description of the product of a literary ethnography as a ‘rather personal account’ of
how the  text  works.  It  may at  times appear  that  the emotion  in  the  text  is  over-
represented, and there is little to say in response to this allegation other than to urge
the reader to replicate my research process. Reading a piece as a whole, and especially
reading the entire issue in which it  appears as a whole,  produces a  fundamentally
different  emotional  experience  of  the  reading  than analysis  of  any  extract  can  do.
Additionally, a feminist reading a feminist magazine is engaged in a different type of
experience than is an academic reading a thesis – upon re-reading my discussion of
Laws’s piece above, even I am not wholly persuaded of the interpretation. It is not my
intention to argue that the analysis should be unaccountable (as I argued above, this is
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the direct inverse of what I have aimed for); rather, I highlight that these realities of the
way  that  reading  works  emotionally  do  not  fall  away  in  concession  to  what  is
convenient for academic writers and readers. Participants in radical feminism’s emotion
culture in the 1980s read the magazine in their capacity as feminists, and did so in their
own historical  moment, and it  is  that type of situated reading of the text that this
research has aimed to explore.
As the analysis in the following chapters will  show, the historical moment in
which 1980s radical  feminism was situated was a crucial  constituent in its emotion
culture. Reading the text through the ‘structures of feeling’ (Williams, 2013[1961]) of
that historical moment affects what the reader takes the text to mean.  Trouble and
Strife is a site of signification, but signifiers never only signify their direct referents. To
return to Laws’s conference report, the long list of specific issues that she recounted
signified who was at the conference and what oppressive issues different women were
being  subjected  to,  but  it  also  indirectly  signified  the  scale  of  women’s  global
oppression and the bleakness of that moment in time for women. Taken within the
broader radical feminist view of the discouraging trajectory of the WLM, it takes on still
further meaning. Laws’s piece was published in 1985, several years into the neoliberal
turn in British politics and the cultural turn in British feminism. Radical feminists saw
changes  in  the  WLM at  this  time as  a  pulling  away from the  radical  demands for
liberation that characterised the 1970s and toward collusion, cooperation, and coping
with the Napoleonic conquest of women, a deeply disillusioning and worrying turn of
events for women who had put tremendous time and energy into WLM organising
throughout the ‘70s (Owen, 2013). If that lens on the overall life of the WLM is borne in
mind with the reading of the extract from Laws’s piece, the emotional impact of its last
paragraph  is  amplified.  I  noted  above  how  the  long  and  distressing  preceding
paragraph increased the strength with which the latter paragraph evoked affection and
warmth, but this effect is increased further still when radical feminists’ shared view of
what was becoming of the world and of the WLM in the 1980s is used actively as a lens
for  reading  the  text.  Radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture  is  a  strong  presence
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throughout the text of Trouble and Strife, but the emotional resonances which emerge
from pieces and magazine issues as wholes, as well as the significant role of historical
moment  in  the  constitution  of  the  text’s  meaning,  were  key  aspects  of  the
interpretation process that made the analysis possible.
3.8
Conclusion: Doing Feminist Literary Ethnography on Emotions & Feminism
Literary ethnography is a powerful method for capturing emotions in text which
otherwise evade analysis.  It  provides a flexible toolkit of reading approaches which
enable  the  researcher  to  instrumentalise  their  own emotions  and  their  embedded
intimacy with the lifeworld of the text to access emotions within it which more aloof
and technical forms of reading might fail to capture. Though there is an apparent risk
that accounting for analysis in this way may decrease the accountability of the analysis,
this  can  be  counteracted  through  detailed  explanations  of  how  the  analysis  has
worked,  through  the  use  of  retrievable  data  and  a  feminist  approach  to  creating
genuinely  replicable  research,  and  by  acknowledging  the  embodied  nature  of
knowledge and its place in sociological research.
Archival  textual  methods  are  particularly  useful  for  researching  social
movement emotion cultures, because they trace the development of those cultures
over  longer  periods  of  time  than  do  non-textual  methods  often  used  to  study
movement emotions, such as ethnography and interviews. By historically examining
the way that emotion cultures have taken shape over time, the present-day emotion
cultures  of  the  same  movements  can  be  better  understood;  in  addition  to  being
analytically fruitful, this may contribute to better inter-movement understanding and
cooperation between feminist movements which have come to be deeply fractured.
Borrowing from the common case study approach of much research on the emotions
of movements and applying this to textual research, this project has undertaken a close
examination of direct dialogue and interaction in the movement as well as its broader
and more macro characteristics, enabling the analysis to account for the interactions
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between micro and macro elements of radical feminism’s emotion culture and rooting
the  research  in  a  quintessentially  sociological  focus  on  the  nexus  of  interaction
between the individual and the social.
The analysis was highly iterative, allowing the data to guide the analytic method
as well as the theorising emerging from the research. This led to a recognition of the
need to make analytic space for the researcher’s emotions as a legitimate research
instrument, even where the research is not autoethnographic (and by extension, to a
rejection of the patriarchal delegitimisation of feeling as a mode of knowing which has
long been weaponised against women and impeded knowledge production). Though it
was not immediately clear how some of even the strong emotional resonances in the
text were produced, the active engagement of theorisations of emotions as relational
enabled the analytic capture of implicit emotion in the text as the representation of
the (re)production, negotiation, and fluctuation of relationships, including relationships
with ideas, paradigms, and values. These relationships are resonant with emotion, and
the strength and character of those resonances can be fully apprehended when the
historical  conjuncture  in  which  1980s  radical  feminism  was  positioned  and  the
ideological  lens  through  which  radical  feminists  saw  that  moment  are  taken  into
account in the interpretation of the text.
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Chapter 4




As discussed in chapter 2, the emotion culture of a social movement provides a
guideline  for  participants  about  what  emotions  are  appropriate  toward  different
groups  of  people,  including  superordinate  groups  as  well  as  the  members  of  the
movement itself and other groups within the social context (Taylor, 2000). As I have
also  argued,  and  as  the  next  three  chapters  will  explore  empirically,  rather  than
understanding emotions ‘toward’ particular groups of people as inner states inside of
social actors which are projected outward, they must be seen as relationships between
the actors involved – these relationships are felt  emotionally,  and are mediated by
social  actors’  own understandings of how they are situated in the social  world and
what that situation says about themselves and others (Denzin, 1984). 
The exploration of radical feminism’s emotion culture laid out in this thesis will
therefore examine two key categories of people toward whom radical feminists had
collective  emotions  (or  with  whom,  I  will  argue,  they  had  collective  emotional
relationships):  (1)  men,  MDRCs,  and  patriarchy;  and  (2)  women  and  feminists.
Women's liberation, like all social movements, needed allies and enemies in its cultural
imaginary in order to form a relational and political logic of collective action, and the
emotion culture incorporated distinct collective emotions toward each. As a WLM sub-
movement which often favoured women's  separatism,  political  lesbianism,  and the
premise  that  all  women  shared  an  oppression  which  cut  across  all  other  axes  of
difference,  radical  feminism  was  better  suited  than  other  feminisms  to  have  a
comparatively straightforward adversarial relationship with the agents of male power.
It is this relationship with patriarchy and its agents which will be the subject of this
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chapter. Relationships between would-be 'sisters' – women and feminists – were more
complex, and sometimes fraught, than were radical feminists' relationships with men
and patriarchy; these relationships amongst women will be explored in chapters 5 and
6. 
In order to elaborate radical feminists' relationship with men and male power,
this  chapter  will  explore  constructions  of  the  men  who  populated  the  MDRC
institutions:  doctors,  psychiatrists,  and  medical  researchers.  The  textual
representations  of  men,  medical  paradigms,  and  various  institutions  produced  the
relationship that radical feminists collectively had with them, giving rise to their place
within the movement’s emotion culture. There are three interrelated questions that
this chapter aims to answer:
 Who were the figures who populated MDRCs in the radical feminist subcultural
imaginary?
 What emotions were associated with them in the text of Trouble and Strife?
 How did the emotion culture of radical feminism (partially) emerge from the
movement’s collective emotions toward these figures?
The patriarchal figures explored below appeared in a variety of forms across the text of
the magazine. Because  Trouble and Strife was a genre-diverse publication, the ways
that  men  and  patriarchy  appeared  in  the  text  varied  in  accordance  with  the
conventions  of  genre,  and  a  range  of  genres  is  consequently  represented  in  this
chapter. The analysis draws from pieces across the dataset,  drawing from all  of the
content  which focuses  on  medical  and psychiatric  health  and healthcare.  The data
discussed in this chapter include analytic articles, polemics, letters, book reviews, first-
person  narratives,  conference  reports,  and  the  cartoons  peppered  across  these.
Representations of men are interspersed throughout discussions of a range of topics
covered in Trouble and Strife, so rather than taking entire pieces as the unit of analysis,
this  chapter  will  focus  thematically  on  representations  of  men,  MDRCs,  and  other
male-dominated institutions where and as they appear.
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The chapter will proceed in four sections. The first will provide a foundation for
those  that  will  follow,  laying  out  radical  feminism’s  lens  on  men,  MDRCs,  and
patriarchal institutions themselves before moving onto explorations of the emotions
associated with these. The resonance of the emotional framing done in the text was
rooted  in  a  particular  view  of  male-dominated  medical  institutions,  their  ways  of
interacting  with  women,  and  the  power  structures  which  their  activities  served.
Section 5.2 will  therefore provide an overview of  radical  feminists’  view of  medical
research, clinical practice, and psychoanalysis as inherently ‘male’, and show what they
understood this ‘maleness’ to mean for them politically. The latter sections will then
tour  the  emotions  associated  with  MDRCs  in  light  of  the  relationships  of  power
surfaced  in  section  5.2.  There  are  four  key  emotions  which  emerge  from  the
movement’s emotion culture in relation to men and MDRCs: horror, fear, anger, and
annoyance – these emotions will each be discussed in turn.
It  should  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  there  is  sometimes  some  slippage
between these different emotions, and some extracts of the text involve more than
one.  Still  other  instances  challenge  the  limits  of  emotion  language,  and  come
somewhere near one of these four key emotions without unambiguously belonging to
any one of them. Much of the research on emotions in social movements explores
specific individual emotions, but the co-mingling of these four key adverse emotions in
radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture  troubles  the  effort  to  ascertain  what  any  given
individual  emotion does for  the emotion culture of  the movement.  What  emerged
from the analysis, as will be expanded upon below, is that the flexibility afforded by the
cultivation of a cultural toolkit of adverse emotions was, perhaps somewhat ironically,
what allowed the movement’s emotion culture to maintain cohesion. Radical feminists
were able to maintain a collective adversarial  relationship between themselves and
MDRCs without the need for a rigid prescription of specifically which adverse emotions
defined that  relationship – horror,  fear,  anger,  and annoyance all,  at  various  times,
served the purpose equally well. The use of multiple adverse emotions for essentially
the same purpose highlights the relational in emotion: what was really important was
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not which emotion was felt, but that it signalled an adverse relationship. I will return to
this point at the end of the chapter.
The central mechanism by which MDRCs were textually constructed as objects
of  adverse  emotions  in  radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture  was  emotional  framing
(Cadena-Roa, 2002), a concept which will recur throughout the chapter. This is divided
into two broad subtypes: naming and framing. In instances of naming, the emotions
associated  with  MDRCs  were  indicated  through  straightforward  denotation  of  a
particular  emotion.  Naming emotions  is  a  crucial  component  of  what  makes them
concrete,  specific  emotions  available  to  be  experienced  and  understood  (Burkitt,
2014a) In cases of what I have called framing, the familiar process of emotional framing
occurs,  in which the text speaks to the authors’ and audience’s shared knowledge,
values,  and  ideology  (Ferree  &  Merrill,  2000)  in  order  to  produce  the  emotional
resonance  of  a  collective  emotional  orientation  toward  the  situation,  person(s),  or
institution(s) represented in the textual account (but generally does so without naming
the  emotion  involved).  In  either  case,  however,  the  text  was  used to  establish  an
association  between  medical  and  psychiatric  institutions  and  actors  and  radical
feminists’ adverse emotions. The two types of emotional representation and their use
across the four key emotions of horror, fear, anger, and annoyance, produced radical
feminists’  collective emotional relationship with MDRCs will  be explored in sections
4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
4.2
Science, Medicine, and the ‘Male’ Power Bloc
Radical feminism’s emotional relationship with MDRCs and men was rooted in
their understanding of the power relationship between men and women. No aspect of
radical feminists’ emotion culture, nor their political ideology, can make sense without
an apprehension of what it was that they saw when they looked out at a world divided
between men who oppressed women and women who were oppressed by men. In this
section, radical feminism’s view of MDRCs, and the movement’s relationship with the
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broader structures of male power, will be explored. This will form a foundation for the
examination of specific emotions later in the chapter, and will help to illuminate the
emotional gravity of debates between feminists which will be discussed in the next two
chapters.
There  were  three  components  to  the  way  that  men  and  MDRCs  were
constructed in the text of Trouble and Strife as distinct from and in political opposition
to women, and these will each be examined in turn in the remainder of this section.
Firstly, the way that language was used to refer to medical practitioners and women
established them as mutually exclusive and oppositional groups. Secondly, medicine
and psychoanalysis were framed as an ideological paradigm. Thirdly, and perhaps most
crucially, MDRCs were linked with other spheres of male power, such as the nuclear
family, the state, and non-state institutions, establishing all spheres of the social world
in which male power was exercised over women as different sites within the same
battle. I characterise this unified front of male power against women as a patriarchal
power bloc8, and radical feminists’ view of patriarchal oppression as part of the same
power  bloc  no  matter  where  in  daily  life  it  might  be  encountered  was  pivotal  to
shaping their collective emotions toward men in general and MDRCs in particular (see
von Scheve et al, 2016).
Radical feminists knew that there were women involved in medical research,
medical practice, and psychoanalysis, and some of the pieces explored in this and the
following  chapters  are  about  precisely  these  women.  However,  the  language  that
radical feminists often used implied that women were a categorically distinct group
from  medical  and  psychiatric  professionals.  These  uses  of  language  ranged  from
observations that medical institutions were dominated by men to implied equivalences
between  medicine  and  men.  For  example,  in  her  analysis  of  the  hormonal
contraceptive pill, Sue Leigh did the former, observing men’s dominance in medicine:
8 I distinguish between patriarchy and a patriarchal power bloc because, while the power bloc would 
generally be considered to be patriarchy itself, a central tenet of radical feminist politics was that men
as a class of agents, rather than patriarchy as an abstract system, was responsible for women’s 
oppression. A structure of power which centres the wilfully oppressive acts of agents, then, was a 
crucial component of radical feminists’ emotional sense-making.
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‘What  eventually  happened  was  that  more  women
turned to the male-dominated medical profession for
contraception  thereby  giving  them greater  power  to
intervene  chemically  or  surgically  in  women’s  lives.’
(Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 36)
In  this  instance,  she  referred  to  the  medical  profession  as  ‘male-dominated’,  a
description which recurred often throughout Trouble and Strife. This, however, was one
of the softest articulations of the claim that medicine was the sphere of men, only
acknowledging that they dominated it. Some articulations described medicine as not
only dominated by men, but as intrinsically ‘male’.  In her report on a reproductive
rights conference, Sophie Laws related that medicine was seen by many women as
more than simply male-dominated:
‘Others saw science as a male institution, and felt that
what  is  crucial  about  this  kind  of  practice  is  that  it
takes  our  bodies  out  of  the  control  of  the  medical
profession.’ (Laws, 1985, issue 5: 38)
In  Leigh’s  and  Laws’s  pieces,  it  was  established  explicitly  through  language  that
medicine was effectively the purview of men. Laws’s reference to ‘our bodies’ being
removed  from  the  ‘control  of  the  medical  profession’  reinforced  the  commonly
recurring construction of ‘us’ being women and ‘the medical profession’ being men.
In  other  instances,  it  was  indicated  that  medicine  was  a  ‘male  institution’
without it having been named so explicitly. For example, in her discussion of an adverse
experience at a Well  Woman Clinic,  Lisa Saffron reiterated the apparent categorical
distinction between women and doctors, and echoed Laws’s discussion of the power
relationship between the two:
‘Women have been labelled as neurotic and complainers
by doctors for too long.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 14)
Crucially, Saffron did not state that doctors were all men, and indeed the reality that
practitioners were sometimes women was central to this piece of writing: the account
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was about the negative experience that Saffron had at a clinic where all of the staff,
including the doctor,  were women. However,  her remarks about how women were
‘labelled as  neurotic  and complainers  by doctors’  implied that  women and doctors
were two separate groups of people, with the one having power over the other. This
was one case amongst many, as will be seen in later extracts, in which the text did the
work  of  producing  women  and  doctors  as  two  distinct  categories  of  actors  with
diametrically opposed interests. 
Saffron’s account went on to emphasise women’s need for medical care that
followed  a  feminist  approach,  and  again  implicitly  reinforced  the  perception  that
MDRCs were inherently ‘male’:
‘When I’ve talked to friends about my visit to the Well
Woman  Clinic,  I’ve  discovered  something  very
interesting – everyone had heard of WWCs but nearly
all  thought  they were clinics  where you could see a
gynaecologist  or  be  referred  directly  to  a  specialist
without having to go through your GP. They thought
you  could  be  treated  at  the  clinic  for  any  kind  of
woman’s complaint and be seen by sympathetic female
staff who would allow you plenty of time to talk. A few
were  under  the  impression  that  WWCs  have  some
form of  feminist  philosophy – emphasising self  help,
prevention of ill health and control over your body.
In fact, the majority of Well Woman Clinics are
funded  by  the  NHS,  and  these  provide  preventative
services only.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 15) 
By taking as self-evident that the NHS was the opposite of a sympathetic,  feminist
medical  practice,  the structure of  this  passage of  text positioned feminism and the
major UK medical institution as mutually exclusive. Saffron made the gender politics of
this opposition more explicit later in the piece:
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‘GPs are generally male.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 16)
Her use of language throughout the piece, then, established a distinction and political
opposition  between  doctors  (who  were  taken  to  be  men)  and  women  (Ferree  &
Merrill, 2000). The use of language was used to establish that medicine was a ‘male’
institution, both by naming it as one and by treating conventional medical settings like
the NHS as the taken-for-granted opposite of what a feminist clinic might be. It was
significant that the debate at the reproductive rights conference and Saffron’s narrative
were concerned with medical research and practice being done by women, because a
recurrent conclusion was that conventional medicine would necessarily be oppressive
to women, even if it was being practised by women. MDRCs were taken to be not just
male-dominated, but to have maleness woven into their constitution.
The view of medical institutions and practices as both in the hands of men and
permeated by an ideology of male power was pervasive as well, building an additional
layer onto the references to medicine as male discussed above. This was the case for
both  physiological  medicine  and  psychoanalysis.  In  a  letter  to  Trouble  and  Strife,
FINNRAGE, a network of feminists organised around resistance to ‘new reproductive
technologies’ (NRTs),  outlined their aims as an organisation, naming the patriarchal
ideology of medical research on fertility amongst them:
To reject the use of new reproductive technologies in
the  service  of  maintaining  patriarchal  definitions  of
women and the family.’ (FINNRAGE, 1987, issue 10: 3)
The  allegation  that  reproductive  technologies  were  intended  to  maintain  the
dominance  of  ‘patriarchal  definitions’  was  a  widespread  concern,  appearing  three
years earlier in an event report on the first national conference on NRTs:
‘We agreed that  we reject  the underlying philosophy
upon which the medical profession, and we think the
Warnock Inquiry, are basing their recommendations for
practice.’ (Hanmer and Powell-Jones, 1984, issue 3: 45)
Hanmer and Powell-Jones’s reference to medicine as having an ‘underlying philosophy’
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that feminists opposed further illustrated the idea of medical knowledge and practice
as an ideological paradigm. They thereby contributed to a shared framing within radical
feminist  discourse  which  would  provide  ground  for  the  emotional  resonance  of
invocations of the frame (Schrock  et al, 2004). This framing was echoed yet again by
Saffron in her narrative about the Well Woman Clinic:
‘A Well Woman Clinic should be a place where women
learn to trust ourselves and each other – to come to
have respect for our bodies and for our views of reality.
But  as  long  as  Well  Woman  Clinics  are  under  the
control of doctors and medical thinking, I can’t see that
happening.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 13)
The idea that medicine was ideological and rooted in patriarchal assumptions about
women pervaded the radical feminist lens on medical care, and informed how they
interpreted each encounter with practitioners and each historical event (such as the
Warnock Inquiry and the development of NRTs) that arose (Taylor, 2000: 274). The way
that language was used in Trouble and Strife named doctors and women as two distinct
and politically opposed groups and also implicitly produced the two groups in this way
in references to doctors and medical institutions as the obvious inverse of women.
The  same  was  true  of  writings  concerned  with  psychoanalysis.  As  with
physiological medicine, this took the form of explicit articulations that psychoanalysis
was patriarchal  as  well  as  arguments  that  psychoanalytic  ideology was opposed to
feminism. In her detailed critique of feminist psychoanalysis (the possibility of which
was frequently denied across the text of the magazine), Stevi Jackson noted that the
cultural context around psychoanalysis necessarily influenced it:
‘Analysts’  conclusions  on  the  construction  of  gender
and  sexuality  cannot  but  be  affected  by  patriarchal
culture  and  frames  of  reference  drawn  from  it.’
(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 36)
Jackson’s piece as a whole was concerned with the necessity for radical feminists to
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address  the  growing  trend  of  feminists  taking  up  psychoanalysis  (in  an  altered,
ostensibly less oppressive form) as a feminist practice. Radical feminists were critical of
this change, seeing psychoanalysis as intrinsically patriarchal:
‘It is now unfashionable to suggest that therapy is of its
origins and nature politically naive or even reactionary.
Nonetheless we feel that feminist criticisms of therapy
are  as  valid  as  they  have  ever  been,  for  the  recent
development  of  women’s  therapy  leaves  the  basic
therapeutic perspective unchanged.’ (Scott and Payne,
1984, issue 3: 22)
In  psychoanalysis,  as  in  medicine,  radical  feminists  saw  care  regimes  as
permeated  by  a  patriarchal  ideology  which  could  not  be  purged  by  feminist
practitioners. A letter to Trouble and Strife articulated this particularly clearly. Offering
a critique of all of the increasingly popular methods for emotional healing, including
psychoanalysis amongst others, Lorraine Davies argued:
‘They  are  all  based  on  male  philosophies,  male
religious beliefs or male theorists. Most practitioners
are not feminists, even where they are that does not
give us for example, feminist acupuncture – it gives us
a feminist who is doing acupuncture. Just as there is no
feminist  therapy,  only  feminists  who  are  working  as
therapists.  Yes,  I  expect  different  treatment  from  a
feminist  and that her feminist  thinking will  influence
her practice as a therapist,  whatever sort she is, but
don’t  let’s  fool  ourselves,  Freud  or  Buddha  are  just
around the corner.’ (Davies, 1984, issue 4: 10)
Even  where  the  need  for  emotional  wellness  was  recognised,  radical  feminists
struggled to imagine what this might actually look like, in much the same way that they
wondered whether safety testing of medicines was a patriarchal practice. ‘Freud and
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Buddha’, they suggested, would be present in any psychotherapeutic enterprise. In her
highly laudatory review of Phyllis Chesler’s book on psychoanalysis as a form of male
violence against  women,  Dale  Spender  summarised Chesler’s  claim that  psychiatric
health in its existing form was permeated by patriarchal ideology:
‘What  was necessary,  she argued,  was a  completely
new way of describing and explaining mental  health
which  was  free  from  male  politics.’  (Spender,  1986,
issue 9: 40)
Throughout  discussions  of  psychoanalysis,  then,  the  underlying  logic  an  ostensibly
caring  practice  was understood to be a  patriarchal  ideology.  Though medicine and
psychoanalysis  are  distinct,  practised  by  different  people,  in  different  settings,  and
maintained generally through different funding sources, they were seen as iterations of
the same phenomenon – the maintenance of patriarchal domination of women.
What  ultimately  cemented  MDRCs’  place  in  the  broad  patriarchal  regime,
however, was their perceived linkage with other spheres of male power. The patriarchal
power bloc of men in different spheres of social life placed MDRCs within a network of
oppressive male institutions, shaping radical feminists’ lens on, and relationship with,
them. There were various social structures in which they saw male power operating in
collusion with MDRCs. One was the corporate sector, which Helen Murrell alluded to in
her letter criticising the use of in vitro fertilisation (IVF):
‘We must remember that the IVF programme in Britain
was set up as a commercial venture.’  (Murrell,  1985,
issue 6: 3)
Murrell’s letter was a response to a piece in (conditional) defence of NRTs, authored by
Sue Leigh on behalf of herself and other women with experiences of infertility, who
sought out the use of NRTs and wanted feminist support for making them less violent
in practice. This intra-feminism debate will  be explored further in chapter 5, as the
complexities of women’s lives gave rise to ambivalences which made a wholly unitary
emotion culture (see Holmes, 2000; 2004). What is notable here is that even where a
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radical feminist had articulated a defence of NRTs, the response from this reader was
that  the  technology  and  its  use  must  be  interpreted  through  the  lens  of  its
entanglement  with  male  corporate  power.  NRTs,  like  psychoanalysis,  were  seen as
being  contaminated with patriarchal  ideology,  to  the exclusion of  the possibility  of
radical feminists approving of their use, even by feminists.
The  corporate  sector  was  only  one  major  institutional  bloc  seen  by  radical
feminists  as  in  cooperation  with  the  oppressive  practices  of  medicine.  Non-
governmental third sector institutions and governments were seen as being part of the
patriarchal power bloc. In her report from a major international reproductive rights
conference in Amsterdam, Sophie Laws raised concerns about the collusion between
population control agencies (organisations concerned with lowering the birth rate in
response to a moral crisis about global overpopulation) and corporations:
‘An associated problem is the dumping of drugs which
are banned in the “first” world, or which are just out of
date  or  damaged  in  some  way.  Population  control
agencies co-operate with multinational pharmaceutical
companies and allow such abuses in pursuit of profit.’
(Laws, 1985, issue 5: 35) 
She continued shortly later in the piece to extend the power bloc between medicine,
non-governmental institutions, and corporations to include governments:
‘They  say  openly,  in  writing,  that  governments  are
justified in resorting to any measures, suspending any
regard  for  civil  liberties,  in  pursuit  of  the  goal  of
limitation  of  births.  The  present  US  administration
doesn’t see their own level of population as a problem
and is attacking US women’s abortion rights. On paper,
it  is  against  the  abuse  of  sterilisation,  but  in
Bangladesh people are paid “compensation” by US AID,
which amounts to giving incentives. Such payments are
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also  made  to  women  accepting  Copper  T  IUDs  and
Depo Provera.’ (Laws, 1985, issue 5: 35)
According to Laws’s account, governments determined what they wished the birth rate
in their countries to be, and regulated or deregulated reproductive technologies and
medications accordingly,  cooperating with the lobbying of non-state institutions and
simultaneously inflating the profits of pharmaceutical corporations. Men were seen to
be cooperating across all of these institutional structures to control women’s bodies for
the interests of men.
Finally, this extensive power bloc of institutions was extended to the nuclear
family, drawing an association between men’s domination of women in every sphere of
private and public life. In her analysis of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill,
Pat Spallone criticised the political interests at play in the proposed law:
‘This  is  protectionist  legislation,  but  if  women  are
protected at all, we come at the bottom of the heap of
contesting  interests:  scientists,  doctors,  fathers,  the
state,  and  each  of  their  claims  on  the  “embryo”.’
(Spallone, 1990, issue 18: 15)
This  extensive  power  bloc  was  what  radical  feminists  saw  themselves  as  being
confronted with, incorporating ‘fathers’ (the nuclear family) as well as all of the major
institutional structures of their context. Their struggle for liberation from patriarchy
was surrounded on all sides by agents of male power, and medical care practices were
seen as being a mechanism for reinforcing women’s oppression. The perceived power
battle was so pronounced that even where women were known to be practitioners,
what  stood  out  as  salient  to  radical  feminists  was  the  functioning  of  MDRCs  as
instruments of women’s oppression. 
As Sophie Laws’s conference report highlighted, the power bloc was not seen as
being  confined to  the  UK context  (though much of  the  discussion  of  reproductive
health in  Trouble and Strife was concerned with UK-specific events and legislation).
Rather,  women’s  oppression  through  medicine  was  understood  as  a  global
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phenomenon, an interpretation which resonated with radical feminists’ view of women
as a globally oppressed political class. The scale of this problem was immense, and this
ordering  of  the  relationship  between  women  and  men formed  the  foundation  for
MDRCs’ place in radical feminism’s emotions (Burkitt, 2014a). The magazine published
some material  covering reproductive rights issues in other countries,  in addition to
reports on international  conferences, linking the power bloc in the UK to its global
context.  For  example,  in  their  report  on  amneocentesis  (a  procedure  to  assess
characteristics  of  a  foetus  in  utero,  such  as  sex  and congenital  abnormalities),  the
Forum Against Sex Determination and Sex Preselection, based in India, complained of
the same inter-institutional collusion that confronted feminists in the UK context:
‘The  government  and  the  sycophants  of  population
control  are  actively  colluding  with  the  medical
profession  in  their  mindless  and  ruthless  pursuit  of
achieving a Net Reproductive Rate of One (one female
child per woman). Therefore it lies in their interest to
not  regulate  any  technology  which  has  even  the
remote  potential  of  helping  them achieve  this  goal.’
(Forum  Against  Sex  Determination  and  Sex
Preselection,  Bombay  and  Saheli  Women’s  Resource
Centre, 1989, issue 15: 38)
Significantly, they also linked this to some of the emotions that will be explored in the
next section:
‘In spite of public protest, the alarming rate at which
new  reproductive  technologies  are  penetrating  the
core  of  Indian  society  is  really  nightmarish.  Sex
determination is only one menace. There are a series
of  medical  technologies such as genetic  engineering,
cloning,  test  tube  babies,  surrogate  motherhood,
which  are  being  glorified  by  the  medical  lobby.  The
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inherent  sexist,  racist  and  class  bias  of  these
techniques which reduce women to “male producing
machines”  and  raw  material  for  scientists/doctors
lusting to enhance the “quality of the population” by
conquering  the  imperfections  of  nature  need  to  be
exposed.  Since  all  these  techniques  are  now
internationally  patented,  and  big  money  is  involved,
we  need  to  build  international  resistance  to  these
practices.’ (Forum Against Sex Determination and Sex
Preselection,  Bombay  and  Saheli  Women’s  Resource
Centre, 1989, issue 15: 39)
The  language  in  this  passage  was  highly  emotionally  evocative:  ‘alarming’,
‘nightmarish’, and ‘menace’ are all suggestive of horror, and the image produced by
their  description  overall,  of  a  medical  establishment  ‘glorifying’  the  reduction  of
women  to  manufacturing  devices  for  more  men  and  the  eugenicist  objectives  of
producing a better ‘quality’ of population frames the ‘medical lobby’ as horrific. This
instance of framing in particular tied together the construct of the patriarchal power
bloc and the horror associated with it. It is the notion of MDRCs as sites of horror that
the next section will explore.
Central  to  the  construction  of  radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture  were  the
individuals and groups with which they shared a collective relationship, and the male
power bloc was key amongst these.  Through the lens of  a radical  feminist political
ideology which saw all women as oppressed by all men, the construct of a male power
bloc emerged which became a significant object of radical feminist collective emotion
and a macro entity with which radical feminists had a collective relationship. Taking as
a starting point their  view of  the male power bloc as  a global  assemblage of  men
working in cooperation to maintain women’s oppression and ensure that patriarchal
ideology permeated every relationship and institution, radical feminists cultivated their
toolkit of collective emotions through which to relate to men and MDRCs. The next
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three sections will explore the emotions of this toolkit and the ways that they were
used  to  (re)produce  radical  feminists’  adverse  relationship  with  MDRCs.  That  the
relationship between women and the male power bloc was adversarial was implied by
radical feminists’ understanding of the power relationship between the two groups,
but the articulations explored in this section do not fully illuminate the emotions of
that  relationship.  In  the  next  four  sections,  the  emotions  of  radical  feminists’
relationship with MDRCs will be examined.
4.3
Psychoanalysis & Horror
As  was  evident  in  section  4.2,  constructions  of  MDRCs  sometimes  implied
horror, and in this section, their construction as horrific will be more fully surfaced.
Horror was associated with MDRCs in various contexts, but this section will focus on
the most salient and recurrent case: Freud and psychoanalysis. By framing Freud and
the  psychoanalytic  framework  as  horrific,  contributors  to  Trouble  and  Strife
(re)produced their collective relationship with both, linking radical feminist values and
ideology to feeling horrified by psychoanalysis. This section will discuss the naming and
framing of  the horror  of  psychoanalysis.  Firstly,  examples of  explicit  descriptions of
psychoanalysis or psychiatric clinical practices as horrific will be examined. Secondly,
instances  in  which  radical  feminists’  shared  knowledge,  values,  and  ideology  were
invoked in horrifying framings of psychoanalysis will be explored. 
References to Freud and psychoanalysis as horrifying differed in the extent of
the emotional evocativeness of their expression, but they did the work of associating
horror with psychoanalysis nevertheless by naming it as such:
‘There  is  no  reason  why  a  very  specific  form  of
psychiatric “treatment”, lobotomy – in which nerves in
the brain, usually in the frontal lobe, are cut – should
not  be  used to  illustrate  the  psychiatric  profession’s
overall attitude to women. In itself the information in
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Di’s article about the history and present day approach
to  psycho-surgery  in  relation  to women is  horrifying
and fascinating.’ (O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 53)
O’Sullivan’s statement was situated within a discussion of a feminist text (which was
itself an analysis of yet another text). Her description named an account of psycho-
surgery on women as  horrifying without expressing feelings  of  horror,  which might
otherwise have been achieved by describing the affective sensations that she felt while
reading the article. Nevertheless,  ‘horrifying’ was an adjective used to describe the
content of a description of psycho-surgery, and while this one instance alone would not
be sufficient to make psycho-surgery horrifying in the movement’s emotion culture,
the cumulative effect of a range of similar instances did so. Sue Leigh’s description of
her  reading  of  narratives  of  women  without  access  to  contraception  functioned
similarly:
‘Reading the letters from working women giving their
experiences of child-bearing in 1915 makes horrifying
reading’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 34)
In  both  of  these  instances,  the  authors  were  describing  their  reactions  to  reading
‘horrifying’  accounts,  but  did  so in  a  way  which was  more matter-of-fact  and less
emotionally evocative than the framings that will be explored later in this section. They
formed one part of a broader array of linkages across the text between psychoanalysis
and horror.
Florence  Rush’s  lengthy  analysis  of  the  history  of  Freud’s  thought  and  the
consequences of its wide-reaching influence named horror as well, but did so in a more
emotionally evocative way. Describing how Freudian ideas were put into contemporary
practice  with  abused  children,  she  used  the  naming  of  horror  alongside  other
conceptual elements that brought the sense of horror to life in the text:
‘The  child’s  experience  is  as  terrifying  as  the  worst
horror  of  a  Kafkaesque  nightmare:  her  story  is  not
believed, she is declared ill, and worse, she is left at
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the  mercy  and  the  “benevolence”  of  psychiatrically
oriented “child experts”.’ (Rush, 1984, issue 4: 34)
This instance straddled the mechanisms of naming and framing. Horror was named,
but  emotional  framing  was  also  employed  in  order  to  make  that  naming  more
emotionally  resonant.  The  additional  terms ‘terrifying’  and ‘Kafkaesque nightmare’,
alongside Rush’s sketching of a scenario of silencing, pathologisation, and helplessness
(a  reality  familiar  and  distressing  to  radical  feminists,  who  saw  women  as  being
constantly plagued by this sort of situation under the male power bloc), and her use of
quotation  marks  to  indicate  the  falsehood  of  practitioners’  ‘benevolence’  and
‘expertise’,  all  worked in concert  in the passage to both name and frame Freudian
psychoanalysis of abused children as horrifying. Another such instance appeared on
another page of the same piece:
‘To  insist  that  these  advances  are  imagined  is  to
underestimate  a  child’s  perceptive  capacity,  create
doubt and confusion, and undermine self-confidence,
and  provide  the  food  upon  which  nightmares  are
nourished.’ (Rush, 1984, issue 4: 29)
The  idea  of  nourishment  of  nightmares  is  deeply  jarring.  Though  it  is  difficult  to
apprehend the emotional weight of these articulations in abstraction from the piece as
a whole, their emotional  impact was buoyed by the emotional flow with the other
explicit and implicit references to horror in the same piece – this will become clearer
later in the section as other aspects of Rush’s piece are explored.
In other parts of the text, horror was not named, but emotional framing was
used to associate horror with psychoanalysis. Drawing on shared knowledge, ideology,
and values, the text presented a scenario, image, or idea which would resonate with
participants in in the culture of radical feminism (and in some cases, the culture of
Britain more generally) to produce collective horror. Returning to Rush’s piece, there
were instances in which horror was framed, but not named:
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‘If a female child developed normally (that is, had faith
that someday she would grow up, be married, get the
penis, baby, and all), Freud assured us she would not
be  overwhelmed  by  the  flood  of  anxiety  and  guilt
coming from the incestuous desire for her father, and
an external stimulus – an actual seduction – would be
harmless.’ (Rush, 1984, issue 4: 34)
This is one of the cases alluded to in the introduction of this chapter which straddles
more than one emotion – there is a viable case to be made for reading this passage as
resonant  with anger at  the violence of  pathologising girls  for  being traumatised by
assault. The multiplicity of adverse emotions toward MDRCs will be discussed later in
this  chapter,  but  one  of  the  emotions  that  emerged from the  passage  above  was
horror. In the context of a piece of writing largely concerned with how Freudian ideas
had come to permeate health and social service provision, and also incorporating the
allusions  to  horror  and  nightmare  appearing  elsewhere  in  the  piece,  the  passage
invoked horror by setting the frame around the helpless and ‘nightmare nourishing’
scenario of an abused girl having the trauma of her experience denied by Freud. The
radical  feminist  readership  of  Trouble  and  Strife would  bring  an  already-existing
emotional culture of horror, fear, and anger toward sexual abusers to their reading of
the text, and as discussed in section 4.2, they already shared a consensus that MDRCs
were violent to women. What Rush’s framing in the passage above did was to draw on
those shared meanings in order to engender collective horror (and here, possibly also
anger) toward Freud. 
Seeing that Freud was constructed as the object of collective horror  through
invocation of already-shared meanings and emotions, it begins to become clear how
radical feminists’ collective emotions toward figures like Freud constituted a collective
relationship. The horror was not inside each individual radical feminist and individually
projected toward Freud,  but  rather  was constituted through women’s  relationships
with  men across  the power bloc  in  their  own lives  and the  lives  of  other  women
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(Burkitt, 2014a), and horror was rendered a part of the movement’s shared emotion
culture  through  its  place  in  the  discourses  and  framings  of  the  movement  (Taylor,
2000). This type of emotional framing differs from much of the other framing done by
social movements, because much of that framing is geared toward people outside of
the movement itself.  From radical  feminists’  cultivation of  collective horror in their
emotion  culture,  it  can  be  seen  that  emotional  framing  was  also  central  to  the
emotions inside the movement, with participants framing ideas, values, and emotions
for interpretation by one another in order to (re)produce collective relationships with
key others such as MDRCs. These emotional framings were not merely a means to an
instrumental end, but served less immediate, but still valuable, purposes for the life of
the movement (Sa’di, 2015).
The association of horror with Freud was further amplified by other accounts
which  more  directly  associated  him  with  sexual  violence,  insinuating  that  he  had
sexually violent tendencies himself as well as having produced a theoretical framework
which enabled abuse.  In her analysis  of  the famous case study of  Dora (a  sexually
abused girl analysed by Freud who withdrew from his treatment upon realising that he
sided with her abuser),  Jane Rondot used her recounting of Freud’s reaction to the
details of Dora’s case to frame him as a sexually (as well as clinically) violent figure.
Dora, a girl at the time, was pursued and propositioned by an adult man called ‘Herr K’,
whose advances she refused. Extending the thesis laid out by Rush a few years earlier,
Rondot represented Freud as a would-be sexual assailant through her framing of his
analysis of Dora:
‘Freud appears  to  admire  Herr  K  whose  proposal  is
“unlucky”. He wonders if Herr K would have “done any
better if he had pressed his suit with a passion”. What
sort of passion is he talking about? “Pressed” indicates
force. Freud knew Herr K’s intentions were “immoral”
yet  speaks  as  if  he  was  conducting  a  romantic
Victorian courtship. According to Freud, Herr K should
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have forced himself upon Dora, because she slapped
his face and ran away, but this “by no means signified
a final no”.’ (Rondot, 1989, issue 15: 21)
As with Rush’s piece, this extract is one small piece of a much longer deconstruction of
Freud’s  thinking  and its  anti-feminist  implications  (some of  which  will  be  explored
below), but even this small segment of the text did a significant amount of emotional
framing work.  With reference to Freud himself,  it  produced Freud as  a  figure  who
advocated rape of girls by grown men. That alone was sufficient to inscribe horror on
him for any reader who subscribed to the view that rape of children was horrific (this
would include most people in British society at the time, as sexual violence against
children was a universally agreed moral horror in the cultural context, but the horror
would  be  even  greater  for  readers  sensitised  through  a  highly  developed  feminist
consciousness to the realities, the erasure, and the traumatic consequences of sexual
violence), and thereby to align the radical feminist frame with a broader moral frame
(Williams, 2016).
Further to this, however, it invoked the feminist anti-rape edict that ‘no means
no’,  highlighting in  the last  sentence that  Freud did  not  consider  Dora’s  ‘no’  to  be
binding on Herr  K.  The allusion to the over-riding of  a sexual  violence victim’s ‘no’
linked Dora’s situation with a culturally established horror familiar to radical feminist
readers: women’s bodily autonomy being undermined and controlled by men. Recalling
again the emphasis on control which permeated the construction of science as ‘male’
and the oppressive  power dynamic  inherent  in this,  Rondot  linked the violation of
women’s and girls’ bodily self-determination by clinicians such as Freud to the sexual
violence experienced by women in their personal lives – another effect of the male
power bloc – when their refusals of sexual advances were over-ridden. Many radical
feminist readers would have lived experience of this sort of sexual violation, making
the framing resonant with horror in a particularly visceral  way (Sointu, 2016). Even
those who had not experienced sexual violence subscribed to the feminist political lens
and value system that saw sexual violence as an urgent and passion-evoking political
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emergency. Rondot’s framing appealed to radical feminism’s existing horror and anger
about  sexual  violence  in  a  way  which  would  produce  resonance  with  readers
committed to the political ideology of radical  feminism (and in this case, even with
many members of the British public more broadly). As with Rush’s representation of
Freud, the anchoring of horror in the shared politics of radical feminists shifted the
emotions from individual to collective and positioned them within a relational emotion
culture  –  rather  than  any  individual  reader  feeling  that  ‘I  am  horrified  by  Freud’,
representations  like  those  of  Rush  and  Rondot,  published  in  a  radical  feminist
magazine,  tied  into  discourses,  values,  existing  frames  (like  the  male  power  bloc
frame), and ideologies shared by radical feminists, drawing the movement together in
collective  emotion:  ‘we (radical  feminists)  are  horrified  by  Freud,  because  Freud is
horrifying’ (Ahmed, 2014[2004]). Framings of Freud as horrifying did the double duty
of (re)producing radical feminists as a group through their shared emotions while also
drawing  on  their  already-existing  status  as  a  group  to  shape  their emotional
relationship with figures like Freud. 
Of  course  radical  feminists  were  situated  in  a  broader  context,  and  the
emotional  frames  of  that  context  were  entangled  with  those  of  the  movement,
providing producers of texts like Trouble and Strife with additional tools for producing
emotional  resonance.  Earlier  in  this  section,  Florence  Rush’s  explicit  and  implicit
invocations of horror were discussed, but I now return to the beginning of her piece.
Like most every piece in  Trouble and Strife,  Rush’s article included images, and one
large and striking one formed the heading of the article. There are two aspects of the
use  of  the  images  in  the  piece  that  are  worth  exploring  here.  Firstly,  the  image’s
content used familiar genre conventions to produce an emotional framing of Freud as
horrific. Secondly, the use of space on the page was used to reiterate and reinforce the
emotional framing produced by the initial image at the beginning of the piece.
The  piece began with a  drawing by  Judy  Stevens which drew upon familiar
aesthetic features of the genre of horror to cast Freud as a horrifying villain:
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(Judy Stevens, 1984, issue 4: 28)
This powerful image incorporated many aspects aspects which set the stage for the
emotional framing work built  throughout the piece. Reading the image from left to
right, the first component to jump from the page is the deadened-looking face of the
girl.  The  bright  light  shone  on  her  face  suggested  an  interrogation,  and  the  blank
expression on her face and dark shadows in place of her eyes showed a helpless child
resigned to torment by a powerful adult. To the right of the frame, Freud can be seen,
situated slightly higher in the frame than the girl and staring at the back of her head
rather than at her face. By looking at her from this perspective, her status as an object
was foregrounded – to look her in the face would render her more as a subject. His
positioning as above her within the frame of the image created the impression that he
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was glowering down at her, and the calm indifference of his posture and expression
emphasised that he possessed all of the power in the room. Looking beyond the two
figures, the room was strewn with flung-open books, imbuing the scene with a sense of
chaos and disorder.
At  the  most  culturally  general  level,  the  image  invoked  horror  through  the
aesthetic of the horror genre. This gave it the potential to emotionally resonate with a
much wider audience than radical feminists, and it provided an additional layer to the
emotional resonance of the frame for radical feminist readers. The representation of
the complete imbalance of power and the subject/object relation between Freud and
his patient aligned with radical feminism’s power critique of psychoanalysis and Freud,
and the emotionally  evocative  representation  of  the  girl  as  emotionally  deadened,
resigned, and helpless augmented the emotional framing as one of horror. The piece
having been opened with this image, followed later by Rush’s references to ‘the food
upon  which  nightmares  are  nourished’  and  ‘the  worst  horror  of  a  Kafkaesque
nightmare’ created an unambiguous emotional framing of Freud as horrifying.
The space of  the text  was used to amplify this  framing further still,  and to
extend it beyond the first page of the piece:
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(Rush and Stevens, 1984, issue 4: 32-33)
The  positioning  of  these  extracts  from  the  image  on  opposite  sides  of  the  page
reproduced the power imbalance and subject/object relationship represented in the
original image, and kept the horror framing threading through the piece. In contrast to
the instances of naming horror discussed at the beginning of this section, this use of
image and space on the magazine’s page was the least  explicit  reference to horror
(demanding  a  more  active  reading-in  from  the  reader),  but  was  nevertheless
powerfully evocative and instrumental in the emotional framing effected by the piece
as a whole. Image and space were used similarly in Rondot’s piece on Freud and Dora
(which I  have produced in  its  entirety  here  for  that  reason,  though here  I  wish to




(Rondot and Stevens, 1989, issue 15: 18-23)
The two types of objects seen in the drawings are of a therapist’s sofa and a bed.
Recalling that Rondot suggested in the piece that Freud was a sexually violent figure,
the  interspersed  images  of  the  sofa  and  the  bed (the  site  of  sexual  abuse  in  the
household)  implied  that  the one could  be  exchanged for  the other  –  both,  it  was
suggested,  were places where sexual  violence took place.  That message was made
clearer by the increasing size of the images as the piece progressed, with the sofa
fading into smallness on the final page and being replaced by an increasingly large bed.
The cumulative effect was a sub-narrative across the piece that the therapist’s sofa was
being revealed to be actually the bed of an abuser.
The use of images and their placement on pages, then, were instrumental in the
emotional framing done with the text (Ahmed, 2014[2004]), making the framing more
resonant  by  drawing  together  movement-specific  knowledge  and  values  about  the
horrifying violence of sexual abuse and broader cultural knowledge about the genre of
horror  to  produce  a  high  degree  of  emotional  resonance  in  framings  of  Freud  as
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horrifying. Authors and editors of the text used both naming and framing to inscribe
horror  on  psychoanalysis,  deploying  language,  images,  and  the  multimodal
combination  of  the  two  at  various  points  to  reiterate  a  consistent  framing  of
psychoanalysis and Freud as horrifying. Some instances in which horror was invoked
used comparatively  emotionally-neutral  and matter-of-fact  expression,  while  others
forewent the cognitively-oriented use of  explicit  language and instead used images
which seemed chilling or horrifying (due to the cultural forms and ideas to which they
referred) to make the subject of the text horrifying by making the text itself horrifying9.
Radical feminists’ shared ideological lens on medical practitioners as inherently
violent to women and part of a male power bloc which straddled public and private life
was drawn upon to (re)produce Freud and his framework as violent and horrifying, and
Freud was used as an archetypal  villain in the movement’s emotional culture as an
illustration of the horror of psychoanalysis. The rootedness of emotional framings of
Freud and psychoanalysis in the shared ideology, values, narratives, and meanings of
radical feminism reproduced radical feminists as a cohesive political collective, sewing
them together  through their  shared  ideas  and feelings.  Inscribing  horror  on  Freud
placed him within  the  movement’s  emotion  culture,  and  the  entanglement  of  the
emotion of horror with what Freud and psychoanalysis were understood to do and to
signify – power-enabled violence against women and vulnerable girls  – rooted that
collective horror in what radical feminists understood to be women’s relationship with
psychoanalysts. Departing from the dramaturgical view of emotions, radical feminists’
shared relationship of horror with Freud illustrates that emotions ‘toward’  an idea,
paradigm, or figure are not unidirectional  in the way that the word ‘toward’  might
suggest,  being  inextricable  from the in-betweenness  of  social  relationships.  To  feel
horror ‘toward’ Freud was for radical feminists to recognise that he wrought horror
upon  them,  making  their  collective  emotions  toward  him  necessarily  a  collective
9 The multimodal representations of Freud as horrifying are a particularly salient example of where the 
researcher’s emotions were instrumental in finding emotion in the text. As I argued in chapter 3, I do 
not contend that someone who was not embedded in the emotional life of feminism could not have 
produced the same analysis, but my own horrified experience of reading drew my attention to implicit
aspects of the text which might otherwise have been overshadowed by other textual elements.
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relationship.
As  the  following  sections  will  show,  however,  the  emotion  culture  of  the
movement required more than just one emotion, even toward a single paradigm or
figure  like  psychoanalysis  or  Freud.  Radical  feminists  encountered  MDRCs  in  their
personal  lives  as  well  as  organising  politically  about  them,  and  different  situations
involved different  emotions.  An  understanding  of  the  movement’s  emotion culture
requires recognition that even emotional cultures that are specific to a particular social
movement are not, as some suggest,  clearly tied to instrumental  ends (e.g.,  Jasper,
2004),  but  instead  are  part  of  farther-reaching  emotional  projects  in  the  lives  of
movement participants (Sa’di, 2015; Yang, 2000). What was needed for the movement
to  maintain  emotional  continuity  was  for  it  to  have  the  flexibility  to  bend  to  the
emotional demands of different types of scenarios where issues around MDRCs might
arise while preserving radical feminists’ collective adverse relationship with them. The
movement’s culture exhibited precisely this sort of flexibility, and sections 4.4 and 4.5
explore the other emotions involved in radical feminists’ contentious relationship with
MDRCs.
4.4
Fear & the Clinical
A  second  emotion  that  in  radical  feminism’s  emotional  toolkit  for  its
relationship  with  MDRCs  was fear,  an  emotion  related to  but  distinct  form horror.
Horror  and  fear  are  both  emotions  involved  in  an  awareness  of  vulnerability  or
helplessness – disempowering emotions, for which reason literature on emotion work
and emotional channelling in movements is often concerned with the transformation
of such emotions into more empowering ones (Gould, 2009; Mizen, 2015; Yang, 2000).
The discussion in this  section will  explore radical  feminists’  feelings of  fear  in their
relationship with MDRCs, examining the vulnerability involved in interactions in which
women were seen to be at a disadvantage in terms of power and in a position to be
potentially harmed or controlled by clinicians (but in a way which falls short of the
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absolute  imbalance  of  power  and  acute  level  of  harm  associated  with  horror).  In
section 4.5, the more empowering emotions of anger and annoyance will be explored.
As with horror, naming was used to define particular situations as fear-inducing,
explicitly stating that MDRCs created situations which caused women fear:
‘I was fitted with the cap in a tiny and far from private
cubicle, where I could hear what was happening to the
apprehensive women on either side of me. If we had
been less  divided (expressing  only  our  fears  to each
other in the waiting room) we might have given each
other advice and support, but the circumstances made
the fittings furtive and hasty.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 36-
37)
In this account of having a cervical cap fitted, Sue Leigh explicitly articulated that she
and other women felt fearful, linking the clinical setting with fear. She extended this
association later in the piece, elucidating how MDRCs’ ways of managing contraception
led to women’s lives being pervaded with fear:
‘Women have replaced the fear of pregnancy with the
constant fear of illness so that women who take the Pill
have to be constantly watchful for side effects, lumps
and positive smear tests.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 38)
Her explicit namings of fear were one component of a larger emotional framing: her
description of ‘furtive and hasty’ fittings with ‘apprehensive women on either side’
constructed an image which would emotionally resonate for the readers of Trouble and
Strife,  who were themselves women (as radical feminists necessarily were) and had
likely had similar experiences. Her incorporation of that narrative of the clinical setting
into a larger analysis of the politics of fear then wove that emotionally resonant lived
experience into a radical feminist political analysis, arguing that MDRCs kept women in
constant fear, merely rearranging the circumstances through which fear was inflicted.
Both  through  her  naming  of  fear,  then,  and  through  her  linking  it  to  emotionally
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resonant narratives and the radical feminist political analysis of the systemic violence
of medicine, Leigh’s representation produced an emotional frame linking contraceptive
medicine to fear,  and incorporating emotional participation in that frame to radical
feminist political ideology.
These sorts of emotional  framings did not always incorporate the naming of
fear,  however,  and  women’s  fear  was  linked with  MDRCs  without  its  having  to  be
named. In her review of Phyllis  Chesler’s work on women and psychoanalysis,  Dale
Spender argued that the frameworks of pathologisation were used as an instrument of
control through fear:
‘In  the  context  of  male  meanings,  all  women  are
defined  as  mad,  or  beyond  normal  explanations  –
when  normality  equals  male  –  and  women  are
required  to  be  different:  the  ones  who  are  directly
penalised  are  arbitrary  victims.  The  threat of
punishment  applies  to  all women  and  serves  as
intimidation  and  is  quite  sufficient  to  keep  many
women in their place.’ (Spender, 1986, issue 9: 41)
Spender’s  argument  framed  all  women  as  living  under  constant  threat  of
pathologisation  and  ‘punishment’.  The  punishment  to  which  she  referred  included
violent  psychoanalytic  interventions  such  as  institutionalisation  and  neurosurgery,
highlighting  the  intensity  of  the  threat  under  which  women  lived.  Like  Leigh,  she
generated an image of women being made by male clinicians to move through the
world fearfully. These framings were tied to radical  feminists’  lens on medicine and
psychotherapy as inherently patriarchal, using radical feminists’ emotional reflexivity to
link women’s daily lived realities to the male power bloc which confronted them in all
aspects of their lives (see King, 2006). Both physiological medicine and psychotherapy
were framed as sources of fear, and the (implicitly male) practitioners involved in them
as sources of the inescapable fear used to ‘keep many women in their place’.
Though  Leigh’s  and  Spender’s  writings  had  the  potential  to  be  powerfully
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emotionally evocative (depending upon the biographical experiences which a reader
might bring to her reading of the text), they did not rely on intense expressions of fear
or evocations of the reader’s fear in order to produce their framings.  Instead, they
engaged the radical feminist political analysis of men and MDRCs to locate doctors and
psychoanalysts  within radical  feminism’s emotion culture (Schrock  et al,  2004) – as
fear-inducing objects. In this way, they incorporated the idea of MDRCs as sources of
fear  into  radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture,  even  if  they  were  not  manifestly
expressing their own fears or evoking those of their readers. Radical feminists’ adverse
relationship with MDRCs was (re)produced by this emotional framing, allowing that
relationship  to  be  maintained  through  the  combination  of  emotion  and  political
analysis. 
Much of the framing of fear in  Trouble and Strife took the evocative form of
images which accompanied written articles. These images allowed for a sub-narrative
of  fear  to  form  alongside  an  analysis  which  was  not  itself  concerned  with  fear,
threading the emotion culture through the magazine. For example, in a piece about
legal  curtailments  of  lesbians’  parenting  rights  (in  favour  of  the primacy  of  having
fathers  involved  in  their  children’s  lives,  a  logic  which  radical  feminists  saw  as
engineered to keep women and children within the grip of the control and abuse of
men), a cartoon by Cath Jackson was used to illustrate the fear (and anger) inflicted by
the judicial system’s oppressive surveillance of lesbians’ parenting practices:
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(Jackson, 1984, issue 3: 13)
The mother (left) was shown cowering in fear of the ‘custody drone’. The article itself
argued that lesbians’ parenting was closely watched by the state in order to maintain
men’s control over women who had left male partners and become lesbians, and that
lesbianism was pathologised and the heterosexual family valorised by psychoanalysts
and the state. The cartoon, in conjunction with the rest of the article, drew upon the
male power bloc concept, linking men in the family, in the state, and in psychoanalysis
and  arguing  that  the  three  colluded  to  control  women’s  lives  and  keep  them  in
constant fear of losing custody of their  children.  This particular  image also showed
another woman (by inference, the mother’s partner) being angered by the way that
her partner was emotionally terrorised, drawing in another aspect of the emotional
toolkit  of  the relationship between radical  feminists  and men to emotionally frame
them in two ways at once. The use of these two emotions in a single cartoon illustrates
the  centrality  of  relationships,  rather  than  specific  emotions,  in  the  movement’s
emotion  culture.  The image uses  emotions  to represent  an  oppressive  relationship
between lesbians and the (male-dominated) state; it was this ‘pattern of relationship’
(Burkitt, 2014a) that (re)produced the movement’s emotion culture. The significance of
relationships over narrowly-defined specific emotions highlights the limitations of an
‘emotional  channelling’  perspective.  Though  emotional  channelling  is  a  highly
productive concept for explaining what enables various forms of collective action, it is
less able to explain the broader emotion culture in which those actions are situated.
In  a  number  of  other  cartoons,  the  women  were  represented  in  clinical
encounters:
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(Jackson, 1985, issue 5: 14)
The cartoon above, from Lisa Saffron’s personal narrative about her experience at the
Well Woman Clinic, represented a woman in a vulnerable position in relation to an
objectifying  doctor  who  did  not  appear  to  notice  that  she  was  a  human  being
(expanding  upon  Saffron’s  explicit  argument  to  this  effect  in  the  piece).  The  facial
expression  of  the  patient  in  the  image  reflected  distress,  but  is  difficult  to  define
emotionally.  It  could  be  read  as  discomfort,  fear,  anxiety,  or  embarrassment.  It  is
particularly clear  in cases such as these why the emotional  culture did not require
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clearly  delineated  emotions  which  were  disciplined  through feeling  and  expression
rules. Any one of the possible readings of the emotions of the image could be used to
serve the same underlying purpose for  the emotion culture:  to frame medical  and
psychiatric practitioners as sources of adverse emotional experience, and thereby to
maintain a collective adverse relationship with them.
Other  images  representing  encounters  between women and  clinicians  more
clearly indicated fear, reinforcing a specific framing of doctors as using their power to
inflict fear upon women:
(Trouble and Strife Collective, 1987, issue 10: 5)
The woman in the image above, similarly to the one in the image about the ‘custody
drone’, was shown cowering in fear with the blankets pulled up to her face. Her raised
eyebrows suggested fearful  concern, and the doctor was represented as indifferent
(particularly by his not having discernible eyes). The explosion lines around the vial he
held in  his  hand hinted that  the chemicals  he planned to use  on his  patient  were
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dangerous, an impression further bolstered by the plume of smoke emerging from the
equipment  behind  the  bed  (the  mysteriousness  of  which  was  exaggerated  by  the
question  mark).  The  overall  emotional  framing  of  this  image  was  that  a  woman,
vulnerable in the situation both by her being less in control than the doctor and by her
being laid down in a bed while he was standing over her, was afraid for her safety and
that the doctor was the sort of figure who she ought to be afraid of. This framing drew
the reader’s sympathy toward the patient, engendering a collective of relationship of
fear toward doctors.
This  framing  was  repeated in  other  images  which  portrayed doctors  as  not
merely indifferent, but actively malevolent:
(Taylor, 1984, issue 3: 45)
The caption in the image above highlighted that the violence done to women through
reproductive technology was framed by doctors (and the rest of the male power bloc)
as a boon to them. The image below the caption countered this framing, showing a
doctor  with  scissors  in  hand  (alluding  to  invasive  reproductive  surgeries)  and  a
maliciously eager facial expression (the smiling mouth and angry eyebrows conveyed
the doctor’s malicious pleasure). The overall message implicit in the image and caption
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combined was that ‘strides in reproductive technology’ were actually doctors eager to
cut up women’s bodies, a framing suggestive of the fearsome even without there being
a woman represented within the image. The framing (re)produced doctors as a source
of women’s fear, again reinforcing their place within the movement’s emotion culture
as objects of fear.
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(Taylor, 1983, issue 3: 47)
Combining the portrayal of dangerous and frightening medical equipment with that of
the  gleefully  malevolent  doctor,  the  image  above  represented  doctors  as  eager  to
exploit women’s desire to have babies. Reproducing the representation of the patient’s
disempowerment by her position in a bed (this time also illustrating her lack of agency
in the situation by her arms being concealed under the bed, leaving her defenceless),
she  was  shown  as  wide-eyed  and  small  by  contrast  to  the  scale  of  the  confusing
equipment around her. As with some of the other framings, the specific emotion that
might be read from the image was considerably open to interpretation – it could be
read as bewilderment, confusion, or fear – but it was the emotional framing of her
relationship  with  the  doctor  that  indicated  where  doctors  fit  into  the  movement’s
emotion culture. All of the cartoons depicting clinicians were concerned primarily with
framing the doctors rather than the patients. One did not include a representation of a
patient at all, and others portrayed women whose precise emotions were difficult to
clearly  discern.  The  common  thread  across  all  of  them  was  that  doctors  were
represented as the sorts of figures that a woman ought to be fearful of. What doctors
were  in relation to women was represented through a combination of the doctors’
emotions, their patients’ emotions, and the infrastructure of ‘male science’ equipment
in  the  clinical  setting,  constructing  radical  feminists’  collective  relationship  with
doctors.
This section has explored radical feminists’ collective fear toward doctors and
psychoanalysts. The fear that all of the various namings and framings referred to, while
represented as a significant presence in women’s lives, was not of the same character
as the horror seen in the last section, but both emotions served to reinforce MDRCs’
and men’s adverse relationship with radical feminists. The relationship was defined by
the  horror  and  fear  that  MDRCs  were  seen to  cause  women,  but  for  purposes  of
emotion culture cohesion, it was of little consequence whether the emotion in play
was horror or fear. The incorporation of emotional  framings of these two emotions
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toward the same MDRC figures provided the emotion culture with the flexibility to
maintain  an  adverse  relationship  without  being  anchored to  one  specific  emotion.
Horror  and  fear  were  two  of  the  emotions  in  the  emotional  toolkit  that  radical
feminists used to cultivate their collective relationship with ‘medical men’, extending
the movement’s  interpretation of  MDRCs as  a  component of  a  broader  patriarchal
power bloc and linking male power over women to the disempowering emotions of
horror and fear.
4.5
Empowering Emotions: Anger & Annoyance
The last two sections have explored the disempowering emotions of horror and
fear in radical feminists’ collective relationship with ‘medical men’. They have shown
how the power critique in the movement’s ideology was brought to bear upon radical
feminists’ emotions in relation to MDRCs, and how framing in the text of Trouble and
Strife drew upon that shared ideology to incorporate horror and fear toward doctors
and  psychoanalysts  into  what  it  meant  to  be  a  radical  feminist.  In  the  next  two
sections, the more empowering emotions of anger and annoyance will be examined.
As discussed above, much of the research on emotional channelling in movements is
concerned  with  the  transformation  of  disempowering  emotions  like  fear  into
empowering ones like anger, suggesting that it is beneficial for movements to eschew
disempowering  emotions  in  order  to  generate  mobilisation.  Independently  of
emotional  channelling  for  mobilisation,  however,  the  emotion  culture  of  radical
feminism used disempowering emotions alongside more empowering ones to produce
a multifaceted  adverse  relationship  with  MDRCs.  As  I  have  argued  thus  far,  which
specific adverse emotion was in play in any given circumstance was less important than
the nature of the relationship implied by that emotion.
Anger was a key component of the emotional toolkit, directing the movement’s
collective emotions in an empowering way and providing the emotional dimension of
the conviction that women were entitled to a better situation than their patriarchal
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oppressors were extending them. Collective anger was engendered through a variety
of  textual  mechanisms  in  Trouble  and  Strife,  and  as  with  horror  and  fear,  was
sometimes named and at other times framed, and was represented in both matter-of-
fact, descriptive ways and through more emotionally evocative framings. All of these
contributed  the  cohesive  presence  of  collective  anger  toward  men  across  the
movement’s emotion culture, and the diversity of methods used to frame men and
MDRCs as objects of anger enabled the collective relationship that radical feminists had
with them to be threaded throughout the movement’s culture.
Naming was used to indicate radical feminist anger toward MDRCs in a matter-
of-fact way which conformed to the typical tone of an analytic article. Writing of her
anger about (ostensibly) new discoveries of cancer risks associated with the hormonal
contraceptive pill, Sue Leigh reflected on her own emotional response:
‘I talked to several friends who gave up taking the Pill a
few years ago, and who thought they might be at risk,
and I became increasingly angry at the thought of one
of them getting cancer as a result of what, at that time,
seemed to be a way for women to gain greater control
over their own reproduction.
First  of all  I  asked myself  why I  was so angry
about the Pill… I  think I  was angry because taking it
involved a free choice – women choose to take it  or
settle for another form of contraception, or can abstain
from penetrative sex.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 34)
The word ‘angry’ appeared three times in this relatively small passage of text, treating
Leigh’s anger as an object of reflection and analysis.  This contrasted with the more
evocative  representations  of  anger  which  will  be  explored  below.  In  this  way,  the
premise that radical feminists were angered by doctors and medical researchers was
incorporated into their political analyses.
The  representation  of  anger  sometimes  straddled  the  line  between  explicit
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naming and implicit framing, combining explication with descriptions of the embodied
experience of anger. Recounting her conversation with the doctor in a Well Woman
Clinic  about her uterine perforation and miscarriage,  Lisa Saffron narrated her own
anger as well as the doctor’s:
‘”You’ll  have to  have  a  scrape.  You  don’t  know that
everything came out.  It’s a very minor operation, just
one overnight stay.” Her voice quivered with contempt
at my cowardice and distrust. 
Glancing down at my medical history, her eyes lit up
when she read that my uterus had been perforated by
a coil 11 years ago.
“That  can’t  be  possible,”  she cried.  “It’s  very,
very  rare  –  only  one  chance  in  a  million  of  that
happening.  You  must  be  mistaken.  Explain  to  me
exactly what happened.”
Indignant at not being believed, I glared at her.
“Actually the incidence of perforation is about two per
1000  insertions  of  the  coil  and  some  studies  have
found a rate of 8.7 per 1000,” I said between clenched
teeth and told her my Perforation of the Uterus by a
Coil story in medical language so she’d believe me.
“Yes,  very  rare,”  she  said.  About  one  in
100,000.” I was just about to bargain her down to 1 in
10,000 when she leaned towards me and said, “You’ll
have  great  difficulty  getting  pregnant  again.  You
probably miscarried because of that perforation.  You
need a D and C and a full check-up. Otherwise you just
won’t  be  able  to  have  a  baby.  You  should  start
antenatal  care  much  earlier  and  you  should  have
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hormone  injections  to  prevent  another  miscarriage.”
(How dare you resist our control” If you don’t submit
to our authority, you will be cursed and cursed be the
fruit of your womb!)’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 15)
Explicitly  stating that  she was ‘indignant  at  not being believed’,  Saffron named the
doctor  as  a  source  of  anger,  and  that  emotional  inscription  was  furthered by  her
reference  to  her  ‘clenched  teeth’,  a  familiar  physical  manifestation  of  anger.  Her
narration that the doctor ‘quivered with contempt at my cowardice and distrust’ and
that her ‘eyes lit up’ at the sight of the medical records implied the doctor’s own way of
relating emotionally to Saffron. Though this might be considered a manifestation of
affect  rather  than  emotion,  its  politicised  interpretation  shows  that  these  bodily
feelings  were  not  ‘autonomous’  from  sense-making  and  reflexivity  (see  Massumi,
1995), but the bodily component of a culturally-mediated emotional exchange (Burkitt,
2014b; Wetherell, 2012). She emphasised the doctor’s apparent craving for power and
control,  and  her  angry  reaction  at  Saffron’s  own  intellectual  empowerment  with
medical knowledge. 
The emotional exchange that this  narrative incorporated the radical  feminist
political  analysis  of  doctors  as  oppressive  and  as  objects  of  feminist  anger,  and
highlighted that the emotions of each were in relation to those of the other. Radical
feminists’ anger toward doctors was not represented as being an internal state which
was projected onto doctors, but instead an emotional emergence from the relationship
between doctors and women (the two, as argued earlier in this chapter, being treated
as mutually exclusive even where the doctor was a woman). Sue Leigh’s discussion of
hormonal  contraception  functioned  similarly,  framing  radical  feminists’  anger  as  a
consequence of the way that the medical establishment related to women:
‘The  side  effects,  which  became  evident  over  the
years,  provide  a  staggering  list  of  nasties,  which  are
consistently smoothed over by the medical profession.
They  were  of  the  opinion  that  certain  side  effects
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would go away with a change of Pill, or go away after a
few  months.  Anyway  most  women  who  developed
blood clots, strokes and so on were taken off the Pill
before they died.
The  side  effects  were  also  blamed  on  other
factors which exacerbated them and which were often
thought  to  be  within  a  woman’s  control.  They  were
blamed  on  the  combination  of  the  Pill  with  the
woman’s own lifestyle. She was the one who was asked
to change her habits rather than be offered alternative
methods of contraception.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 37) 
Her  manner  of  representing  the  medical  response  to  side  effects  implied  the
indifference that doctors had to women’s safety. Though she did not quote a doctor,
the flippant tone of her remark that ‘anyway most women who developed blood clots,
strokes, and so on were taken off the Pill before they died’ ran counter to feminists’
feelings, which would entail anger, rather than flippant indifference, toward doctors’
negligence. The way she represented this attitude, then, was not a conveyance of her
own feelings,  but a mimicking of doctors’  attitudes to patients.  This  representation
drew on radical feminists’ lens to frame doctors’ indifference to women’s safety as a
cause  of  feminists’  anger.  Her  subsequent  argument  that  the  adverse  effects  of
contraception were blamed on women, rather than on the doctors who had developed
and prescribed the medication, then built upon the resonance of that initial framing,
showing multiple angering aspects of the way that doctors related to women. In Leigh’s
and  Saffron’s  accounts,  doctors  were  represented  as  seeking  to  control  and  harm
women  with  impunity,  drawing  upon  radical  feminist  political  analysis  as  well  as
women’s lived experiences of clinical interactions to frame doctors as objects of radical
feminists’ collective anger.
Where they could not outright blame women, men were seen to collude inure
one  another  from  accountability.  The  association  with  this  unaccountability  and
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feminists’ anger enabled the embedding of emotional frames into text which did not
make any mention of, or even allusion to, emotion, relying upon the readers’ already-
existing participation in the political ideology and emotional world of the movement to
generate  emotional  resonance.  For  example,  in  a  letter  to  Trouble  and  Strife,  the
Sheffield  Rape  Crisis  Centre  provided  an  account  of  a  sexually  predatory
psychotherapist who had been protected from accountability by the collusion of others
in his profession:
‘When  these  women  spoke  out  in  June  it  was
immediately apparent that there was no mechanism at
all  to deal  with issues of this sort in the therapeutic
community in Sheffield. The therapeutic organisations
that Brian was very active and central in initially felt it
was  not  within  their  terms  of  reference  to  consider
censuring  him.  His  employers  at  Flame  Foundation
(who own Unstone Grange, the conference centre used
by  many  therapy  groups  where  he  was  resident
caretaker) and those at the University did not feel able
to take any action unless some other organisation had
done  something  first.  There  was  no  professional
validating  body  to  appeal  to  for  assistance  with
disciplinary  procedures,  although  if  only  one  such
complaint  had  been  upheld  against  a  GP  he  would
have been immediately and permanently struck off the
register.  There  was  no  recourse  in  law,  and  even  if
there  had  been  it  is  a  notoriously  difficult  and
distressing process to invoke. There was considerable
disbelief  within  the  therapeutic  community  that  the
women were telling the truth, or even that they were
able to tell it from fantasy. There was also considerable
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sympathy  for  Brian  and several  practitioners  wanted
the whole business kept quiet.’  (Sheffield Rape Crisis
Centre, 1989, issue 17: 4) 
The tone of this passage was matter-of-fact, with no explication given about why this
situation ought to be a source of anger. However, when read through the lens of radical
feminist politics, including the male power bloc and the view of psychiatric institutions
as designed to facilitate violence against women, the factors included in the frame (lack
of  accountability,  protection  by  colluding  others,  disbelief  in  women’s  testimony,
sympathy  for  the  abuser,  silencing  women’s  truth)  made  it  an  emotional  frame,
engendering  collective  anger  by  invoking  existing  angry  associations  (Cadena-Roa,
2002). This  framing  strategy  could  be  further  augmented  through  the  use  of
emotionally-imbued  punctuation.  Across  the  text  of  Trouble  and  Strife,  quotation
marks and parentheses were used to mark out a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’,
distinguishing different groups and positioning them within the movement’s emotion
culture. In her discussion of psychoanalytic frameworks used by the state to justify and
enable male violence against women, Lynn Harne used punctuation to highlight those
aspects she found most angering and to produce a distinction between the offending
authors and radical feminists that would function as a foundation for their emotional
opposition:
‘Bowlby  and  maternal  deprivation  theories  have,
according to it,  undermined the importance and the
role  of  the  father  in  a  child’s  development.  The
members’ underlying motives, to regain some of the
control that men have lost, can be seen quite clearly in
some  of  its  past  documents;  for  instance,  in  its
“evidence” on Violence in Marriage submitted to the
Parliamentary Select Committee of the same name in
1975. It stated that, “We believe it fair to see much of
the physical violence…. As a final response to violence
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inflicted in other forms,  especially  by women, verbal
violence” and they go on to state that the causes of
domestic violence are due to (male) frustration. FNF10
does  not  explain,  however,  why  it  is  that  men  beat
women  up  and  not  the  other  way  around.  Where
violence  has  been  involved  (FNF  calls  it  alleged
violence) it emphasises that men must still have access
to their children. It states that “It is always better for
children  to  see  their  father”  -  and  fathers  who  are
excluded from their children may resort to (justifiable)
assault,  manslaughter  and  even  murder.  In  a  1981
document  it  states  that  there  has  been  a  “deep
psychological wound” imposed on fathers who do not
get custody which is “little appreciated by the divorce
courts”.’ (Harne, 1984, issue 12: 14) 
Her use of quotation marks and parentheses identified the most objectionable claims.
To a general reader (or especially to a reader sympathetic to the framework she was
discussing), this would not have produced emotional resonance. To a radical feminist
reader,  however,  the  use  of  punctuation  invited  participation  in  Harne’s  emotional
frame, (re)producing the movement’s collective emotions toward the male power bloc.
In addition to framing men’s violence toward women as an object of collective
anger, the benefits that men gleaned from exploiting their power over women were
raised  as  reasons  for  anger.  Harne’s  discussion  incorporated  the  state  and  MDRC
components of the male power bloc, and the cooperation of the different components
of this bloc continued to arise in framings of mens’ gains at women’s expense. In her
interpretative  ‘translation’  of  the  medical  discourses  on  new  reproductive
technologies, Diana Leonard noted medical researcher’s exploitation of the state and
10 FNF is an acronym for Families Need Fathers, a fathers’ rights advocacy organisation formed in the 
1970s.
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prospective mothers’ desires for parenthood to generate private profit:
‘Note that Steptoe and Edwards’ work was developed
using  public  and  charitable  funds  (NHS,  University
Laboratories,  Ford  Foundation).  They  then  went
private, charging up to £2000 to couples desperate for
a  child.  They  will  only  consider  using  the  egg  of  a
married woman and her husband’s sperm.’ (Leonard,
1984, issue 3: 46) 
By incorporating the various elements of the power bloc into the frame: the state,
private  profit  motives,  and the policing  of  women’s  sexualities  (by  only  permitting
women to be artificially  inseminated by men to whom they were married,  barring
lesbians  and  single  women from  having  children),  Leonard  invoked existing  radical
feminist anger toward men and their power bloc (Owen, 2013) to frame the specific
historical  event of the development of this reproductive technology as angering. By
drawing  upon  the  radical  feminist  political  analysis  of  the  male  power  bloc  and
directing  existing  anger  toward  it  at  this  one  issue,  Leonard  used  radical  feminist
readers’  own  knowledge  and  collective  feelings  to  build  upon  and  reinforce  the
movement’s emotion culture.
Not  all  emotional  framings  which  produced  collective  anger  took  this
comparatively matter-of-fact tone, however. Others were more emotionally evocative,
acknowledging the author’s  feelings  and inviting the readers  to share  in them. For
example,  in  her  explanation  of  artificial  insemination,  Leonard  provided  a  lengthy
description of grisly medical procedures to which women’s bodies were subjected in
the process before then noting what men’s involvement in it entailed:
‘To obtain semen, the man simply jerks off into a clean
glass or china container. Most AID11 uses semen from
male medical  students  (who are  paid  a  fee  –  unlike
blood donors). (Leonard, 1984, issue 3: 48) 
11 Artificial insemination by donor, using donor sperm for conception.
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The contrast between the unsettling descriptions of invasive and painful procedures for
women  and  the  simple  and  pleasurable  contribution  that  men  made  to  artificial
insemination, buoyed by the annoyed and colloquial tone (‘the man simply jerks off’),
conveyed Leonard’s own adverse feeling. That feeling was amplified still further by her
parenthetical aside that men were paid for this – a particularly angering fact to include
after having explained that ‘desperate’ couples were charged thousands of pounds for
IVF  treatment.  The  combination  of  these  two  elements  –  Leonard’s  expression  of
adverse  feeling  and  her  mention  of  the  (implied)  unfairness  of  men  being  paid  –
produced an emotionally resonant frame. 
The  overall  image  that  Leonard’s  discussion  produced  was  of  men  who
profiteered off of women’s ‘desperation’ for motherhood in order to extract wealth
from the state and from women themselves, to police women’s sexuality and curtail
their reproductive freedoms (requiring them to have babies only with their husbands),
and in situations involving sperm donors, to create an opportunity for men to profit
financially  from  women  as  a  reward  for  ‘simply  jerking  off’.  Images  were  used  to
exaggerate  the  emotional  impact  of  this  framing,  showing  the  radical  feminist
interpretation of men’s emotional experience of the arrangement:
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(Trouble and Strife collective, 1984, issue 3: 48)
The  appearance  of  the  above  image  alongside  Leonard’s  writing  augmented  the
emotional  frame  of  anger  which  was  built  throughout  the  piece,  highlighting  the
unfairness of men benefiting in all spheres of the male power bloc – interpersonal life,
the  private  profit  sector,  the  state,  and  medical  control  of  women  –  at  women’s
expense.
Within the overall text of Leonard’s piece, the images and verbal components of
the text were used to convey a synthesised message, but in other pieces, the images
were used to tell a related but distinct story. The header image font and cartoons in
Dale  Spender’s  review of  Phyllis  Chesler’s  book on women and psychoanalysis  was




(Trouble and Strife collective, 1986, issue 9: 40)
Much  of  the  piece  discussed  women’s  ill-treatment  at  the  hands  of  psychiatric
professionals,  elaborating how they were imprisoned in  the home or in psychiatric
institutions in order to keep them submissive to men. The header above, printed in
what looks like hand-written script scribbled with a shaky hand and in all capital letters,
was suggestive of the institutionalised woman. This abstract ‘crazy’ woman was worn
and  fraught  from  years  of  pathologisation,  institutionalisation,  and  abuse  by  men
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(hence  the  shaky  hand),  but  remained defiant  (writing  in  all  capitals,  suggesting  a
written form of shouting – of refusing to be made meek or small). That image set the
emotional frame for the rest of the piece, which strongly praised Chesler’s book for its
uncompromising stance on psychoanalysis as violent to women and a straightforward
mechanism of patriarchal control.
The implied ‘crazy’ woman was then shown on later pages of the piece:
(Courtney, 1986, issue 9: 43)
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The woman’s worn and wrinkled face, the uneven hand in which it was drawn, and her
bloodshot eyes suggested that she had been through a long ordeal, but her smiling
face and the defiant anger expressed in her eyebrows portrayed resistance to men’s
control – a message made clearer by the caption. This image was followed two pages
later by another representation of the same woman:
(Courtney, 1986, issue 9: 45)
The emotional framing across the piece was multifaceted, incorporating the difficult-
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to-define emotional satisfaction of defiance as well as anger at men’s pathologisation
of women, but this last image foregrounded anger. The woman in it appeared panicked
and trapped (her entrapment being represented by the inversion of light and dark), and
indicated  the  sort  of  ordeal  that  the  defiant  woman  in  the  previous  image  had
endured. This latter image is indicative of why the script at the heading of the piece
would have been scribbled with a shaky hand, as if by a ‘crazy’ woman driven mad by
the oppression of  male  control.  The  three  images  across  the piece taken together
added an evocatively emotional dimension to what was otherwise not an emphatically
emotionally expressive piece, connecting the radical feminist analysis of psychotherapy
(the topic of the verbal text) to the anger evoked by the grim reality alluded to in the
images.
As had been the case with images representing horror, the spacial arrangement
of some pieces was also used for emotional framing. Sue Leigh’s piece on hormonal
contraception included a wide array of  small  images in the margins illustrating the
patriarchal narrative behind contraceptive medicine, and in one image in the piece,




(Stevens, 1984, issue 3: 35)
The image showed a woman confined to a domestic life, standing over her kitchen sink
with an apron around her waist and a feather duster in her hand. She stood with her
eyes closed, appearing to be trying to remain calm as a deluge of patriarchal narratives
surrounded her. The image extracts organised around her and along the side of the
page  include  patronising  doctors,  assurances  that  ‘experts  agree’  on  the  safety  of
hormonal contraception and that it ‘life’s easier you know – with The Pill!’, a diagram of
the  female  brain  made  up  of  pain,  pressure,  and  tension,  a  pictographic  of  a
(supposedly) happy couple acknowledging that the woman was now unable to excuse
herself from sex (the argument made on another page of the article where this image
appeared  in  the  margin),  and  a  woman  who  would  prefer  ‘anything  rather  than
another’  child.  The  bottom  of  the  image  was  marked  ‘today’,  and  the  top  ‘the
tomorrow things’, indicating that the woman centred in the image would be ‘in control’
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by taking the pill today, and over time all of the distressing things represented in the
smaller images would pile on top of her.
In this way, the space of the page was used to draw together the threads of the
emotional frame of the rest of the piece, elaborating Leigh’s argument that she was
angry about the way that women had been misled about the safety of the pill, been
left  little  alternative  if  they  wanted  to  successfully  avoid  pregnancy,  and  been
dismissed or blamed by doctors when adverse side effects arose (Ahmed, 2014[2004]).
The image added an additional layer to the framing of these realities as angering by
suggesting that all  of them piled on top of women at once, avalanching them with
patriarchal  harm. Doctors were framed as the objects of feminists’  collective anger
through the cumulative emotional effect of the various ideas and claims represented in
the smaller images and their linkages with components of the argument made across
the piece, producing an emotional frame which was more strongly resonant than the
individual parts of the piece taken separately.
Images, then, were powerful tools of representation for the building of frames
of anger into the emotional  toolkit  of  the emotion culture,  but  there was another
empowering  emotion  for  which  images  were  also  productively  used:  annoyance.
Annoyance was a presence in some of the frames of anger seen above as well – as
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the different emotions sometimes bled
into one another. Annoyance was also represented in its own right separately from
anger, however, and it performed its own function in the emotional toolkit of radical
feminists’ relationship with MDRCs. Frames of anger incorporated women’s oppression
by men, generating emotional resonance by appealing to shared political values and
common  interpretations  of  men’s  power  over  women.  Frames  of  annoyance,
conversely, framed men as ridiculous or laughable. These framings were less linked to
women’s  oppression  by  men and more  associated with representations  of  men as
stupid or not worth getting emotionally agitated about.
Frames of annoyance reduced men to buffoons or pestilences, adding a layer to
the emotional relationship between radical feminists and men which did not require
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the emotional agitation that was aroused by frames of horror,  fear,  or anger, all  of
which were, for  radical  feminists,  concerned with oppression.  Independently of the
ideological  lens  which  saw men as  powerful  and oppressive,  they  were framed as
absurd.  For  example,  in  Stevi  Jackson’s  critique  of  feminist  psychoanalysis,  two
cartoons appeared representing Freud,  one literally  and one figuratively.  The literal
representation amplified Jackson’s overall argument that Freudian theory was logically
unsound in addition to being anti-feminist:
(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 35)
The  shifts  in  Freud’s  facial  expressions  through  the  cartoon,  progressing  from  his
becoming angry at his intellectual failing, to then embarrassed in the fourth frame, and
finally blankly dumbfounded in the final frame, portrayed him as dim-witted and ill-
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humoured. This was in sharp contrast to other representations of him as a powerful
figure  of  horror.  The flexibility  of  an emotional  toolkit  in  the movement’s  emotion
culture allowed radical feminists to feel different emotions toward Freud at different
times, depending on their moods, immediate situations, and contexts, while preserving
the adverse relationship which was central to their shared emotion culture.
Another cartoon in the same piece alluded implicitly to Freudian theory without
explicitly depicting him. It  produced a similar emotional frame to the image above,
however, representing Freud (and his theory) as annoying:
(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 38)
The penises  flying through the air  were depicted as analogous to annoying insects
which had to be repelled. The indifference of the woman portrayed in the image, who
was sufficiently unperturbed by the pests that she did not turn her gaze toward them,
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again reduced Freud to something annoying and, crucially, insignificant. Emotions such
as horror, fear, and anger all implied that radical feminists were under the grip of men,
but emotional frames of annoyance incorporated the possibility of relative indifference
to men while maintaining their position in the movement’s emotion culture as objects
of adverse emotion. 
Significant figures like Freud were not the only objects of annoyance – men in
general were represented as ridiculous as well,  extending the reach of this emotion
into other parts of the male power bloc. In a piece about a moral panic about ‘virgin
births’  (women  having  babies  through  in  vitro  fertilisation  without  being  sexually
active), Jill Radford framed mens’ reaction to the phenomenon (which might otherwise
have been framed through anger) as annoying:
‘Because of this history and our personal knowledge of
quite  a  few  women  who  have  had  or  are  currently
having  children  through  donor  insemination,  the
Lesbian Custody Project was not expecting the phone
lines at Rights of Women to be suddenly besieged in
March  this  year  with  calls  from  journalists,  mostly
male, on the verge of hysteria.
“Is it true?”; “Is it possible?”; “Can women have
babies  without  men?”;  “Will  virgins  throughout  the
land  start  giving  birth?”;  “Is  this  the  end  of  the
family?”; “Is this the end of society?”; “Can you find us
some  virgin  mothers  to  interview?”;  “What  does  it
mean… (gasp)… for men?”; “Will we be laid off?”; “Are
we redundant?”; “Mass castration?”; “Is it legal?”; and,
from the so called “quality  press”,  “Will  you help us
with an objective piece? Of course we are sympathetic
really,  but we do need to cover all  perspectives. Can
you find us some virgin mothers to interview?”; and
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“Are  lesbians  virgins?”.  The  most  unpleasant  caller
asked us, in the same breath and without any sense of
irony,  to  find  both  virgin  mothers  and  wives  with
experience of marital rape.
Having agreed to appear as the “other Jill”, i.e.,
one yet to be knighted, on the Silky Kilroy show (LCP’s
funding crisis is such that we have to accept all the fees
we are offered) it seemed necessary to give thought to
the  question  I’d  put  to  the  first  journalists:  “What
exactly is the problem?”’ (Radford, 1991, issue 21: 8-9)
In this account, men were framed (and denoted) as hysterical in much the way that
their own patriarchal discourse typically framed women. Radford’s representation of a
calm woman receiving a deluge of fearful, panicked calls from men who were afraid
that they might be dispensable (a role which, again, was usually reserved for women)
produced men as the objects of radical feminists’ collective indifferent annoyance. The
inversion of gendered representations of emotionality, with men being hysterical and
reactionary and women being calm and in control, made annoyance an empowering
emotion which could counter-balance the disempowering emotions in other parts of
the emotion culture.
That inversion was extended further through images. For example, on a later
page in Radford’s  piece, an image portrayed a man being anguished about women
objectifying him:
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(Trouble and Strife collective, 1991, issue 21: 11)
The  woman  was  placed  in  the  foreground  of  the  image,  facing  the  reader.  Her
expression was good-humoured and eager.  By contrast,  the man was placed in the
background, his objecthood exaggerated by his facing backward, in tears over precisely
the sort  of  objectification usually  enacted by men toward women.  Radical  feminist
ideology contained as one of its core tenets the idea that women were objectified and
possessed  sexually  by  men (one  reason  for  the  outgrowth  of  political  lesbianism),
making this framing particularly emotionally resonant. Though the cartoon on its own
did not clearly convey annoyance, and might be read instead as mirth, the conjunction
of the cartoon with the overall message of the piece drew it into an annoyance frame.
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With  radical  feminists’  emotional  relationship  with  men  being  pervaded  by  a  felt
awareness  of  being  overpowered  and  controlled  –  horror,  fear,  and  anger  –  the
satirising  emotional  frame  of  this  piece  reduced  men  to  something  ridiculous  and
laughable, and the objects of a type of annoyance which inverted who was framed as
having  power  over  whom.  Contrary  to  the  common  perception  that  anger  is  the
political  emotion (e.g.,  Ost,  2004),  the use of  humour and mockery achieve crucial
political ends and demonstrate that to see only some emotions as political is unduly
reductionistic (Wettergren, 2009).
Annoyance was a crucial  inclusion in the movement’s emotional  relationship
with men, because it gave radical feminists the flexibility to reproduce their adverse
relationship with men in situations in which they did not feel emotionally agitated and
where the other emotions in the toolkit  would not have been appropriate.  Radical
feminists were living, socially-embedded people, and no one can be horrified, fearful,
or angry all  of  the time. The inclusion of an indifferent type of annoyance made it
possible for the recognisable shared emotional toolkit of the movement’s relationship
with men to reproduce an adverse relationship in texts (and, by extension, in-person
interpersonal  interactions  and  private  reflections)  when  radical  feminists  were  not
sufficiently emotionally aroused to engage the other emotions in the toolkit. It also
provided an  emotional  mechanism for  inverting  the  relationship  of  power.  Though
anger is more empowering than horror and fear, it also emerges from the experience
of struggle – in order to be angered, one has to be in the emotional grip of another.
The indifferent annoyance framed in Jackson’s and Radford’s pieces shows that a less
intense emotion could be used to round out the emotion cultural toolkit, stocking it
with emotions ranging from complete powerlessness (horror) to an inversion of the





Like  all  emotion  cultures,  radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture  provided
guidelines for how participants ought to feel ‘toward’ particular others. In this chapter,
their emotions toward men and MDRCs have been explored. The foundation of their
collective emotions toward MDRCs was their ideological stance on male power, seeing
all men as being united in an effort to reproduce women’s oppression and keep women
under the control of men in every sphere of their lives. With that idea in the minds of
participants of the movement, individual figures and events relating to MDRCs were
interpreted to be signs of the male power bloc at work. Threading across different sorts
of  textual  forms,  radical  feminists  represented  and  textually  (re)constructed  their
collective emotions toward MDRCs, drawing upon their already-existing shared view of
male  power  in  order  to  produce  emotionally  resonant  frames  which  would  be
compatible with the movement’s ideology.
Emotions in social movements are widely understood through a dramaturgical
lens  which  sees  emotions  as  internal,  varying  in  degrees  of  authenticity  or
inauthenticity, and unidirectionally projected outward. Though it is acknowledged that
emotions  arise  in  the  context  of  relationships  (and  within  the  study  of  social
movements, these are particularly often concerned with relationships of power), this
has not generally been fully reflected in understandings of how emotions work in social
movements, seeing the emotion work that movements do as relationship work. What
this chapter has shown is that collective emotions cannot be understood except by
reference  to  their  situatedness  in  relationships.  There  are  analytically  significant
consequences to this. One is that explorations of movement emotion cultures need not
be concerned with one or two specific emotions, and indeed the data explored in this
chapter  shows  that  it  is  not  always  clear  what  emotion  is  involved  at  all.
Representations  of  emotion  are  sometimes  ambiguous,  particularly  (though  not
exclusively) where images are concerned. The study of emotions in movements, then,
need not  be  constrained  by  emotion  words  and  the  impulse  to  cleanly  categories
instances  of  emotion  as  one  particular  emotion  or  another.  Furthermore,  the
ambiguity of these emotional representations troubles emotion theories which confine
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emotions’ place in culture to emotions which are clearly named and represented (e.g.,
Barbelet, 2001) and locate all other aspects of emotion in social structure, and similarly
troubles the displacement of ambiguous feelings to the realm of affect (e.g., Massumi,
1995; 2002; see Wetherell, 2012 for a decisive critique). A second major consequence,
as I have argued throughout this chapter, is that the emotions themselves are in fact
secondary in emotion culture. The cultivation and maintenance of an emotion culture
is  less  about  any  specific  emotion  than  about  reproducing  particular  types  of
relationships between the movement participants and key categories of others. While
Verta Taylor’s  (2000) foundational  work on emotion cultures of  movements argued
that emotion cultures indicate how participants ought to feel  toward themselves and
others,  this  chapter  has  argued  that  a  more  fitting  question  is  what  sorts  of
relationships are produced and maintained through collective emotions, allowing for
the possibility that there may be quite a lot of oscillation between different emotions
in order to produce what is ultimately the same relationship.
Radical  feminists  represented  MDRCs  alternately  as  horrifying,  fearsome,
angering, and annoying, using familiar cultural forms such as the genre of horror along
with more movement-specific shared meanings to produce resonant emotional frames.
They named MDRCs as objects of these emotions explicitly as well as framing them
emotionally  through  their  shared  political  lens,  and  used  verbal  text,  images,  and
syntheses of the two to produce consistent emotional frames across the text of the
magazine. Even with variation in content and form of pieces, a cohesive and consistent
relationship  with  MDRCs  emerged.  The  flexibility  afforded  by  an  emotion  culture
toolkit allowed them to maintain their adverse relationship with MDRCs without being
tethered to any one specific emotion, freeing them to build emotional frames in ways
which were responsive to their immediate situations. The disempowering emotions of
horror and fear produced an emotional relationship which reflected men’s power over
women, while the more empowering emotions of anger and annoyance engendered
resistance and enabled the reproduction of the adverse relationship in instances of
comparative  emotional  indifference.  Through  the  use  of  all  of  these  emotions,  a
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consistent  collective  relationship  was  cultivated  and  maintained,  allowing  radical
feminists as a group to participate in a shared relationship with men and MDRCs. Their
ideology was drawn upon for resonant emotional frames, and through that resonance,
buoyed the movement’s  ideology.  Men were the key adversary in  the movement’s
emotion culture, but not the only one, and chapter 5 will explore another contentious
relationship in radical feminism’s emotion culture: that between radical feminism and
other strands of the WLM.
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Chapter 5




In chapter 4, radical feminists’ collective relationship with men was explored. I
argued  that  collective  emotions  ‘toward’  men  actually  constituted  a  collective
relationship with them, providing a flexible but cohesive toolkit through which radical
feminists could make sense of their ongoing experiences and reproduce their collective
emotional relationship with MDRCs. They used emotional framing to represent actors
within MDRCs as horrifying, fearsome, angering, or annoying, cultivating a collective
adverse relationship with them which had the malleability to travel across situations
involving different adverse emotions  while  remaining within  the framework  of  that
fundamentally cohesive adverse relationship.
The  same  conception  will  be  deployed  in  this  chapter,  which  explores  the
relationship  between  radical  feminism  and  other  strands  of  the  WLM.  Like  their
collective relationship with men, radical feminists’ relationship with other feminisms
was positioned in their emotion culture not in relation to a specific script for what
emotions radical  feminists  ought to feel  toward other feminists,  but rather using a
loose  and  permissive  emotional  guideline  which  enabled  the  (re)production  of
particular  types  of  relationships  between  feminisms.  Radical  feminism  was
ideologically distinct from other segments of the WLM, and its ability to differentiate
itself  was  sustained  in  part  by  the  emotional  relationships  which  maintained  the
divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ seen in radical feminism’s collective relationship with
men in chapter 4.
Radical feminists’ relationship with other feminisms had many more layers than
can be unpacked in a single chapter. The analysis here will  focus on one important
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aspect  of  it  which  has  been  particularly  under-explored  in  existing  literature  on
emotion: the background emotions. It will focus principally on antipathy (contrasting
this with its opposite, affinity). Affinity and antipathy are amorphous and difficult to
define  background  emotions  which  evade  straightforward  theorisation,  and  it  is
unsurprising that theoretical approaches to these vague feelings are often rooted in
theories of affect rather than emotion. However, this chapter will argue that antipathy
can be understood as a background emotion, and that antipathy toward other parts of
the WLM (notably socialist feminism and ‘cultural feminism’, in which feminism’s turns
to  psychoanalysis  and  alternative  medicine  were  rooted)  was  a  key  component  of
radical feminism’s emotion culture. I define antipathy as the emotion of ‘no’ - a general
disposition (Burkitt, 2014a: 16-17) toward disagreement and rejection which is not as
episodic  (von  Scheve,  2018:  2)  as  other  emotions,  but  which  I  contend  should
nevertheless be considered an emotion. Antipathy has in common with other emotions
that it emerges from relationships and is entangled with meanings and interpretations.
To feel antipathy, or an inclination to disagree, reject, or be against, permeated radical
feminists’  relationship  with  other  strands  of  the  WLM,  making  a  background  of
antipathy a diffuse presence in that relationship.  Seeing antipathy as a background
emotion, I contend that it is similar to a ‘structure of feeling’ (Williams, 2013[1961]),
but  bears  an  important  distinction  from  this  due  to  its  specificity  to  a  subaltern
emotion culture rather than being emergent from hegemony, the source of culturally
pervasive structures of feeling.
Contrasted  with  antipathy  was  affinity,  the  inverse  of  antipathy  and  the
background  emotion  which  permeated  radical  feminists’  relationships  with  one
another.  Affinity  will  be  explored  further  in  chapter  6,  but  it  is  highlighted  in  this
chapter because it inevitably arises (by its presence or its absence) where antipathy
does. Just as the emotional toolkit of radical feminists’ relationship with men joined
them together as a group through shared relationship, their shared antipathy toward
other feminisms produced the affinity that they shared amongst themselves. Where
affinity  and  antipathy  came  into  tension,  ambivalence  arose,  and  the  presence  of
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ambivalence was another clear presence in the movement’s emotion culture which will
be examined in this chapter. By focusing on these vague but consequential background
emotions,  a  more  complete  picture  of  the  movement’s  emotion  culture  can  be
formulated – one which is less confined by the limitations of clearly-defined emotion
words, but which allows vaguely-defined emotions to still be theorised as emotions.
It is unsurprising that background emotions have been comparatively neglected
in  studies  of  emotion  –  they  are  notoriously  difficult  to  pin  down  empirically.  All
emotions are relational and wedded to historicity and context, but this may be even
more  emphatically  the  case  for  background  emotions.  Questions  about  emotional
background lead directly and immediately to a thorough examination of the context,
because  it  is  there,  lurking  quietly  in  the  context,  where  the  subtle  currents  of
background emotion are located. In order for the emotional framings explored in the
analysis in this chapter to make sense, it is helpful here to revisit some of the details of
the historical moment that confronted radical feminists in the 1980s, and in light of
which  they  interpreted  the  significance  of  ongoing  developments  in  feminism  and
forged their relationships with other parts of the WLM.
Though this chapter does not centre around radical feminist subcultural villains
such as Freud, there was a hegemonic cultural figure which haunted their ideology and
collective emotions, and which will recur as a regular (if sometimes subtle) presence
throughout  the  chapter:  the  innately  caring,  nurturing,  and  nature-attuned  ‘earth
mother’ stereotype. Radical feminists’ emotional relationship with the ‘earth mother’
was less straightforward than the one they built with the figures explored in chapter 4.
Radical  feminism,  like  all  feminisms,  roiled  with  internal  dissonances  and  debates.
Some  radical  feminists  rejected  as  misogynistic  any  notion  of  women  as  innately
maternal,  caring,  loving,  or  ‘in  tune’  with  their  bodies  or  their  feelings.  The
presupposition of women’s emotional and caring ‘nature’ was a powerful discursive
tool for the very conscription of women to the private, domestic sphere which the
‘second  wave’  largely  sought  to  dismantle  (Holmes,  2004).  Other  radical  feminists,
however, saw revolutionary potential in the embrace of modes of relation and selfhood
174
generally coded as feminine. Masculinist traits such as assertiveness, anger, violence,
and purportedly unemotional ‘rationality’, they suggested, were not a model to aspire
to. 
There was an internal tension within radical feminism, then, and it will surface
in this chapter’s discussion of ambivalence. Radical  feminists were divided amongst
themselves,  and  even  sometimes  within  themselves,  about  the  political  tension
between the feminist turn to ‘feminine’ modes of relation (and its reclamation from
patriarchal cultural inscriptions) and the individualist turn which they saw as overtaking
feminism.  To  embrace  emotions  and  practices  associated  with  the  ‘earth  mother’
stereotype risked reproducing patriarchy, but likewise the embrace of healing practices
like  psychotherapy  and  alternative  medicine  might  replace  collective  responses  to
patriarchy  with  depoliticising,  individualist  ones.  The  early  1980s  as  a  moment  in
feminism coincided with another key historical moment: the neoliberal turn in Britain.
Just  when  it  seemed  to  be  more  crucial  than  ever  to  maintain  the  collective
consciousness that had been painstakingly built in the previous two decades, feminists
began  to  increasingly  adopt  psychotherapy  and  alternative  medicine  as  ways  of
practising  feminism.  These  developments  had  emotional  consequences  for  radical
feminism, and the antipathy emerging at  this time will  be explored throughout the
chapter.
Drawing again from Verta Taylor’s definition of emotion culture and uniting this
with the idea of emotions as relational, this chapter sees radical feminism’s emotion
culture  as  guiding  movement  participants  regarding  how they  ought  to  feel  about
themselves and other feminisms, and I contend again here that the two components –
how participants should feel about themselves and how to feel about others – makes
emotion  culture  always  already  about  relationships.  As  with  their  collective
relationship with men, radical feminists engaged in inward-facing emotional framing.
They produced framings of other feminisms for an audience of their own movement in
order to produce collective emotions, and the concept of emotional framing will  be
used throughout the chapter. Framing did not manifest in precisely the same way here
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as  it  did  with  framings  of  men,  however.  While  the  fundamental  operation  of
emotional framing was similar,  radical  feminists’  relationship with other feminists  –
even  those  with  whom  they  strongly  disagreed  –  was  not  as  adversarial  as  their
relationship with men. 
The data examined in this chapter incorporates pieces in which radical feminists
most directly addressed themselves to other strands of  the WLM. Book and article
reviews  were central  to  this,  and  three richly  detailed  reviews  are  examined here.
Other genres of text included are report, letter, and analytic article. All include a topical
focus on the growing popularity of ‘alternative’ medicine and feminist psychotherapy,
addressing  the  tensions  between  radical  feminism  and  other  feminisms  on  these
issues.  The  chapter  proceeds  in  three  sections.  Section  5.2  will  surface  radical
feminists’  awareness  of  the  ascending  uptake  of  alternative  medicine  and feminist
psychotherapy, illuminating the reasons why these issues were a locus of antipathy for
them  and  showing  how  these  trends  grated  against  radical  feminism’s  political
ideology.  As  was  the  case  with  the  male  power  bloc,  radical  feminism’s  emotions
toward these developments can only be understood in light of their shared thinking
about them, and their interpretation of the shifts in feminism and what they signified
will  clarify  their  emotional  responses  to  them.  Section  5.3  will  explore  antipathy
between  radical  feminism  and  other  strands  of  the  WLM,  showing  how  the
movement’s ideological opposition to alternative medicine and psychoanalysis, as well
as fractures in the WLM which had formed prior to the 1980s, manifested emotionally
in adverse relationships. Finally, section 5.4 will explore the hazy area of ambivalence.
Radical feminists were not as united in their feelings about alternative medicine and
feminist psychotherapy as they were about male power, and some were divided even
within themselves. With a strong objection to male-dominated care, woman-centred
alternatives had significant appeal, even if radical feminists saw reason to object to
them as well. These contradictions in the realities of their context left them with no
consonantly  appealing  option,  and  section  5.4  will  explore  radical  feminists’
ambivalence within contradictions and how they endeavoured to resolve them.
176
5.2
A  ‘Tendency’  in  the  WLM:  The  Growing  Reach  of  Alternative  Medicine  &
Psychotherapy
Emotion pervaded radical feminists’ engagements with other feminisms and the
changes  happening  in  the  WLM  throughout  the  1980s.  Just  as  their  emotional
response  to  medical  institutions  was  formed substantially  in  light  of  their  view  of
medicine and psychoanalysis as formed through long histories of medicalised violence
against women, their emotional responses to the changing WLM was rooted in their
understanding of its past and, crucially, their concerns about its future. This section will
draw  out  a  few  salient  examples  of  radical  feminists’  interpretation  of  the  rising
popularity  of  alternative medicine and feminist  psychotherapy.  These examples  will
help  to  illuminate  their  collective  emotions,  which  will  be  discussed  later  in  the
chapter.  It  should be noted that  there  is  no clear  division  between emotional  and
unemotional  references  to  other  feminisms in  the text  of  Trouble and  Strife –  the
examples in the present section include emotion, and those in the sections that follow
bear  out  the  themes  raised  in  this  section  (which  is  not  about  emotion  per  se).
However, the emotional weight for radical feminists of the WLM’s shifting during the
1980s farther and farther away from radical feminist ideology is difficult to apprehend
fully without first being aware of how present in radical feminists’ minds that shifting
was. 
Radical feminists’ concerns with feminists turning to alternative medicine and
psychoanalysis were based partially in an awareness that patriarchy was difficult to
purge:
‘There  has  been  a  feminist  response  –  the
development  of  a  feminist  psychology  and  feminist
therapy – but there has been no essential change in
the  ethics  of  mental  health,  partly  because  it  is  so
inextricably interwoven with the concept of male-as-
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norm,  a  concept  which  shows  few  signs  of  being
dislodged.’ (Spender, 1986, issue 9: 45)
However, more at issue for the relationship between radical and other feminisms was
radical  feminists’  own  awareness  of  the  growing  popularity  of  psychoanalysis  and
alternative  medicine.  Their  emotional  responses  to  medicine  (alternative  and
otherwise) and psychoanalysis were not responses to those things in abstraction from
their  histories,  contexts,  and  meanings.  Rather,  as  explored  in  chapter  4,  these
medicalised practises and their pervasiveness signified something about the broader
trends afoot in feminism and in Britain more generally. 
The issue of historical change toward alternative medicine and psychoanalysis
was a strong presence on radical feminists’ minds at this time, and came through in the
political thought and emotional frames in Trouble and Strife. A recurrent theme in this
area was that of tendency – of what was becoming increasingly standard in the WLM.
For  example,  the  opening  of  Stevi  Jackson’s  critique  of  feminist  psychoanalysis
acknowledged the inescapability of the shift:
‘It  is  no  longer  possible  for  those  of  us  who  reject
psychoanalysis to ignore it. It has gained too strong a
hold to be easily  dismissed.’  (Jackson,  1983,  issue 1:
32)
Later in the piece, she went on to make clearer why this was a matter of growing
concern for herself and other radical feminists:
‘Even  those  who  are  critical  of  psychoanalysis  and
opposed to its being used as an explanation for the
persistence  of  patriarchy  frequently  display
considerable deference towards it. There is a tendency
to  assume  that  any  aspect  of  women’s  experience,
especially sexual experience, that is not immediately
explicable by any other means must come within the
realm of psychoanalysis, that psychoanalysis provides
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a key for decoding mysteries which would otherwise
remain unfathomable.’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 32)
It was precisely that change – that even those who were critical of psychoanalysis were
growing  increasingly  drawn  to  its  frameworks  –  which  aroused  radical  feminists’
discomfort.  Their  awareness  of  the  weakening  influence  of  feminist  critiques  of
frameworks such as psychoanalysis signalled to them a weakening of the WLM itself (a
point which will be explored further below), and heightened the antipathy they felt
toward  strands  of  the  WLM  which  were  promoting  these  ideological  shifts.  The
movement's emotion culture was rooted in its political ideology, but also in the shifting
context in which it was situated. While it is known that movement emotions change in
response to changing contexts (e.g., Gould, 2002), in this circumstance the antipathy
within  radical  feminism's  emotion  culture  did  not  change  in  quality,  but  rather
intensified.
Discussions of ‘tendency’ and trend toward feminist psychotherapy were not
only focused on the feminist engagements with psychoanalytic theory to which Jackson
referred, but also on the growing popularity of psychotherapy as a practice which was
being taken up as a legitimate part of women’s liberation work. In her book review of
their book Feminist Revolution, Sara Scott highlighted the contemporary relevance of
Redstockings’s critique of psychoanalytic socialisation theory:
‘There  is  another  reason  why  the  critique  outlined
above seemed to appropriate to the present: the rise
of  “feminist”  therapy.  The  listings  of  professional
therapists in Spare Rib get longer by the month, and, at
least  in  this  part  of  the  country,  the  small  women’s
therapy  group  appears  to  have  replaced  the
consciousness-raising group. It seems to me that here
we  have  the  most  recent  version  of  an  orientation
which situates the state of our heads rather than the
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overthrow of male power at the centre of the solution
to women’s oppression.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 25)
Scott’s  allusion  to  the  centring  of  individualistic  emphasis  of  psychotherapy  was  a
common concern, and expressed even more emphatically by Lorraine Davies in her
admiring letter to Trouble and Strife about a piece critiquing feminist therapy:
‘Who  can  we  turn  to  when  we  become  casualties?
Psychotherapists – there are some who call themselves
feminist  therapists  –  can  they  help?  Or  maybe  it’s
physical  –  what  about  one  of  those  osteopaths  or
acupuncturists everyone is going on about. Could it be
diet  –  maybe  a  herbalist?  It’s  probably  a  disease  –
better a homeopath. What if it’s physical and mental –
maybe  one  of  those  deep  massage  people  –
chiropractor  or  rolfer  or…  I’ve  no  doubt  that  some
some [sic] of these “therapists” help women but where
does  feminism  come  in?  How  does  power  operate?
How is it abused?...
Such  is  the  state  of  our  women’s  liberation
movement,  so  softened  by  “feminist  therapy”  and
alternative  medicine  that  EST*12 is  back  with  a
vengeance.  Change  your  life  (I  thought  we  already
had),  you  too can be as  aggressive  and hard  sell  as
other ESTers (sorry assertive) – for £250 we will strip
your  psyche,  verbally  abuse  you  (haven’t  we  had
enough?),  make  you  into  nothing  then  rebuild  your
new self (brain washing).’ (Davies, 1984, issue 4: 9)
The former paragraph of the letter conveyed Davies’s sense of the creeping ubiquity of
these practices. It made more manifest what was also suggested by Jackson and Scott –
12 Ehrhardt Sensitivity Training
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that  therapies  purporting to  be feminist  were becoming too widespread to  readily
ignore. In all three pieces there was a felt sense of adverse emotion, and though the
emotions  involved  were  not  clear  from  these  small  extracts,  they  convey  some
indication  of  radical  feminists’  awareness  of  how  psychotherapy  and  alternative
medicine were changing the WLM.
The  latter  paragraph  of  the  extract  above  highlighted  radical  feminists’
association of the turn to feminist therapy with a feminisation and depoliticisation of
the WLM. Davies referred to feminist therapy and alternative medicine as a sign that
the ‘state of our women’s liberation movement’ was ‘softened’, alluding to the ‘earth
mother’ stereotype which formed a locus of antipathy for radical feminists. This, too,
will be explored in greater depth in the sections that follow, but it is worth generating
here a portrait of what radical feminists saw when they looked out at the WLM at this
point in time. As Scott argued, consciousness-raising groups were fading from sight and
being replaced with women’s therapy groups. According to Davies, questions of power
and its abuse were being forgotten in favour of a focus on which trendy remedy might
be  used  to  heal  any  particular  ill  that  women  might  experience,  softening  the
movement and turning its attention to care and well-being rather than the dismantling
of patriarchal power structures. These observations formed the basis of the persistent
under-riding antipathy which will be explored below.
Even where there was not such a salient sense of irritation, the perception that
alternative medicine was a sweeping craze was a strong presence in radical feminists’
thinking. Sue O’Sullivan described in a brief aside within her review of Catcall magazine
issues 15 and 16 her own direct encounter with the omnipresence of women’s growing
preoccupation  with alternative  medicine  and her  interpretation  of  its  depoliticising
effect:
‘A few months ago I co-ordinated a day workshop on
“Women, Health and Sexuality” at an adult education
institute.  I  quite  expected  that  there  would  be  a
diverse group of women; what I  wasn’t prepared for
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was the number of women who were so wound up in
holistic  medicine  that  reactions  to  oppression  and
exploitation, as well as health, were individualised into
a  matter  of  a  “state  of  mind”.  Not  only  could  you
prevent cancer through being “in tune” with your mind
and  body,  you  could  transcend  sexism  by  the  same
method.’ (O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 51)
O’Sullivan  made  still  more  explicit  a  line  of  thinking  which  has  been  surfaced
throughout  this  section:  that  the  WLM  was  becoming  ‘wound  up  in’  alternative
medicine and psychotherapy, and that the fixation had political consequences. Not only
might women make use of therapies which radical feminists saw as politically flawed
(for  the  reasons  discussed  in  chapter  4),  but  the  ideological  foundations  of  these
practices were seen to be contaminating women’s thinking about gendered oppression
itself.  The quotation marks that O’Sullivan used to mark out women’s reduction of
oppression to a ‘state of mind’ which could be remedied through being ‘in tune’ with
one’s self conveyed a sense of incredulity, differentiating women who subscribed to
this view from O’Sullivan and her radical feminist readers (who were invited by her
phrasing and use of punctuation to share in her incredulity).
Radical feminists’ collective emotional relationship with different strands of the
WLM through the 1980s developed in the light of this thinking. The movement’s lens
on medicine and psychoanalysis themselves were just one component of the ideology
through which they interpreted concrete historical developments. They also brought to
their interpretations a particular account of the unfolding trajectory of the WLM: the
movement  was  becoming  depoliticised,  ‘wound  up  in’  therapy  and  alternative
medicine, and these trends were leaving less and less space for what radical feminists
saw as a sound political analysis or approach to pursuing liberation. Their relationship
with men was unambiguously adversarial, with men being the oppressor class and the
objects of horror, fear, anger, and annoyance. Other feminisms, meanwhile, were seen
to be culpable for  changes to the WLM which were breaking it  down from within,
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pushing radical feminist analysis farther out to the margins of the WLM as a whole and
implementing as the WLM’s  modus operandi practices which radical feminists saw as
incompatible with a successful women’s movement (Owen, 2013). That interpretation
formed  the  foundation  for  the  movement’s  collective  antipathy  toward  other
feminisms, the topic of the next section.
5.3
Antipathy in Inter-feminism Relationships: Radical & Other Feminisms
As the last section suggested, the relationship between radical feminism and
other strands of the WLM hinged largely on their respective politics. Radical feminists
saw men as wilfully oppressive of women and sure to hold to their dominance if able to
do so, and therefore saw anything which might de-centre the question of power from
feminist  thought and practices as dangerous to the future of  the WLM. The 1980s
came after roughly a decade of WLM action, however, and fractured relationships had
formed  between  different  feminist  movements  in  the  1970s  through  their
interpersonal encounters with one another as well. These contentions carried over into
the  ‘80s,  and  were  entangled  with  ideological  differences.  In  this  section,  radical
feminists’  antipathy  toward  other  feminisms  will  be  examined,  with  that  antipathy
proceeding from differences of politics as well as radical feminists’ adverse emotional
experiences of dealing with feminists outside their own movement (either in person or
through their writings). Notably, antipathy toward other feminisms was a particularly
strong presence early in Trouble and Strife’s publication run, and this section will focus
on the first two years of the magazine’s life. As the decade wore on and the context
surrounding  radical  feminism  continued  to  change,  radical  feminists’  own  feelings
exhibited some degree of change, giving rise to a stronger presence of the ambivalence
which will be discussed in the next section.
The emotional timbre of each piece examined in this section is unique. Where
emotional framing is concerned, representing the emotions of these pieces of writing
in the form of small extracts does them some considerable degree of violence. In the
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interest of maintaining as much emotional cohesion as possible for an exploration of
the subtlety of antipathy, the data in this section will  be presented in chronological
order rather than thematically. Exploring each piece in turn will enable the emotional
currents to come forward a bit more visibly than they would otherwise do in the form
of extracts. Antipathy is a deliberately ambiguous emotion word which captures an
emotional  aversion  involving  feelings  of  dissatisfaction,  rejection,  disagreement,
discontent, and some of the emotions explored in chapter 4 like anger and annoyance.
What the concept  of  antipathy as a  background emotion does that  other emotion
concepts do not do is break free from the episodic nature of emotion, accounting for
the reach  of  the emotion  across  time and throughout  a  long-running  relationship.
Longer-lasting feelings are more often understood as 'structures of feeling' (Williams,
2013[1961]),  or  affects (Massumi,  2002),  which are less firmly anchored to specific
ideas, meanings, and interpretations. I argue that radical feminists' collective antipathy,
however, is an emotion precisely because it proceeds from a shared interpretation of
the  world  and  is  attributed  to  a  commonly  understood  set  of  causes,  though  the
emotion,  like  an  affect,  stretches  across  long  expanses  of  time  and  travels  across
different immediate situations. The feminists and feminist ideas that radical feminists
grappled  with  in  each  of  the  pieces  extracted  below  were  emotionally  framed
differently in different cases, but what united them all was the antipathetic relationship
between the movements that was (re)produced by those framings.
Radical  feminists actively saw through the lens of their interpretation of the
tendencies and trends in feminism, and they were likewise actively engaged with the
relationship between radical feminism and other parts of the WLM. In her review of
Feminist Revolution in the first issue of Trouble and Strife, Sara Scott highlighted radical
feminists’ interest in inter-feminism relations:
‘Redstockings  were  not  only  concerned  by  the
disappearance/misinterpretation of  radical  feminism,
but  also  with  clarifying  radical  feminism’s  direct
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relationship with other  strands of  the WLM.’  (Scott,
1983, issue 1: 24)
The active presence of  the relationship between feminisms in the minds of  radical
feminists was significant for their emotion culture, because ‘other strands of the WLM’
did not fall into a place in the movement’s emotion culture passively or by accident.
Rather, radical feminists actively deliberated what their relationship with other feminist
movements  was  and  what  those  relationships  meant  for  the  women’s  liberation
project. (Their active interest in how feminists related to one another also gave rise to
significant consequences for relationships within radical feminism itself, a matter which
will be explored in chapter 6.)
With inter-feminism relationships in active focus, there was scope to ascribe
political (and by extension, relational and emotional) significance to the way that other
feminisms engaged with radical feminism:
‘The first  section of  Feminist  Revolution,  from which
the title of this article is taken, discusses the way in
which  radical  feminist  ideas  and  slogans  become
disembodied,  and  therefore  open  to  whatever
interpretation and use others want to make of them.
My own experience confirmed the truth of this, in that
my  knowledge  of  Redstockings  until  very  recently
extended only to the ability to attribute to them the
statement: “We take the woman’s side on everything”.
The  “foolishness”  of  which  socialist-feminist  friends
kindly pointed out to me five years ago by insisting that
such  a  position  implied  at  least  tacit  support  for
Margaret Thatcher. Not having access to the manifesto
which delineates the meaning and implications of their
slogan,  I  believed  what  I  was  told  about  radical
feminists,  all  of  which  contributed  to an  image of  a
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“lunatic  fringe”  which  lurked  only  in  the  furthest
corners of  the “real”  (socialist)  women’s movement.’
(Scott, 1983, issue 1: 23-24)
In this small selection of text, Scott represented a variety of layers to the relationship
between socialist and radical feminism. Firstly, she raised the issue of representation
and interpretation, expressing annoyance that socialist feminists had misrepresented
radical feminism to her. Her dissatisfaction about this suggested that she understood
there to be a reasonable expectation that feminists  would not mischaracterise one
another,  and  the  violation  of  that  expectation  by  her  socialist  feminist  ‘friends’
influenced her  relationship  with that  movement.  That  she  termed as  ‘kindly’  their
injunction that a radical  feminist slogan implied ‘at least tacit support for  Margaret
Thatcher’ proved to be sarcastic when seen in light of the rest of the extract and the
piece, in which she complained that what socialist feminists were saying about radical
feminism  was  being  believed  by  others  (including  herself)  despite  its
misrepresentativeness. 
It would be difficult to pinpoint a specific emotion conveyed by Scott’s sarcasm.
It framed socialist feminists as perhaps angering or frustrating, but without naming any
emotion and without expressing emotion per se. There is therefore no emotion rule in
the conventional  sense of  the term – no specific  emotion that  ought to be felt  or
expressed – but rather a rule about the 'pattern of relationship' (Burkitt, 2014a) that
ought to be (re)produced. The impression on reading this segment of the text is not
that Scott actively felt irritated or angry as she was writing it (though perhaps she did),
but  the  use  of  sarcasm  which  named  socialist  feminists’  actions  as  ‘kindly’  while
obviously intending to indicate the contrary framed socialist feminists as the rightful
objects of some adverse emotion. What this framing did was invite the like-minded
radical feminist reader to participate emotionally in an emotion culture which placed
socialist  feminists  as  an object  of  antipathy without  clearly  or  explicitly  delineating
what adverse emotion to direct toward them. Depending upon the mood of the reader
or  her  own relationship  with socialist  feminists,  she might  read  Scott’s  account  as
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angry, irritated, or disaffected. The unifying thread across all of the possible readings
was the relationship with socialist feminists that any of those emotions would imply. As
with their relationship with men, what was most important was not which specific
emotion a radical  feminist  felt  toward socialist  feminists,  but that  a  relationship of
antipathy was maintained.
The  other  crucial  component  of  this  section  of  Scott’s  piece  was  her
representation that socialist feminists portrayed radical feminists as a ‘“lunatic fringe”
which lurked only in the furthest corners of the “real” (socialist) women’s movement’.
Again echoing their relationship with men, stereotypes and cultural figures appeared
as significant in the movement’s emotion culture. A repeated pattern in the emotion
culture was a concern with the type of cultural character or role that various actors
were  cast  into.  In  their  discussions  of  men,  radical  feminists  complained  of  being
portrayed by doctors as neurotic complainers or hysterics, a common mechanism for
the oppression of women (Collins, 1990: chapter 4). They responded by creating an
assembly  of  subcultural  figures  through  which  to  represent  and  relate  to  men
(horrifying villains, annoying buffoons, etc.) which organised the movement’s collective
relationship toward doctors as permeated by a toolkit of adverse emotions. In their
relationship with socialist feminists, Scott represented quite a vivid image of a ‘lunatic’
who  ‘lurks  in  the  corner’  of  a  space  which  was  principally  occupied  by  the  ‘real’
women’s  movement.  With  an  established  precedent  for  adverse  emotions  in  the
movement’s emotion culture in relation to how doctors and men represented women
(in relation to themselves), this framing of socialist feminists’ dishonesty about radical
feminism connected to a familiar source of a full range of adverse emotions in order to
achieve emotional resonance. By framing socialist feminists as having implied that they
themselves were the ‘real’, superior women’s movement, and radical feminists were
‘lunatics lurking in the corner’, Scott generated a resonant emotional frame which was
clearly  linked  to  an  established  narrative  and  source  of  adverse  emotions  in  the
movement.
Cultural  figures  did  significant  emotional  work  in  the  movement’s  emotion
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culture.  They  provided  a  locus  of  emotional  relationship  (providing  a  relatively
cohesive, concrete object with which to emotionally relate), they facilitated the linking
of emotions and ideas with familiar and immediately recognisable representations, and
they  associated  abstract  collectives  (like  men  or  other  feminisms)  with  radical
feminism’s ideological lens on power relations and the historical moment in which they
were situated. Radical feminists’ paramount concern with power and the success of the
women’s movement made ‘good’ feminist politics a key aspect of which frames would
achieve emotional resonance, and by extension, made linkages between ‘bad’ feminist
politics  and the broader patriarchal  context a  source of  collective antipathy.  In the
extract above, Scott’s framing was resonant with radical feminism’s existing ideals and
values because it associated socialist feminists’ conduct toward radical feminists’ with
men’s oppressive behaviours. In other places, an even wider range of components of
the  context  were  drawn  into  the  same frame,  setting  radical  feminism apart  as  a
uniquely  ‘good’  feminism  by  anchoring  other  feminisms  to  the  oppressive  ‘earth
mother’ stereotype:
‘Redstockings  were  watching  a  process  of  de-
radicalisation,  not  only  of  feminist  ideas  as  they
became  more  widely  disseminated,  but  also  of  the
WLM  itself.  In  her  article  “The  Retreat  to  Cultural
Feminism”  Brooke  accords  cultural  feminism  the
responsibility  for  a  reduced  emphasis  on  political
change,  replacing  radical  feminist  principles  with  an
individualistic  morality.  She  describes  this  strand  of
feminism as being concerned with lifestyles,  and the
setting up of “alternative” situations within the status
quo, which tend to co-exist with, rather than challenge,
male  power.  She  considers  that  these  embody  the
back-to-nature  trends  of  the  1960s,  and  as  with
therapy of the careerism of liberal  feminism find the
188
solution to our problems in individual changes.’ (Scott,
1983, issue 1: 25)
This small selection of text tied together the historical moment (individualism was a
particularly great threat at this time, with the neoliberal turn under way and the radical
social movements of the 1960s and ‘70s dissipating), problematic trends in the WLM
(such  as  perceived  de-radicalisation),  the  cultural  turn  in  feminism,  the  rise  of
psychotherapy,  ‘the  careerism  of  liberal  feminism’,  and  the  ‘back-to-nature  trends’
(which were themselves  associated with the widespread ‘earth mother’  stereotype
about women).
Though  this  segment  of  the  text  was  not  emotionally  expressive  (in  other
words, it did not give the impression that Scott was emotionally agitated in writing it),
it nevertheless contributed to the production of antipathy toward other feminisms in
radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture.  The  historical  phenomena,  cultural  trends,  and
harm to the progress of the WLM with which ‘cultural’ feminism and liberal feminism
were linked positioned them as objects of the same sorts of emotions as the other
components represented in the frame. This aspect of emotion culture is key, and is one
of the more crucial components to note in theorising it. Research on social movement
emotions generally focuses on the expression of emotion itself, looking for emotional
expression  or  accounts  of  participants’  emotion  work  (e.g.,  Coe  &  Schabel,  2011;
Gould, 2009; King, 2006; Kleres & Wettergren, 2017; Yang, 2000). What can be seen in
the extract above is that given the theorisation of emotion culture as a guideline for
participants  about  how they  ought  to  feel  about  themselves  and pertinent  others,
there need not be a representation or expression of feeling for movement discourses
and  narratives  to  convey  something  about  their  emotion  culture.  Scott’s  framing
produced all of the phenomena she named as being related to one another (Ferree &
Merrill,  2000),  anchoring the movement’s established antipathetic  emotions toward
each of those phenomena to the others. In addition to guiding the movement’s shared
emotions toward all of these things, her marking out of radical feminism as the other,
better thing – as that from which these other things all departed – produced radical
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feminists themselves as objects of affinity to themselves and one another (a valued
intra-movement emotional relationship which was closely guarded and protected, as
will be explored in chapter 6).
The  emotional  expression  in  Scott’s  piece  was  subtle,  conveyed  through
sarcasm and implicitly encoded into her historical and contextual analysis. Other pieces
represented feeling more overtly. All  of the pieces which discussed other feminisms
centred  history  and  context,  locating  radical  feminists’  emotional  responses  within
broad feminist debates and historical trends, but there were variations in the extent to
which the text read as emotionally ‘hot’. Stevi Jackson’s critique of feminists’ attempts
to redeem Freud from charges of misogyny used emotional framing in much the way
that Scott’s account of her encounters with socialist feminists did, but used more open
emotional expression to do so:
‘The original feminist gut-reaction against Freud was, I
believe,  justified.  I  do not  accept that we “read” his
work incorrectly or misunderstood and misrepresented
him. It is sheer arrogance to suggest, as Juliet Mitchell
does,  that  we  could  only  come  to  this  negative
conclusion on the basis  of  second-hand,  popularized
versions of Freud, or because we only read the bits on
femininity  without  understanding  their  place  in
psychoanalytic theory, or simply because we thought
penis envy was a sill idea. (Mitchell 1975, see pp xv-xvi)
We are now told that new “readings” of Freud,
specifically  those  deriving  from  the  work  of  Lacan,
have  purged  his  work  of  all  the  elements  which
feminists found unsavourary, magically disposing of all
its sexist elements – these were in any case products of
our misinterpretations.’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 33)
Like  Scott’s  piece,  Jackson’s  articulation  produced  antipathy  toward  psychoanalytic
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feminists by framing their work as having insinuated that radical feminists (and others
who  shared  their  view  of  psychoanalysis)  were  inferior.  Socialist  feminists  were
represented  as  having  accused  radical  feminists  of  supporting  Margaret  Thatcher,
whereas  psychoanalytic  feminists  had  accused  radical  feminists  of  misinterpreting
Freudian  writings.  Also  like  Scott,  Jackson  used  quotation  marks  to  indicate  her
rejection of claim she was paraphrasing, implying that she did not accept that there
were different ways of ‘reading’ Freud. The cumulative effect that developed across
these different pieces was that radical feminism was distinct from the other strands of
the WLM, which were all  positioned, for similar but different reasons, as objects of
antipathy.
The tone of this selection of Jackson’s piece was representative of its entirety.
The quotation marks on ‘read’ and ‘reading’ signalled rejection, and they took on the
emotional  timbre  of  irritation  or  anger  when  read  within  the  context  of  other
components  of  the  extract.  Jackson’s  characterisation  of  Mitchell’s  claim  as  ‘sheer
arrogance’, followed by her paraphrasing of Mitchell’s argument that feminist critics of
psychoanalysis ‘could only come to this negative conclusion on the basis of second-
hand, popularized versions of Freud, or because we only read the bits on femininity
without  understanding  their  place  in  psychoanalytic  theory,  or  simply  because  we
thought penis envy was a sill idea’ followed much the same emotional framing formula
as Scott’s. In both cases, feminists from other strands of the WLM were represented as
having reproduced men’s framings of women. In Scott’s critique, socialist feminists had
portrayed radical  feminists  as  a  ‘lunatic  fringe’,  echoing  doctors’  stereotypes  about
women,  and  in  Jackson’s  formulation,  psychoanalytic  feminists  had  insinuated that
radical feminists were ‘too stupid to see the great Truths’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 34).
Antipathy travelled through these two framings  of  the relationship between
radical  feminism and other feminisms. Two key ‘others’  were highlighted – socialist
feminism and psychoanalytic feminism (which was largely associated with the cultural
turn in feminism to which Scott also referred), and though the emotions involved in the
framings were sometimes vague or flexible, they produced other feminisms as objects
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of antipathy. Some readers of Scott’s piece might read it as angry, while others would
read  irritation  or  other  adverse  emotions,  and  some  radical  feminists  might  read
Jackson’s piece as annoyed, while others might see it  as angry or even indignant13.
What was important for  radical  feminism’s emotion culture was not whether these
other feminisms were produced as the objects of anger or of irritation, but rather that
a contentious and antipathetic relationship with them was (re)produced.
In  Scott’s  and Jackson’s  framings,  real  people were implicated and linked to
ideologies,  but  the ideological  frameworks  of  other  feminisms were in  other  cases
implicated without the need to level blame at particular individuals. In their critique of
feminist therapy groups (as a practice),  Sara Scott  and Tracey Payne used a similar
emotional framing to place feminist psychotherapy as an object of antipathy for radical
feminists,  but  did  so  without  naming  particular  individuals  as  the  source  of  their
adverse emotions:
‘Therapy’s emphasis on the past is based on the idea
that  we  store  up  emotions  which  we  couldn’t  then
express,  and  that  these  emotions  remain  blocked
inside us until we find a way of letting them out. These
blocks are the source of our problem in the present:
they  are  what  prevent  us  from  (here  we  go  again)
being the whole, happy people we really are. Therapy
becomes  a  sort  of  mental  laxative.  This  perspective
leaves us reaching constantly backwards into our own
past  experience  rather  than  outwards  to  the
experiences of other women to find explanations for
our lives.’ (Scott & Payne, 1984, issue 3: 22)
Scott  and  Payne  expressed  some  of  the  same  ill-defined  but  unambiguously
antipathetic  emotions  that  were  present  in  the  other  writings.  Their  parenthetical
13 Indeed, in doing the analysis, I read the text in all of these ways on different days in the analytic 
process.
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aside  about  psychoanalytic  claims  -  ‘(here  we  go  again)’  suggested  annoyance,
irritation, exasperation, or disaffection. It is not clear which of these emotions they
were feeling, nor which, if any, they intended their readers to feel. The relationship
between radical feminism and proponents of feminist therapy was one of antipathy
regardless of which specific emotions were involved in the writing and the reading,
enabling  the text  to  do the work  of  (re)producing  antipathetic  relationships  in  the
movement’s  emotion  culture  without  the  need  for  clearly-defined  and  specific
emotions.
In addition to producing other feminisms as objects of antipathy due to how
they  made  radical  feminists  feel  (misinterpreted,  misrepresented,  maligned,  or
pathologised), they were represented as having particular types of traits in themselves
which made them appropriate  objects  of  antipathy.  Scott  and Payne’s  summary of
therapy  in  the  first  three  sentences  of  the  extract  above  demonstrated  a  good
understanding  of  the  perspective  of  their  presumed  (radical  feminist)  reader’s
ideological stance, recognising that the emotional effect of reading the text would be
shaped by what the reader themselves brought to the reading (Hall, 1980[1973]). To a
reader  who  favoured  therapy,  their  representation  would  likely  be  upsetting  and
possibly offensive, but to a radical feminist critic of therapy, their framing resonated,
helping  to  augment  the  perception  of  therapy  as  ridiculous  (Schrock  et  al,  2004).
Feminists who favoured therapy were not only the objects of antipathy because of
what they said about radical feminists (as in Jackson’s account), then, but were also
represented  as  being  absurd  in  themselves.  That  absurdity  was  also  part  of  an
emotional  frame  which  (re)produced  other  feminisms  as  objects  of  antipathy.  In
framing feminist therapy proponents in this way, Scott and Payne reiterated the affinity
that  subsisted  between radical  feminists  themselves,  as  the  more  critically-minded
feminists.  The  framing  of  other  feminisms  as  objects  of  antipathy  was  necessarily
relational,  then,  because  the  frame  that  produced  other  feminisms  as  ridiculous
simultaneously produced radical feminism as superior.
The framing of  other  feminisms as  ridiculous  did  not  require expressions  of
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annoyance or irritation,  however,  and could be achieved through more emotionally
subtle framings.  In her review of  Catcall 15 and 16, Sue O’Sullivan,  heavily quoting
Sophie  Laws,  achieved  the  same  emotional  framing  as  the  one  seen  in  Scott  and
Payne’s piece, but without the apparent annoyance that they expressed:
‘She  tellingly  questions  a  tendency  to  romanticise  a
golden  past  of  female  healers  when  women  were
supposedly in control and in contact with nature, able
to use herbs and “home” remedies to heal the people
of their community. This uncritical harking-back has less
to  do  with  the  harsh  realities  of  life  in  previous
centuries than with our present day awareness of how
male  dominated  medicine  and  technology  has
alienated  us  from  what  little  women  did  control  in
those past days.
I  liked  Sophie’s  discussion  of  “nature”  and
feminism  in  relation  to  alternative  health  treatment.
“there  must  be  other  reasons,  though,  for  all  this
willingness to believe – we do not, for instance, go on
pilgrimages to Lourdes because generations of women
have believed it was good for them to do so. I’ve been
thinking that maybe one of these is that many feminists
are attracted to the idea of nature that the alternative
disciplines  teach.  Instead  of  the  doctors’  image  of
nature as a battleground of germs versus chemicals, the
‘natural’ faction offers a much pleasanter vision where
natural  foods exist  to keep us healthy,  where a plant
exists to match every kind of breakdown our bodies are
subject  to.  We are  to  live  in  harmony with ‘Mother’
Nature.  Women  are  often  felt  to  have  a  special
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relationship with nature, a duty, even to defend ‘her’
from bad men who seek to deny ‘her’ goodness and to
dominate ‘her’.”
This is good stuff and I would have liked it to go
on more – more about how this view links into a quite
traditional  view  of  the  “feminine”  which  extends
beyond matters of illness and health and can be seen at
work  in  some  of  the  appeal  of  Greenham  Common.
(O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 50)
O’Sullivan’s  framing  depended  largely  upon  Laws’s  representation,  but  it  inscribed
ridiculousness on feminists who subscribed to alternative medicine just as Scott and
Payne’s  framing had inscribed it  on  feminist  proponents  of  psychotherapy.  In  both
cases,  the authors’  knowledge of  and participation in radical  feminist  ideology and
their lens on the historical context was used to produce emotionally resonant frames.
Both framings incorporated echoes of the patriarchal ‘earth mother’ stereotype, linking
it to tendencies in other strands of the WLM and ongoing trends within it (including the
Greenham Common peace camp) and reproducing them as ridiculous and as objects of
antipathy. The emotional agitation with which Scott and Payne’s piece was imbued was
not a necessary component of O’Sullivan’s piece, because it was equally effective as a
textual reproduction of the movement’s emotion culture without giving the impression
that  the  author  was  herself  emotionally  agitated  in  the  act  of  writing.  Antipathy
sometimes took the form of active, ‘hot’ adverse emotions, but it was equally valuable
to the emotion culture in a subtler, ‘cooler’ form which nevertheless reproduced an
antipathetic relationship.
As I have argued, representations of other feminisms as objects of antipathy
exhibited a range of emotions, some more overt and others more subtle. I have also
argued that the antipathy directed at other feminisms always simultaneously produced
its  inverse:  affinity  toward  radical  feminists  themselves.  Radical  feminists’
consciousness  of  the trends sweeping  the WLM gave their  antipathy  toward other
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feminisms and affinity toward their own movement a sense of urgency, and in closing
this  section,  I  turn  to  a  reader  letter  from  Lorraine  Davies  which  conveyed  the
antipathy that has been explored thus far and expressed the agitation of urgency at
this historical moment:
‘Psychotherapy has  crept  into our  feminist  theory to
such an extent that  women write books on feminist
therapy,  women  advertise  themselves  as  feminist
therapists and in doing this rip other women off. We
live traumatic lives making us vulnerable to this attack.
Now  alternative  medicine  is  well  on  the  way  to
becoming the “new feminist therapy”. Its theories and
practices not being questioned. Women are devouring
its  theories  and  assimilating  it  with  feminism  –  our
theory.’ (Davies, 1984, issue 4: 9)
Davies’s language tethered the shifts in feminism to which she referred to notions of
violence  and violation:  ‘crept  into  our  feminist  theory’,  ‘rip  other  women off’,  and
‘vulnerable  to  this  attack’  all  framed the growing popularity  of  psychoanalysis  and
alternative  medicine  in  terms  of  danger  and  threat.  Within  the  movement’s
understanding  of  medicine  and  psychoanalysis  as  male  (and  therefore  inherently
violent),  Davies’s  language  associated  feminists’  ‘devouring’  and  ‘assimilating’
patriarchal  paradigms  as  not  merely  ridiculous,  but  violent.  Like  Scott’s  piece  on
Feminist  Revolution and  Jackson’s  on  psychoanalytic  feminism,  Davies  framed  the
practices  of  other  segments  of  the  WLM  as  being  analogous  to  what  men did  to
women, placing them within the normative framework of the movement as objects of
antipathy. The final sentence of the extract, in which she referred to feminism as ‘our
theory’  did  the  same  dual  work  as  other  authors’  framings  of  psychoanalysis  and
alternative medicine, implicitly producing radical  feminists’  collective affinity toward
themselves and one another in the same phrase which produced other feminisms as
antipathetic.
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In this section, I have argued that radical feminists’ writings during the early
years  of  Trouble  and  Strife’s  publication  exhibited  a  powerful  awareness  of  the
changing  ideological  tides  of  the  WLM.  These  changes  ran  contrary  to  radical
feminism’s ideology and its vision for the future of the WLM, entrenching contentious
relationships  between  feminisms  that  had  formed  in  the  1970s.  Radical  feminists
emotionally framed other strands of the WLM as objects of antipathy, using a flexible
array of  emotions similar  to that  found in  their  relationship with men.  Unlike that
relationship, however, the emotions involved in their relationship with other feminisms
were often vague, expressed implicitly, and more open to a range of interpretations.
Regardless of which possible interpretation a radical feminist reader had, however, the
antipathetic  relationship  between  radical  feminists  and  other  feminisms  were
maintained  through  the  emotional  framings  in  the  text.  The  positioning  of  radical
feminism itself  as the superior alternative to these other feminisms, by implication,
produced  the  movement’s  relationship  with  itself,  engendering  radical  feminists’
affinity toward their own movement and making their antipathetic collective emotions
toward other feminisms always-already relational.
5.4
Rock & Hard Place: Radical Feminist Ambivalence
In spite of the apparently clear radical feminist stance on psychoanalysis and
alternative  medicine,  participants  in  the movement did  harbour  some ambivalence
about these practices. As Davies’s letter stated, ‘we live traumatic lives’, a reality which
made healing practices of  almost any sort appealing to some degree.  The emotion
culture of the movement was deeply marked by the antipathy explored in section 5.3,
but it would be a misrepresentation to suggest that there was a rigid ideological and
emotional line on these issues. Even some of the authors of the pieces quoted above
alluded to some ambivalence, suggesting that there were dissonances present even
where they were not made explicit (Ost, 2004), and that ambivalence will be explored
in this section. As in the last section, the analysis will progress chronologically rather
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than thematically.  The whole section will  focus on ambivalence,  but  what  emerges
from a chronological examination of it is the progression of the ambivalence toward
greater and greater openness to the possible merits of the therapies strongly critiqued
in the earlier  years examined in section 5.3,  and the progression concludes with a
crossover case in which framing strategies were undertaken to allow for an exception
to the existing radical feminist position, providing a unique instance of affinity toward
psychotherapy.  The  temporal  progression  demonstrates  the  effect  that  radical
feminism’s changing context had on the emotion culture of the movement (see Gould,
2002), and while it remained overwhelmingly ideologically (and emotionally) intact, by
the 1990s some flexibility had begun to appear in its ideology and emotion culture.
In the early ‘80s, there were signs of ambivalence in radical feminism about the
new therapeutic trends emerging from their recognition that as problematic as they
were, these therapies addressed real and legitimate needs:
‘We are not suggesting that we do not still need to talk
about  ourselves  at  length  with the support  of  other
women: it seems to us that the rise of the small self-
help  therapy  group  owes  much  to  the  gradual
disappearance  of  consciousness-raising.  Therapy
groups are often the first point of access for women
new to  the Women’s  Liberation  Movement.  We feel
that their popularity is a comment on the fact that we
still  need  a  space  to  discuss  personal  experience,
rather than showing an attraction specific to therapy.’
(Scott & Payne, 1984, issue 3: 23)
That acknowledgement sometimes extended beyond a recognition that there was a
need for the therapies, including admissions of making use of them to some degree:
‘Sophie’s clear look at a tendency for feminists to fall
into an individual sampling of the different alternatives
to  conventional  medicine  –  her  insistence  that  as
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feminist  we should ask  political  questions  about  the
theories  and  practices  of  different  treatments  –  is
appealing  to  me.  And  yet…  when  I  turned  to  Carol
Smith’s  article,  Is  Alternative  Medicine  Necessarily
Better for Women?, (pretty much a qualified yes), I was
also in sympathy. I  am a sampler of alternative health
care,  I  am  a  “believer”,  if  not  in  a  big  way,  and
especially  in  relation  to  chronic  health  problems.’
(O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 51)
O’Sullivan’s emotional framing was an ambivalent framing. In this instance, she did not
express antipathy and then simply acknowledge the possible merits of an opposing
stance on alternative medicine, but actually narrated her own ambivalent experience
of reading and relating to arguments in  Catcall which fell on both sides of the issue.
Though the emotion culture  of  the movement directed radical  feminists’  emotions
toward  antipathy  with  respect  to  alternative  health  care,  that  did  not  make  them
immune to the draw of the trend in favour of it, and in the face of health difficulties, it
would take a great deal of emotional work for them to remain strictly faithful to the
emotion  culture  of  the  movement.  Straightforward  emotion  rules  dictating  how
movement  participants  ought  to  feel  are  inadequate  for  explaining  this  tension
(Holmes,  2004),  because  their  emotions  were  not  merely  instrumentally-oriented
means to a political end (as is sometimes implied – see, Jasper et al, 2000). The conflict
between their context (more health options becoming available, and more testimony
being  circulated  that  alternative  therapies  were  effective)  and  the  movement’s
emotion culture placed pressure on that culture, giving rise to ambivalence which itself
found its way into the movement’s emotion culture.
Their shared awareness of their collective emotion culture created a need for
this ambivalence to be accounted for. O’Sullivan resolved the tension by rejecting the
premise  that  it  was  necessary  to  choose  between  the  WLM  and  psychotherapy,
another antipathy-associated therapy which she acknowledged using:
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‘I don’t need therapy to understand my oppression as a
woman, nor to identify where that oppression comes
from. But none of this is enough to help me change the
often  unconscious,  negative  repeating  aspects  of
myself which are rooted in the socially determined but
individualised way I grew up in a western, patriarchal,
capitalist  country.  If  I  had  to  choose  I’d  choose  the
women’s  liberation  movement  over  therapy  in  one
second  flat.  But  I  don’t  have  to  choose,  I’m  willing,
through  what  feels  like  personal  necessity  (and
opportunity!),  to  go  to  someone  who  says  she  has
skills,  to  try  to  understand  those  inarticulated  [sic]
patterns  and  defences  which  have  had  pretty
disasterous [sic] effects on my life.’ (O’Sullivan, 1984,
issue 3: 52)
Though  as  a  whole  the  piece  presented  an  argument  against  the  ‘back-to-nature’
trends and their links to femininity, O’Sullivan’s narration of her own use of therapy as
a  necessity  (and  its  publication  in  Trouble  and  Strife,  an  avowedly  radical  feminist
magazine) used some aspects of the movement's emotion culture to mediate others
(Kleres & Wettergren, 2017), making space for change in the emotion culture on these
issues. Crucially, however, the incorporation of this ambivalence in a piece in which she
also  critiqued  illusions  about  the  ‘golden  past  of  female  healers’  retained  the
antipathetic relationship with other strands of the WLM even as ambivalence was used
to open up space for change in radical feminism’s internal ideology.
This was still at an early point in the magazine’s run, but as the ‘80s wore on,
there  continued  to  be  evidence  of  ambivalence.  Radical  feminists’  political
commitments demanded seemingly contradictory stances from them on some issues,
providing them with no clear emotional frame to associate with their political ideology.
For example, in her review of reflective writings by women who worked in health care,
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Laura  Potts  discussed  the  issue  that  dealing  with  illness  and  unwellness  through
medicine  individualised  problems,  looking  at  the  symptoms  rather  than  the  social
causes. She also, however, highlighted how problematic it potentially was to demand
that other women eschew these individualising approaches:
‘We cannot be bullied into feminism and the notion of
sisterhood  may  seem  to  be  of  uncertain  benefit.
Respect for each other implies not imposing a political
analysis,  as  much  as  not  imposing  a  particular
treatment. As Jean Orr says:
“What right do we have to encourage women to raise
their consciousness if we cannot follow through with
the help they may need? Are we to be just another
form of tyranny, forcing women to confront aspects of
their lives which are too painful for them to change?
(p. 71)”
Our health may be our only reference point for
dissatisfactions  and  complaints.  As  Merryn  Cooke
points  out,  we  tend  to  regard  physical  ailments  as
entrance  tickets  to  help  and  support.’  (Potts,  1987,
issue 11: 46)
Potts drew upon different aspects of radical feminism’s political values to frame the
imperative  to  avoid  individualising  therapies  as  an  object  of  ambivalence.  Radical
feminists rejected individualism and saw practices which relocated collective problems
into the realm of the individual as incompatible with women’s liberation, but they also
rejected the placement of demands upon women which it was not possible for them to
fulfil or which would require martyrdom from them. Rather than rejecting either of
these in favour of the other, her emotional frame incorporated these two strands of
radical feminist political thought and showed how they came into contradiction in ths
material reality of medical care. The emotional frame that resulted was an ambivalence
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frame, rejecting both antipathy and affinity.
The ambivalence of these conflicting political ideals was not always held intact,
and instead framing could be used to resolve the ambivalence and allow an atypical
relocation of an object of antipathy into the category of objects of affinity. Emotional
frames of psychotherapy across Trouble and Strife were consistently either antipathetic
or ambivalent, but in one isolated case, feminist psychotherapy was framed in a way
which allowed for  the practitioners  to be represented as  objects  of  affinity.  In  her
report on the Shanti women’s therapy service (a service for under-served women in
South London), Sophie Laws demonstrated that a way that radical feminists resolved
ambivalences was finding ways to relocate them in the emotion culture matrix even
when they seemed to belong with the men:
‘Shanti  takes  psychotherapy  to  a  populations  of
women who are rarely offered it. Do they welcome it,
or is psychotherapy a middle-class way of dealing with
problems? Mo turns the question back, to look at  it
another  way:  who  says  this  is  a  middle-class  thing?
Maybe  Freud  and  Co  hijacked  something  ordinary
people  did  all  the  time anyway.  After  all,  at  bottom
psychotherapy is simply about talking to someone who
“will not judge you, not lash you down with blame, or
top  you  up  with  guilt,  not  tell  you  to  pull  yourself
together, or pull yourself up by your socks, but give you
a sympathetic hearing”. That has a history, with roots
much wider than the middle class.’ (Laws, 1991, issue
20: 10)
Rather than rejecting the premise of psychotherapy regardless of where and by whom
it was practised (as Davies had recommended in her injunction that ‘Freud and Buddha
are just around the corner’), Laws provided an account of her interviewee going behind
the ideological wall of radical feminism to encourage an embrace of psychotherapy by
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drawing upon the movement’s own political values. Radical feminism (ideologically, if
perhaps  not  in  practice)  was  opposed  to  exclusion  of  working-class  women,  and
framing  criticism  of  psychoanalysis  as  classist  allowed  for  permissiveness  toward
therapy to be consonant  with radical  feminist  political  values.  Positioning Shanti  as
having radical feminist values then positioned them within a relationship of affinity,
rather than antipathy, in radical feminism’s emotion culture.
The  movement’s  structural  critiques  of  psychoanalysis  were  extensive  and
forceful,  however,  making  it  impossible  to  wholly  resolve  ambivalence.  Laws
incorporated into her  report  on  the service  a  carefully-articulated  discussion  of  its
structural position, allowing ambivalence to emerge from measured representations of
antipathy:
‘Shanti exists within the NHS, an extremely hierarchical
bureaucracy, where everyone is paid according to their
place within the professional  hierarchies.  Counsellors
may  be  qualified  psychologists,  psychiatric  nurses  or
social workers, with further training in psychotherapy.
Asked  about  their  internal  structure  Avan  says  they
“try to work as a collective”. The obvious contradiction
are  too  tender  to  discuss  on  the  day  I  visited.  The
creche workers, not seen as particularly important by
the managers who planned the service, have worked
hard to gain a place within the staff group.
The  women  at  Shani  often  feel  that  they  survive
despite the Health Authority rather than because of it..
The problems created by working within the NHS are
very raw at Shanti at present.’ (Laws, 1991, issue 20:
10)
By discussing Shanti’s struggle with their institutional status, but also alluding to the
contradictions in their position (as part of a major medical institution but also as a
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group  endeavouring  to  operate  ‘as  a  collective’  which  was  undermined  by  that
institution),  Laws  reiterated  radical  feminists’  adverse  emotional  relationship  with
medical  institutions while also making space for a possible exception for Shanti.  As
argued  in  chapter  4,  women  in  major  health  institutions  were  positioned  in  the
movement’s emotion culture as de facto men; however, portraying Shanti as being in
struggle with the NHS allowed them to be excepted from this. Laws’s framing of Shanti
as a whole, then, resolved the ambivalence emerging from the tension between the
movement’s commitment to opposing classism and its commitment to opposing ‘male’
medical institutions like the NHS by representing Shanti as a service within the NHS
that was, for emotion cultural purposes, not really part of that institution.
5.5
Conclusion
Antipathy and affinity are amorphous emotions which are difficult to define,
but  which  nevertheless  play  a  strong  role  in  the  cultivation  and  maintenance  of
collective relationships. The histories of disagreement, misrepresentation, frustration,
anger, and difficulty between different strands of the WLM that had taken shape in the
1970s followed it into the 1980s, permeating relationships between feminisms in non-
episodic ways which stretched across these relationships through time. As was the case
in radical feminists’ collective relationship with men, their political ideology was the
prism through which they saw their relationships with other strands of the WLM, and
just as the male power bloc had defined their  emotions toward men, the changes
taking shape in the WLM in the 1980s affected how radical feminists related to the
ideas and practices of other feminists.
There were key differences between the movement’s relationship with men and
that  with  other  feminisms,  however.  Their  relationship  with  men  involved  the
cultivation of an emotional toolkit to allow them to maintain an adverse relationship.
This often involved clear emotional frames which represented men as the objects of
strong  and  often  (though  not  always)  clearly-defined  adverse  emotions.  Their
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relationship with other feminisms, however, was not as directly adversarial as that with
men, leading to a different framing approach which did not involve the representation
of  other  feminists  as  emotionally-laden  caricatures.  Instead,  there  was  a  diffuse
framing of the averse feelings of disagreement, rejection, and objection which were
less clearly-defined than most of their emotions toward men, but which nevertheless
allowed for the reproduction of an antipathetic relationship.
Also unlike men, other feminisms advanced ideas which radical feminists did
not wholly reject, for which reason ambivalence sometimes arose. Radical feminists’
political values were not entirely unlike those of other feminisms, and the practices
that these other strands of the WLM had developed in order to provide women an
alternative to the oppressive regimes of care that radical feminists also rejected had
some degree of appeal for radical feminists (who, after all, had to get their medical and
emotional care from somewhere). As the influence of these practices expanded, radical
feminists’ ambivalence toward them became a stronger presence in the movement’s
emotion culture, even as they remained committed to the same core ideology, and this
trend ultimately culminated in the early 1990s with the appearance of some efforts to
reorganise  the  movement’s  emotion  culture  to  allow  for  affinity  toward  (select)
feminist psychotherapists.
Across these relationships of affinity and ambivalence was the implicit presence
of affinity. By developing relationships of affinity with all  feminisms which were not
radical feminism, radical feminists effectively created an emotionally significant group
which was unique in its own emotion culture. Radical feminists themselves remained
marked  out  as  the  only  group  which  was  not  an  object  of  adverse  emotion  or
antipathy.  The relationships  in  the movement’s  emotion culture were consequently
multiple – in addition to radical feminism having relationships with men and with other
feminisms, the uniqueness of their implied affinity toward one another connected all
other groups to one another,  partially  fusing them together as that which was not
radical feminism. The forcefulness of this distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ surfaced
implicitly  in  their  antipathy  toward  other  strands  of  the  WLM,  but  was  surfaced
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extensively in their direct engagements with one another. This intra-movement affinity
and its textures will be examined in the next chapter.
206
Chapter 6
Relationships  Within the  Sisterhood:  The  Maintenance,  Rupture,  &
Repair of Intra-movement Affinity
6.1
Introduction
In  chapters  4  and  5,  I  have  argued  that  radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture
revolved  around  relationships,  which  themselves  were  rooted  in  the  movement’s
politics and its lens on the past, the present, and the future. The direction that the
movement’s emotion culture provided for radical feminists about how they ought to
feel about themselves in relation to various others pulled toward particular common
emotions: their relationships with men brought up horror, fear, anger, and annoyance,
and their relationships with other strands of the WLM aroused vague and ill-defined
emotions of antipathy. In both cases, there were no rigid emotion rules about what
emotions  ought  to  be  felt  or  expressed.  Rather,  there  were  particular  types  of
relationships that needed to be (re)produced in order to maintain the movement’s
emotion culture and to keep it consonant with radical feminist politics, and flexible
toolkits of emotions were drawn upon as appropriate for that purpose.
In this chapter, the relationships within radical feminism itself will be explored.
The affinity discussed in chapter 5 was of paramount importance to relations between
radical feminists, and this chapter will examine the presence of affinity between radical
feminists and their efforts to maintain it, even where they felt anger, frustration, or
disappointment  with  one  another.  The  chapter  will  also  explore  some  nuances  in
relations of affinity, showing where there was flexibility in the expectation that such
relations would be maintained. Finally, an explosive breach of the integrity of radical
feminism’s internal emotional relations will be explored. In an uncharacteristic move,
one radical feminist violated the affinity which characterised relations between radical
feminists, and there was a forceful response from others in the movement to censure
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this violation and reinforce the intra-movement relationships which had been violated.
The powerful reaction to the breach made clear how significant affinity was to radical
feminism’s emotion culture, and highlighted again that emotional relationships across
the  movement’s  emotion  culture  were  at  their  foundation  a  matter  of  what  were
considered to be consistent or inconsistent with radical feminist politics.
The  chapter  proceeds  in  three  sections.  In  section  6.2,  the  significance  of
relationships of affinity within the movement will be discussed. This section will show
how radical feminists used the text to express their investment in the affinity of radical
feminist relationships, and to maintain them even in situations of disagreement and
adverse emotions.  It  will  then go on to explore textures in affinity,  showing where
particularities  of  specific  radical  feminists  allowed for  less scrupulous  adherence to
affinity and invited more adverse ways of engaging with one another. Section 6.3 will
examine the landmark breach of the relationship of affinity, dividing this discussion into
two parts. Firstly, Stevi Jackson’s unreservedly critical review essay of psychoanalytic
feminist  books  will  be  revisited,  showing  in  more  detail  the  antipathy  which
characterised her discussion of writings by women outside of radical  feminism. The
antipathy of Jackson’s review will  then be used as a point of comparison for Marge
Berer’s book review essay by a different set of texts authored by radical feminists. The
striking similarity in the antipathy in the two essays will make clear why Berer’s piece
was considered by other radical feminists to be a breach of intra-movement relations
of affinity amongst radical feminists. Finally, section 6.4 will explore the responses to
Berer’s  essay,  which  were  dominated  by  (though  not  universally)  expressions  of
censure.  Through the rejection of Berer’s way of relating to other radical  feminists,
readers  of  the  magazine  who  wrote  letters  of  response  to  Trouble  and  Strife
resurrected  the  relationships  of  affinity  that  defined  the  emotional  interior  of  the
movement and repaired the relational damage done by the breach.
6.2
The Ideal of Sisterhood: Affinity & its Maintenance Under Strain
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The idea of a feminist ‘sisterhood’ had already become something of a trite
trope by the time Trouble and Strife commenced publication, and at the time of this
writing,  it  is  so  widely  rejected  a  notion  that  it  is  almost  unutterable  in  feminist
scholarship. Nevertheless, ‘second wave’ feminism in general, and radical feminism in
particular, exhibited an investment in the idea of sisterhood which gives the concept
significant  explanatory  power,  even  if  the  ideal  has  since  come  to  be  discredited.
Radical feminists’  defining ideological  conviction that all  women were oppressed by
men because they were women (regardless of in what other capacities they might also
be oppressed) created a foundation of bondedness which made the ideal of sisterhood
uniquely pertinent to radical feminists’ relationships with one another. Like the ideal of
'mother love' which was a key component of Taylor and Rupp's (2002) formulation of
the concept of emotion culture, the ideal of sisterhood provided a cohesive cultural
basis to guide radical feminists' 'patterns of relationship' with one another.
Most manifestations of the affinity of sisterhood in Trouble and Strife appeared
as  implicit  allusions  aimed  at  maintaining  it.  To  set  the  stage  for  these  subtle
reproductions of affinity, however, it is worth first briefly visiting an atypically explicit
and clear articulation of the ideal, appearing in Dale Spender’s warm review of Phyllis
Chesler’s book on women and psychoanalysis:
‘What women need to do is to turn to other women
and to show some of the care and compassion for each
other that for centuries women have lavished on men.
(Thus echoing some of Robin Morgan’s words in Going
Too  Far,  1978.)  Phyllis  Chesler  is  distressed  by  our
inability to live up to our own ideals of sisterhood and
urges the greater effort and understanding necessary
to a revolutionary goal.’ (Spender, 1986, issue 9: 44)
Whatever feminists at the time or since may have thought of this ideal, the familiar
manner in which Spender (and according to Spender’s representation, also Chesler)
referred to it demonstrated how taken-for-granted its status was for the movement. It
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is worth noting the compassion that Chesler called for, because it was a widely-noticed
absence from Marge Berer’s breaching incident.
Throughout most of  Trouble and Strife,  however, allusions to sisterhood and
affinity were not explicitly named in this way, but rather manifested in authors’ efforts
to express their ideas in ways which preserved affinity when it  might otherwise be
compromised. When disagreement was expressed, it was framed in language which
avoided overt confrontation:
‘I found myself struggling with contradictory responses
to Brooke’s position.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 26)
Scott’s use of a phrase like ‘struggling with’ averted some of the adverse emotion away
from Brooke (the author she was reviewing) and placed some of it with herself. Where
she more explicitly directed criticism at the Redstockings, she still withheld from the
level  of  antipathetic  expression  which  appeared  in  radical  feminists’  writing  about
Marxist and psychoanalytic feminists:
‘I have left till last those aspect of Redstockings’ work
which  are  most  difficult  to  deal  with.’  (Scott,  1983,
issue 1: 26)
Her representation of the parts of the text she found objectionable as ‘difficult to deal
with’ again placed some of the problem with herself, even if not suggesting that her
own reading was the source of the problem, and enabled her to express disagreement
in a way which did not compromise the affinity of the relationship between herself and
the Redstockings.
A recurrent textual strategy for expressing criticism between radical feminists
was to  state  that  something  objectionable  was  ‘confusing’,  ‘curious,  or  ‘surprising’.
There are a number of examples of this across the magazine, and though any one of
them on its own does not clearly suggest an underlying effort to maintain relationships
of affinity, the frequency with which this framing appeared indicated that there was a
tacit understanding that this manner of expressing objection was more sisterly and
consistent with the integrity of radical feminists’ relationships with one another than
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more accusatory phrasings might have been. Scott used this framing in her piece on
Redstockings:
‘There  is  no  romanticism  about  anti-sexist  men;
indeed,  Carol  Hanisch’s  article  on men’s  liberation is
the most cutting imaginable. At the same time Hanisch
has printed an open letter to Don McLean asking him
why he says such horrible things about women in his
songs and how nice it would be to have his music on
the side of women, the effect of which is, to say the
least, confusing.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 26)
This instantiation of the framing of disagreement as confusion did not,  on its own,
seem to suggest the presence of a convention around how radical feminists ought to
express  themselves and relate to one another.  By itself,  the  extract above seemed
straightforwardly  to  suggest  actual  confusion.  However,  when  taken  alongside  the
recurrence of this tendency across the text, it appears as one of the relational practices
in the movement to preserve affinity. Though this might otherwise be taken to be an
emotion  rule  or  emotional  expression  rule  when  viewed  through  the  lens  of  the
dramaturgical  account  of  emotions,  to  understand  it  as  a  strategy  of  maintaining
relationships  better  accounts  for  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  used.
Movement  participants  are  emotionally  affected  when  their  movement's  emotion
cultures  do  not  accommodate  differences  (Klatch,  2004),  but  it  was  nevertheless
necessary for discontent to be expressed in ways which would maintain the integrity of
intra-movement  relationships.  Where  overt  anger  did  appear,  it  was  because  the
person at whom anger was directed was seen to have failed to conform to radical
feminist ideology, but explicit anger was foregone in favour of less affronting language
where  the  political  values  of  all  of  the  women  involved  were  in  line  with  radical
feminism’s movement ideology. This demonstrates that ‘good’ radical feminists were
related to differently  than feminists  who did  not  meet  the movement’s  ideological
benchmark.
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Even  where  an  author  needed  to  express  significant  anger,  other  women’s
radical feminist political ideology produced an imperative to maintain affinity within
them. For example, in her angry piece about the exclusion of infertile women from
feminist  debates  about  fertility  treatments,  Naomi  Pfeffer  expressed  curiosity  and
confusion rather than anger:
‘Because of their absence, this debate appears,  from
the perspective of an infertile woman, to be curiously
ill-informed in terms of what it is  like to be infertile,
socially,  medically  and  emotionally.’  (Pfeffer,  1985,
issue 5: 46)
This  pattern  was  repeated  throughout  the  piece.  Three  additional  instances  are
extracted below so that the emotional weight of the repetitive pattern might be visible:
‘However, unlike the Warnock Report,  I  am including
here  the  techniques  which  the  majority  of  infertile
women  will  experience  in  doctors’  surgeries  and  in
hospitals all  over the world today, techniques which,
curiously, are never mentioned.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5:
46)
‘What I am referring to are those techniques practised
today  by  a  whole  range  of  medical  practitioners  of
varying  degrees  of  expertise.  Surprisingly,  the
procedures  most  often  used  are  those  most  rarely
discussed.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5: 47)
‘Because  no  one  has  bothered  to  consult  infertile
women, a curiously distorted stereotype has emerged.
The  word  “desperate”  appears  so  frequently  in
conjunction  with  infertility  that  the  reader  could  be
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forgiven for believing that infertility is in fact a disease
of the personality rather than the body.’ (Pfeffer, 1985,
issue 5: 49-50)
As I argued above, any one of these instances in isolation is not noticeably a way of
expressing anger, but the cumulative effect of repetitions of this framing across the text
produce an impression of anger even where it has not been explicitly expressed. This
enabled authors to convey anger without violating the integrity of the relationships of
affinity  between  radical  feminists.  Though  readers  would  presumably  perceive  the
anger (and that was likely the intention), the use of this sort of language gestured a
desire to preserve relationships even at times of disagreement – a concern which was
not present in radical feminists’ ways of writing about other strands of the WLM or
about men.
Any  uncertainty  about  Pfeffer’s  feelings  was  addressed  in  an  emotional
disclosure near the end of the piece, wherein she explained her reasons for having
written it:
‘I write this article after many bitter and angry attempt
to put down what I feel about the feminist response to
reproductive technology. Several years ago, Anne and I
made valiant efforts to set up workshops on infertility
at women’s health conferences and in our own homes.
The response was nil. We had no preconceptions about
how  we  wanted  infertility  to  be  discussed,  we  just
wanted it to be put on the feminist agenda because we
believed that we could find support from our sisters.
Sadly, our efforts failed.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5: 50)
Her  investment  in  relationships  of  sisterhood  and  affinity  was  implicit  in  her  own
emotional expression throughout the piece, and she made explicit in these concluding
remarks that she was angry, bitter, and disappointed to not have received the same
from other  feminists.  Her  understanding  that  there  was  an  expectation  across  the
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movement of sisterhood and affinity was therefore present in her feelings about not
having  had  that  expectation  fulfilled  toward  herself  (Klatch,  2004),  and  in  her
continued  fulfilment  of  the  expectation  through  her  own  writing  (in  spite  of  her
disappointment).
A  letter  in  response  to  her  piece  revealed  again  that  there  were  dual
expectations  that  relationships  of  affinity  should  be  maintained  and  that  the
significance of that imperative was relative to how well someone was seen to adhere
to radical feminist political ideology:
‘I was surprised that Naomi Pfeffer failed to see the
significant  difference  between  ‘In-vitro  fertilisation’
(IVF) and the technologies which make it up and have
been  used  for  considerably  longer.’  (Murrell,  1985,
issue 6: 2)
Murrell  adhered to the recognisable practice of  framing disagreement as ‘surprise’.
Consistently,  then,  where  disagreements  unfolded  amongst  participants  in  the
movement who generally adhered to its ideology, there was a tacit expectation that
relations of affinity could be expected and would be maintained.
The  centrality  of  power  critiques  in  radical  feminist  ideology  troubled  this
relational  imperative  in  some  instances,  however.  Not  all  radical  feminists  were
positioned identically  –  some had  more  power  (of  various  sorts)  than  others,  and
additional  power  was seen to come with additional  responsibility.  Where a radical
feminist with an atypical amount of power was seen to be wielding that power in an
objectionable way, the imperative to exhibit the compassion that Chesler had called for
and express emotions toward her in a way which maintained affinity was softened. The
flexibility  in  intra-movement  affinity  surfaced  in  Amanda  Sebestyen’s  review  essay
about books by renowned radical feminists Germaine Greer and Robin Morgan. In their
introductory blurb to the review essay, the  Trouble and Strife editorial collective laid
out the reasons why Sebestyen’s review might be subject to less rigid expectations of
affinity than pieces about radical feminists would generally be:
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‘Famous feminists such as Robin Morgan and Germaine
Greer receive a lot of attention in the media and are
seen,  often  to  our  annoyance,  as  speaking  for  the
women’s liberation movement generally. What’s more,
people  will  buy  their  books  whatever  they  write.’
(Trouble and Strife collective, 1984, issue 4: 50)
Because Greer and Morgan were seen to have a significantly greater degree of control
over  how  the  WLM  was  perceived  and  understood,  they  were  also  levelled  with
additional responsibility, and were met with less leniency if they were seen to be in
error. Just as Scott had complained that socialist feminists had harmed radical feminism
by misrepresenting it, it was important to radical feminists that famous feminists like
Greer and Morgan did not misrepresent the WLM.
Sebestyen reviewed one book by each author, and the reviews incorporated
praise  of  their  strengths  as  well  as  critiques  of  their  shortcomings.  Notably,  the
criticisms  were  expressed  in  ways  which  would  generally  be  reserved  for  people
outside of radical feminism:
‘Just  as  The  Obstacle  Race championed  free-living
Modern Art and castigated Victorian academic women
as  if  postwar  changes  of  taste  (and  feminism!)  had
never  happened;  so  Sex  and  Destiny drags  in  an
irrelevant Shakespeare sonnet, talks like some benign
dowager about “the working girl”, and manages to roll
back the colonial clock so far as to describe Vanuatu as
“the New Hebrides”.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 51)
This  unreserved  criticism  of  Greer’s  book  included  name  calling  (‘some  benign
dowager’) as well as complaints about the quality of its analysis, demonstrating a sharp
contrast to the relations of affinity seen in the pieces addressed to and between radical
feminists  who lacked Greer’s  public  platform. Morgan’s book was represented with
similar criticism:
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‘One minute we’re in high hyperbole, a kind of cosmic
“Call My Bluff”: “We are the particles, the waves, the
bumps  on  the  ribbon,  the  negentropic  information
gathering  itself  to  itself  for  the  sheer  joy  of
communicating through interference waves which also
are part of the field to other negentropic photons of
light-darkness-matter-illusion-energy.  We  are  the
holomovement.” We are the walrus, too, I expect. The
next minute everything’s scaled down to domesticity
and cuteness.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 53)
These sorts of remarks were emotionally similar to comments on feminists from other
strands of the WLM, but would generally be considered too cutting and unsisterly for
radical feminists. In the case of famous feminists who had substantial influence over
the movement’s reception in the broader public, however, the expectation of affinity
was diminished.
The value of affinity between radical feminists was not altogether eliminated in
these special  cases,  however.  While socialist  and psychoanalytic  feminists  were not
extended any affinity, Sebestyen expressed warm admiration of Greer’s and Morgan’s
work which maintained some degree of the affinity expected within the movement and
counterbalanced some of the antipathy that might emerge from her harsher criticisms:
‘Greer  spent  six  months  in  India  researching  for  Sex
and  Destiny,  and  I  don’t  think  that  the  Women’s
Liberation Movement has itself succeeded in putting so
much  material  together  in  such  an  accessible  form.’
(Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 52)
‘The poet’s skills have been growing in the years since
Monster*,  and  there  are  passages  of  sustained
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metaphor  where she makes the truth known with a
beauty I’ve seldom read.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 54)
These remarks indicated that even powerful radical feminists were positioned within
the emotion culture of the movement alongside other radical feminists, though they
were nearer to feminists in other strands of the WLM than were most radical feminists:
‘We  are  now  the  Feminist  Constituency,  we  can’t
pretend to be entirely powerless any more. Don’t we
owe it to these women to free them of the burdens of
celebrity, to read their books with loving rigour, to stop
publishers  encouraging  them  to  push  out  big  over-
written  manuscripts  because  every  word  means
money? Like science fiction readers, we’re very close to
our  writers  –  as  close,  Robin  Morgan points  out,  as
mother  and  child;  so  close  that  we  often  change
places.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 54)
 The emotion culture had some flexibility, allowing radical feminists to remain ‘very
close  to  our  writers’,  placing  them  within  the  intra-movement  affinity  that
characterised  relationships  between  radical  feminists.  Affinity  was  not  a  matter  of
unthinking partisanship, but emerged from movement participants' ongoing reflexive
evaluations of the movements politics and practices. The distinction between famous
feminists and ‘the Feminist Constituency’ emerged from a 'relational  logic'  (Burkitt,
2005), intertwining political reflexivity with emotional relations. This created space for
the  critiques  of  power  which  were  so  central  to  radical  feminism’s  ideology  to  be
enacted in the emotion culture through a diminished expectation of consistent affinity.
In this section, I have returned to the affinity explored in chapter 5, showing
that radical feminists expected affinity from one another and endeavoured to maintain
it  in their ways of expressing feelings about and toward one another. They framed
adverse emotions as less confrontational ones in order to preserve affinity while still
allowing their readers to understand the feelings that they were expressing. The extent
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to which someone was considered part of the intra-movement emotional relationship
of  affinity  depended  upon  the  level  of  her  adherence  to  radical  feminist  political
ideology  (with  less  ideologically  conforming  feminists  being  objects  of  less  sisterly
relationships  –  this  will  be  explored  further  below).  Some  radical  feminists  were
positioned as having more power over the life  and success of  the movement than
others, and they were subject to close scrutiny and extended less affinity if they were
seen to be misusing the benefit of their prominent positions. Evident across radical
feminists’ engagements with one another was the importance of preserving sisterly
relationships, and as with the movement’s emotions toward men and other strands of
the  WLM,  which  specific  emotions  were  involved  was  less  important  than  the
(re)production of particular types of relationships. Though the maintenance of affinity
might  otherwise  be  conceptualised  as  an  emotion  rule,  the flexibility  about  which
specific  emotions  were  involved  (in  radical  feminists’  relations  within  their  own
movement  and  with  various  others)  does  not  reconcile  with  this  theorisation.
Throughout  the  emotion  culture  of  the  movement,  it  can  be  seen  that  the
maintenance and reproduction of particular qualities of relationship are the underlying
work done by collective emotions. The special exception to the expectation of affinity
made for Germaine Greer and Robin Morgan showed that even in relations with radical
feminists whose place in the interior of the movement was not contested, conformity
to radical feminist political ideals (including ideals of horizontal relationships of power)
was the key factor that mediated the movement’s collective emotional relationships
with individuals and groups.
6.3
The Imperative for Affinity & its Breach
The maintenance of affinity amongst radical feminists was generally consistent
(with due exceptions for those such as Greer and Morgan),  but it  was not without
exception. In one particularly noteworthy case, Marge Berer wrote a book review essay
authored  by  a  coalition  of  radical  feminists  concerned  with  the  dangers  of  New
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Reproductive Technologies. This review was highly critical and scathing in tone, much
more  closely  resembling  radical  feminists’  writings  about  those  outside  of  radical
feminism than the emotion culture of the movement allowed. The publication of her
piece was met with heavy backlash from readers, and the magazine published 9 reader
letters in response to it – far more than the approximately zero to three letters that
pieces  in  Trouble  and  Strife typically  generated.  The  letters  signalled  that  readers
regarded Berer’s manner of treating the work of other radical feminists as a serious
breach of the relations in their movement. 
In  this  section,  Berer’s  breach  of  the  relationships  of  affinity  within  radical
feminism will be explored. Drawing from Harold Garfinkel’s (1984) ethnomethodology,
it will use this norm-breaching incident and the subsequent adverse response to it to
evidence that there were strongly established norms in place, and that these were of
emotional significance to participants in the movement. For frame of reference, the
section will  open with an exploration of Stevi  Jackson’s critical  review essay on the
work of Rosalind Coward’s and Juliet Mitchell’s writings on psychoanalysis,  showing
how antipathy appeared in the text in radical feminists’ dealings with other strands of
the WLM, where the preservation of  affinity was not considered necessary.  Berer’s
review essay will then be examined, highlighting the emotional similarities between
the antipathy of Jackson’s piece and the emotions of Berer’s essay. The antipathy of
Berer’s piece constituted a breach of the emotion culture of the movement, which
demanded that she express criticisms in affinity-preserving ways. Readers then used
their letters to respond to Berer’s breach and remedy the harm done to the integrity of
the movement’s interior relationships of affinity – this response will be explored in the
next section.
In her critique of psychoanalytic feminism, Stevi Jackson represented it as an
appropriate object of antipathy, using sarcasm and satire, and expressing annoyance
and irritation (and, it might be argued, also low-level anger). Her manner of relating to
this strand of feminism was similar to Sara Scott’s in relation to socialist feminism. Like
Scott, she used quotation marks to convey her rejection of other feminists’ claims:
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‘It  is  always  important  for  feminists  to  understand
ideas that  seek to “explain”  female  subordination as
“natural” or as unchanging and unchangeable. It is for
this reason that I ask you to bear with me as we pick
our way through what may seem nonsensical rubbish.’
(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 32)
More significant in this passage than the emotionally-imbued use of quotation marks,
however, was her overt naming of psychoanalytic texts as ‘nonsensical rubbish’. Even in
Naomi  Pfeffer’s  ‘angry  and  bitter’  writing,  she  did  not  resort  to  this  type  of
representation, and she consistently adhered to the relationship of affinity in radical
feminism by framing her strong adverse emotions as less confronting ones. Jackson’s
writing was not about the work of radical feminists, which removed the imperative to
express  adverse  emotions  in  affinity-preserving  ways.  Furthermore,  by  using  the
collective  ‘we’  (‘we  pick  our  way  through...’),  she  amplified  her  already-implicit
invitation to the reader to share in her emotions toward psychoanalysis and to see
themselves as part of the same group to which Jackson herself belonged. As discussed
in chapter 5, expressions of antipathy were used to do the dual work of engendering
antipathy toward people  outside of  radical  feminism and producing affinity  toward
those within it.  The intra-movement relationship of affinity was not only preserved
here, but strengthened, with the various emotions which might be read from the text
(depending on her  own feelings,  a  reader  might  read the passage above as  mildly
irritated  or  substantially  angry)  consistently  preserving  and  reproducing  the
relationships in the movement’s emotion culture.
Also  like  Scott’s  discussion  of  socialist  feminism  and  Sebestyen’s  of  famous
radical  feminists,  Jackson’s  emotions  toward  other  feminists  were  concerned  with
differences of ideology and power:
‘The  unwillingness  or  inability  of  the  proponents  of
psychoanalysis to translate their ideas into terms which
the  uninitiated  can  comprehend  has  been  rightly
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damned  as  elitist.  It  makes  these  writers  relatively
immune from criticism from outsiders and this, I think,
accounts  for  much  of  the  deference  towards
psychoanalysis.  How  can  we  presume  to  criticise
something we don’t understand? Those working within
this framework can smuggly [sic] reassure themselves
that if the rest of us have doubts it is only because of
our ignorance. Juliet Mitchell’s work, being less directly
influenced by Lacan than many of the other writers of
this genre, is more comprehensible. She makes up for
this by constantly implying that if we reject Freud it is
because we are too stupid to see the Great Truths that
he has uncovered. The whole tone of  Psychoanalysis
and Feminism is arrogant and condescending.
Faced  with  either  incomprehensibility  or
condescension our confidence is undermined and we
are  denied  the  possibility  of  assessing  what,  if
anything,  psychoanalysis  has  to offer… I  believe that
we  must  resist  being  cowed  into  silence  by  elitist
mystifications.’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 34)
Jackson’s  representations  of  psychoanalytic  feminists  produced  them  as  objects  of
antipathy, simultaneously reinforcing the affinity of radical feminism. The image she
represented was of a smug elite of scholarly feminists who did not give other women
credit  for  sufficient  intelligence  to  understand  a  framework  which  they  saw  as
oppressive. Because these were not radical feminists, she was able to represent them
in a way which somewhat resembled representations of men – angering figures who
lorded over women and dismissed their objections and complaints as irrelevant and ill-
founded.  The  ideological  difference  between  psychoanalytic  and  radical  feminists
placed authors like Juliet Mitchell in the movement’s emotion culture such that there
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was no relationship of affinity to preserve, and the ‘deference to psychoanalysis’ on
which Jackson saw Mitchell as relying effectively made Mitchell a beneficiary of male
power (in this case, drawing intellectual authority from the pervasive influence and
acceptance of Freud’s ideas).
Recalling again the relationships of affinity between radical feminists, it is clear
that even an emotionally heated disagreement between participants in the movement
would not allow the type of expression seen in Jackson’s review. Her representation of
psychoanalytic  feminists  engendered  antipathy  toward  them  as  people  as  well  as
rejection of their ideas, and her recurrent references to and self-identification with the
radical  feminist  group who collectively  shared that  antipathy  (‘as  we pick  our  way
through..’,  ‘how can we presume to criticise...’,  ‘we are denied the possibility...’,  ‘we
must resist being cowed into silence’)  consistently reinforced radical  feminists’  own
distinct place within their emotion culture. Affinity was preserved for radical feminists
alone (with  some flexibility  where marked power differential  existed,  such  as  with
Greer  and  Morgan).  Everyone  outside  the  movement  had  a  more  antipathetic
relationship  with  radical  feminists  which  allowed  for  less  (to  borrow  again  from
Spender’s  paraphrase  of  Chesler)  ‘compassionate’  expression.  In  disagreements
between radical feminists, the same emotions which were present in Jackson’s review
would  have  been  expressed  quite  differently,  allowing  for  adverse  emotional
expression while preserving the affinity within the movement.
Marge Berer’s review essay was about a series of writings by women involved in
FINNRAGE (Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic
Engineering). Though the FINNRAGE network was radical feminist in politics and largely
organised by radical feminists, Berer’s review essay produced the authors whose work
she reviewed as objects of antipathy rather than affinity. The relationship of affinity
was not preserved, and Berer’s emotional expression placed radical feminist authors in
the wrong place within the movement’s emotion culture. 
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There  were  several  parallels  between  Jackson’s  essay  and  Berer’s  which
illuminate the violation of the movement’s emotion culture implicit in Berer’s piece.
The first was its naming and blaming of specific women:
‘It  is  my  impression  that  most  of  the  eight  women
involved  in  these  three  books  are  the  guiding  force
behind  FINNRAGE  and  primarily  responsible  for  its
public face: they are Gena Corea, Renate Duelli Klein,
Jalna  Hanmer,  Helen  Holmes,  Betty  Hoskins,  Janice
Raymond,  Robyn  Rowland  and  Roberta  Steinbacher.’
(Berer, 1986, issue 9: 30) 
Jackson  similarly  named  Rosalind  Coward  and  Juliet  Mitchell  as  key  figures  in
psychoanalytic feminism, singling them out for blame, but notably Naomi Pfeffer did
not name specific people in her discussion of feminists from whom ‘the response was
nil’ when she attempted to garner support from them – naming specific figures rather
than  systems  or  phenomena,  as  von Scheve,  Zink,  and  Ismer  (2016)  have  argued,
engenders more angry responses,  and the text of these pieces seems to reflect  an
intuitive awareness of this. Within radical feminism, part of the maintenance of affinity
involved the direction of criticisms at ideas and practices where possible, eschewing
naming and blaming.  Because the writings by Stevi  Jackson and Marge Berer were
book reviews, it might seem common-sense that the authors were named, and not an
emotionally  consequential  gesture.  However,  readers  saw  Berer’s  articulated
‘impression  that  most  of  the  eight  women  involved  in  these  three  books  are  the
guiding  force’  as  an  aggressive  and  unsisterly  gesture,  suggesting  that  it  was
incompatible  with  the  intra-movement  emotion  culture  of  radical  feminism  –  this
reader response will be examined in the next section.
As discussed in chapter 5, a key ideological aspect of radical feminism was its
view of men as oppressors and enemies of women, which gave rise to much of their
reticence to adopt ‘male’ medical practices and ideologies. This placed an embargo on
collusion with men for radical feminists, which explained Jackson’s antipathy toward
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women  who  exhibited  ‘deference’  toward  psychoanalysis  (or  worse,  those  who
suggested that women who did not agree with it  were ‘too stupid’).  Emulating the
pattern of relationship toward psychoanalytic feminists rather than radical feminists,
Berer responded to one section of a FINNRAGE text by siding with the male doctor
rather than his radical feminist critic:
‘She describes an interview with a scientist working on
cloning which also conveys her horror of him, and not
much else. It turns out that this scientist is interested in
cloning  because  he  thinks  it  may  lead  to  useful
information  about  cancer  and  therefore  to  possible
ideas for  prevention or  cure of  cancer.  Is  this  a valid
reason to do research on cloning? She doesn’t say, and
she doesn’t ask. Instead she draws him out on how it
might be used on another planet, and then goes on to
describe a totally discredited book about an experiment
in  cloning  people  which never  took  place,  by  a  man
called Rorvik.’ (Berer, 1986, issue 9: 31)
Her representation portrayed the radical feminist author as unreasonable, unfair to a
well-intended man, and ill-willed (‘she draws him out on how it  might be used on
another planet’). She represented the doctor in this interaction as worthy of sympathy
and the feminist interviewer as indictable, violating a core tenet of the emotion culture
of  the movement.  She encouraged antipathy toward the radical  feminist,  and even
worse than engendering affinity toward other strands of the WLM, she represented a
male doctor as a rightful object of affinity:
‘The book includes the texts  of  ethical  and scientific
evaluations  of  the  technology  by  US,  British  and
Australian  medical  bodies,  which  are  amazingly
sensible in many respects… There are points in it that I
think  are  naive…  But  overall,  it  is  sane  and  more
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informative  than  Corea’s  et  al,  and  an  excellent
counterpoint to them.’ (Berer, 1986, issue 9: 34-35)
Echoing men’s misogynistic constructions of women as inherently pathological, Berer’s
praise of male-authored texts on the grounds that they were ‘sane’ and ‘amazingly
sensible’ inverted the places of radical  feminists and men as objects of affinity and
antipathy.  Berer’s  apparent  sympathy  for  what  she  represented  as  misunderstood
doctors was also highlighted in readers’ criticism – this will be elucidated in the next
section.
In another parallel with Jackson’s critique of Coward and Mitchell, Berer framed
radical feminists as deliberate manipulators of women. In Jackson’s case, this took the
form  of  suggesting  that  psychoanalytic  feminists  used  impenetrable  language  to
confuse women and prevent them from having the intellectual confidence to criticise
psychoanalytic theory. In Berer’s case, she suggested that radical feminists encouraged
women to fear what they did not understand:
‘What is wrong with many of the pieces on the new
technology  is  that  they  are,  in  fact,  fantasies.  They
posit futures that frighten because they are awful: and
that  seems  to  be  their  purpose.  They  are  effective
because  some  of  them  are  imaginative  and  well-
written  fantasies.  The  writers  do  not  examine  the
technology for what it is, but can dismiss it for what it
might become. They do not then need to offer reasons
for  why it  has  come about,  nor  explore  the reasons
why women are queueing up to take advantage of it.
Instead, they make you fear it, as Eve was made to fear
the apple, because of the knowledge it would bring.’
(Berer, 1986, issue 9: 31)
The religious parallel was particularly powerful, drawing an analogy between the idea
that women are responsible for the downfall of humankind and radical feminists’ texts.
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In addition to conveying her own antipathy toward the radical feminist authors she
critiqued, her framing encouraged her readers to see them as a threat to their own
intellectual autonomy. Such a framing relocated these particular radical feminists from
their place of affinity within the emotion culture to one of antipathy, and reordered the
collective ‘we’  to which Jackson had referred to include Berer and her readers but
exclude the FINNRAGE authors.
Making  the  displacement  of  the  FINNRAGE  group  from  radical  feminism’s
interior of affinity even more pronounced, later in the piece Berer explicitly argued that
Gena Corea wilfully manipulated other feminists’ emotions:
‘Corea  uses  her  skill  as  a  writer  to  manipulate  the
reader’s  feelings,  by turning the information she has
collected against its source to support her own point of
view.  Using  images  of  breeding  brothels,  egg  farms,
war  on  the  womb,  hormonal  bombardment  of  the
ovaries, and subversive sperm, she takes the reader on
a  fascinating  tour  through  her  vision  of  woman  as
victim. It is sensationalist journalism at its best.’ (Berer,
1986, issue 9: 34)
The  tone  of  this  characterisation  was  similar  to  that  of  Jackson’s  discussion  of
psychoanalytic  feminists,  and  again  demonstrated  a  marked  contrast  to  Pfeffer’s
affinity-preserving piece. There were three relevant actors involved in the emotional
framing that Berer used here: herself, the authors whose books she reviewed, and her
own readers. Her representation of Corea as a manipulative ‘sensationalist’ violated
the terms of  her own expected affinity with Corea,  and additionally  extended that
violation to Trouble and Strife’s readers, encouraging them to break with their affinity
towards  radical  feminists  like  Corea.  This  potentially  far-reaching  violation  of  the
internal integrity of the relationship of affinity within radical feminism constituted a
significant breach of the movement’s emotion culture, and the extent to which intra-
movement  affinity  was  valued  was  evidenced  by  the  forceful  response  from  the
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readers – it is to this response that the next section will turn.
6.4
Reconstructing  the  Movement  through  Emotional  Relationships:  Enforcing
Sisterhood
The  movement’s  internal  relationship  of  affinity  was  (re)produced  in  many
settings, and the text of radical feminist publications like Trouble and Strife was one of
them. As I argued in chapter 3, texts are a site of social action in its own right as well as
of representation, and Marge Berer’s breach of intra-movement affinity in her review
essay  was  a  breach  of  the  relationships  she  represented  textually.  That  left  the
movement’s  internal  affinity  in  a  fractured  state  after  her  review,  demanding  a
response. Either the breach would be allowed to pass, which would signify a shift in
the movement’s emotion culture and a transition to a different relationship between
radical feminists, or the fracture would have to be repaired. The readership elected for
the latter, and responded to Berer’s piece with an onslaught of letters far exceeding the
number typically published in response to even relatively controversial articles. Their
critical comments about Berer’s piece highlighted her violation of precisely the aspects
of  affinity  maintenance which have  been discussed thus  far,  confirming  that  these
relational norms were understood and expected by radical feminists. The manner in
which  they  related  to  Berer  herself  in  their  letters  also  confirmed  that  whether
someone was included in the radical feminist relationship of affinity hinged upon the
political ideals to which they apparently subscribed and which they enacted in their
behaviour,  giving  rise  to  antipathetic  responses  to  Berer  from  the  magazine’s
readership  despite  her  self-identification  as  a  radical  feminist.  In  this  section,  two
aspects  of  the  response  to  Berer’s  piece  will  be  explored:  drawing  on
ethnomethodology, it will highlight how the adverse responses to the breach of the
prevailing  terms  of  relationship  in  the  movement  illuminate  the  presence  of  an
imperative  that  could  be  breached,  and  it  will  explore  the  readers’  strategies  for
reconstructing the affinity that had been harmed by the violation.
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There were a range of  bases for  objection to Berer’s  way of  relating to the
radical feminists of FINNRAGE. One of these, as highlighted in the last section, was her
naming  and  shaming  of  specific  women.  Berer’s  direct  criticisms  toward  specific
individuals  was  considered  incompatible  with  the  affinity  that  participants  in  the
movement  were  expected  to  feel  and  express  toward  one  another  as  well  as  an
aberration from the movement’s political principles. Naming themselves as ‘founder,
and past, members of the Trouble and Strife Collective’, and opening their letter with a
claim that ‘the current issue shows a marked turn to reactionary politics’ (Hanmer and
Saunders, 1987, issue 10: 8), the authors of a joint letter stated that,
‘This  is  a  straightforward  attack  on  radical  political
theory expressed in the form of a brutal critique on the
writings  of  individual  feminists.’  (Hanmer  and
Saunders, 1987, issue 10: 9)
As had been in the case in radical feminists’ relationships with men and other strands
of the WLM, the movement’s political ideology was a key pivot of relationships within
the movement, and attacks on ‘radical political theory’ were intertwined with attacks
on the emotion culture:
‘The  article  by  Marge  Berer,  (T&S  9),  in  which  she
attacks  certain  feminists  and  feminist  critiques  of
reproductive technologies,  can be criticised on many
points;  one  of  these  is  the  personal,  defamatory
remarks against Gena Corea, Helen Holmes, and other
women portraying  them as  hysterical  ring-leaders  of
the  international  feminist  network  FINNRAGE.’
(Spallone, 1987, issue 10: 5-6) 
There was a dense recurrence of complaints from readers that the FINNRAGE authors
had been personally attacked, demonstrating that they shared an understanding that
this would not happen within radical feminism:
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‘I write in response to the article (supposedly) a book
review) [sic] you published by Marge Berer, “Breeding
Conspiracies.  Feminism  and  the  New  Reproductive
Technologies”. This article attacks a number of women
who  are  my  colleagues  but  also  myself,  both
professionally and personally.
Unfortunately  it  does  not  grapple  with  the
debates or the facts themselves within the area of the
new reproductive technologies. It does not deal with
the  issues  but  resorts  to  snide  dismissal.’  (Rowland,
1987, issue 10: 3) 
Though all of these objections also highlighted that Berer ‘does not grapple with the
debates or the facts themselves’, they also all specified personal attacks. The similarly
scathing review essay that Stevi Jackson had written about Rosalind Coward’s and Juliet
Mitchell’s work had not elicited this response – readers raised no objection to Jackson’s
‘personal attacks’, despite her naming specific women as ‘arrogant and condescending’.
Because Coward and Mitchell were outside of the bounds of radical feminist affinity
and placed in the movement’s emotion culture as objects of  antipathy,  to write of
them in that manner did not constitute a breach and therefore did not create a need to
repair relationships. 
The threat that Berer’s manner of relating to other radical feminists had posed
to the affinity of the movement raised an occasion for the value that radical feminists
placed on the intra-movement relationship to become more visible. Berer was seen to
have ruptured the bonds of affinity:
‘Not only do we need to describe what we see but we
must  also  analyse  what  we  feel.  For  example,  the
patronising  way  in  which  Madhu  Kishwar’s  work  is
dealt  with  is  no  less  than  disgusting.  On  page  35:
“Madhu  Kishwar’s  piece  in  Man-Made  Woman
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deserves  to  be  in  a  better  book.”  How  dare  you
presume that Madhu Kishwar did not positively choose
to publish her work  in a  book which she believes is
dealing with issues hitherto ignored by white western
women who think that there might be something in it
for them!’ (Hanmer and Saunders, 1987, issue 10: 9) 
Hanmer  and  Saunders’s  outrage  was  directed  at  Berer’s  suggestion  that  Madhu
Kishwar ought to be separated out from her co-authors. In addition to undermining the
assumption that Kishwar made that choice under her own deliberate agency, Berer’s
remark implicitly drove a wedge between Kishwar and the other authors, adulterating
the relationship that they had developed amongst themselves (and their work). The
relational ideal that Hanmer and Saunders were defending was one of radical feminists
united in the bonds of affinity and sisterhood (even if sometimes disagreeing amongst
themselves), and Berer’s suggestion that Kishwar ought to have been extracted from
that  group  and  placed  elsewhere  portrayed  a  quite  different  image  of  atomistic
individuals whose feminism and writing could be chopped up and separated out, and
of a contrarian relationship between Kishwar and the other authors. The passion of
Hanmer  and  Saunders’s  anger  at  this  illustrates  how  deeply  felt  radical  feminists’
affinity toward one another was,  and how urgently they felt  the need to defend it
against threat. Though the cultural ideal of sisterhood was not explicitly invoked, it was
nevertheless a prominent guiding principle in radical feminists' relationships with one
another which became more apparent when violated.
Berer’s perceived violation of the relational bonds within radical feminism also
created a need to reclassify her in relation to the emotion culture.  Her manner of
relating  to  the  FINNRAGE  authors  had  not  been  consistent  with  intra-movement
emotions,  which required that  her status  as  a  radical  feminist  be addressed. Some
letter-writers consequently dislodged her from her place in the radical feminist affinity
relationship and positioned her alongside feminists outside the WLM:
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‘Comfortable  and  smug  middle-class  women  should
not be selfish enough to believe that their own sense
of  personal  control  in  their  world  is  automatically  a
control exercised by all women.’ (Rowland, 1987, issue
10: 4)
‘Comfortable  and  smug  middle-class  women’  was  a  phrasing  similar  to  Jackson’s
discussion of Coward and Mitchell, using emotions to contest the legitimacy of Berer’s
place amongst radical feminists. Rowland did not use any emotion words or allude to
her own emotions overtly, but her manner of referring to Berer in this scornful way
altered the terms of her own (and by extension, other radical feminists’) relationship to
Berer. Though personal attacks had been the topic of many of the criticisms levelled at
Berer, in a case in which someone’s place within the radical feminist intra-movement
relationship  was  contested,  such  attacks  –  and  what  they  signified  about  the
relationships  between  those  involved  –  could  be  used  to  move  Berer  from  the
relationship of  affinity to that of  antipathy,  using emotional framing to emotionally
exile her from radical feminism.
A second locus of criticism against Berer, and one which helps to explain the
perceived need to use emotional framing to remove her from the radical feminist intra-
movement relationship, was her mimicking of men’s denigrations of women:
‘Berer makes it  sound as  if  the  hundreds of  women
who interact via the FINNRAGE networks are duped,
blindly  following  a  fantastic  conspiracy  theory
constructed by a few women. This is insulting to all the
women involved – many of whom have been criticising
reproductive  and genetic  technologies  since the  late
1970s, and all of whom are part of the whole, many-
faceted FINNRAGE story.’ (Spallone, 1987, issue 10: 6) 
Men’s framings of women as ‘too stupid’, hysterical, or crazy were familiar to radical
feminists, and the emulation of these framings by women were the subject of some of
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radical  feminism’s  contentions  with  other  strands  of  the  WLM  (as  suggested  by
Jackson’s claims about psychoanalytic feminism and Scott’s about socialist feminism).
For Berer’s argument to have been accepted, then, would have implied an acceptance
of  these  framings  of  radical  feminists  (the  ‘lunatic  fringe’  to  which  Sara  Scott  had
referred). This precise concern was made more explicit in a letter from Gena Corea,
one of the authors critiqued by Berer, in her letter:
‘In general, the Trouble and Strife article has portrayed
feminist  critics  of  the  NRTs  as  crazy,  paranoid  and
hysterical.  The  Singer  and  Wells’  book  is  “sane  and
more  informative  than  Corea’s  et  al.”  We  are
accustomed  to  portrayals  of  feminists  as  crazy  and
male  defenders  of  patriarchal  interests  as  “sane.”
Historically these techniques for silencing feminists and
helping them to disappear from public view have not
been  used  by  people  identifying  themselves  as
feminists. Nor have they appeared in journals labelling
themselves “radical feminist.”’ (Corea, 1987, issue 11:
6) 
The breaches were laid bare here: Berer had violated the terms of the radical feminist
relationship by representing other feminists in the same ways that patriarchal men did,
distancing  her  from  radical  feminist  politics.  Furthermore,  Corea  linked  Berer’s
argument with Trouble and Strife as a publication, illuminating a concern about what
the  editorial  collective’s  choice  to  publish  Berer’s  piece  suggested  about  radical
feminism itself and signalling a need to defend the movement’s integrity from attack.
What  distinguished the  relationship  of  affinity  in  radical  feminism from the
more antipathetic relationships outside of it was that how radical feminists made one
another feel was considered consequential.  Their antipathy toward other strands of
the WLM and toward men did not require them to give consideration to how their
emotional frames would affect the people about whom they were writing,  but the
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affinity of radical feminism did necessitate this. Critics of Berer’s piece noted the way
that her manner of writing about the FINNRAGE authors might affect them:
‘FINNRAGE  was  formed  out  of  the  women’s
movement; we are growing and we enjoy a plurality of
opinions  on  the  matter  of  reproductive  and  genetic
technologies.  Our  resistance  is  based  on  our
assessment of  what  these  technologies  mean for  all
people, particularly women. Perhaps a helpful analogy
is  how  we  resist  nuclear  technology  despite  the
apparent benefits  (jobs, energy).  Would not a better
feminist  tactic  be  to  listen  to  each  other,  not
castigate?’ (Spallone, 1987, issue 10: 6) 
The characterisation of listening to one another rather than castigating as a ‘better
feminist tactic’ linked the practice of compassionate listening to feminist practice, and
demonstrated that the relationship itself was a topic of conscious interest in its own
right as radical feminists read  Trouble and Strife.  By calling for modes of interaction
which were more compatible with the preservation of affinity, Spallone reinforced the
intra-movement relationship that had been threatened by Berer’s more antipathetic
way of relating to other radical feminists through the text. 
Dale Spender still more directly addressed the issue of how feminists made one
another feel through their manners of reviewing written work. Referring to research
she had done about women’s experiences of having their writings reviewed (by a male-
dominated mainstream media which tended to give women authors ‘bad press’):
‘But my investigation of Gatekeeping led me to an area
that I had not anticipated; I soon encountered some of
the women who had been on the receiving end of the
“bad  press”  and  who  had  been  left  raw  by  the
experience.
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When I wrote to all the women whose work I
had  summarised  in  For  the  Record –  to  ask  them
whether  they  felt  their  views  had  been  fairly
represented for I had no desire to be a “gatekeeper” of
their  work or  to distort  their  meanings – I  was very
disturbed  by  some  of  the  responses  that  were
returned  to  me.  For  without  exception  the  authors
recounted such horrific  stories about being reviewed
that  they  even  entertained  the  idea  of  abandoning
their writing on the grounds that it was not worth the
risk of such repudiation – which not only took so long
to deal with, but which also took its toll the next time
they took up their pens.’ (Spender, 1987, issue 10: 6)
Spender’s focus on the emotional impact of being reviewed helps to demonstrate why
the  dramaturgical  account  of  emotions  is  inadequate  to  explain  radical  feminism’s
emotion culture. Theorisations of emotion rules are concerned with what is felt and
what is expressed. Where the person on the receiving end of emotional expression is
concerned, the concept of emotion rules jumps the gap between the actors involved
and focuses on what the receiving person feels and expresses. What is missed out by
this theorisation is the quality of the relationship that is engendered by what emotions
are felt, expressed, expected, or encouraged – what subsists in between the actors.
Spender’s  concern  with  how  practices  of  reviewing  emotionally  impacted  feminist
writers demonstrates a concern with the relationships that those authors have – with
themselves (whether they feel confident enough to continue writing) as well as with
other feminists. 
Linking this finally with the political ideology which was central to all aspects of
radical  feminism’s  emotion  culture,  Spender  referred  back  to the  writing  of  Phyllis
Chesler, whose book on women and psychoanalysis she had reviewed for Trouble and
Strife. Chesler argued that women needed to find less scathing ways to relate to one
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another and to review each other’s work, and Spender echoed this sentiment:
‘This is my stand as well. For unless we find new ways
to  comment,  review  –  exchange  ideas  and  views  –
there  will  be  no  necessity  for  patriarchy  to  oppress
women; we will  destroy each other.’  (Spender, 1987,
issue 10: 7) 
The way she framed the link associated antipathetic ways of relating amongst feminists
with doing the oppressive work of patriarchy on men’s behalf. The implications that
women oppressing one another would have for the movement’s emotion culture were
highly damaging, and required a rebuke as well as the sort of displacement from radical
feminism’s intra-movement emotion culture that was seen in reference specifically to
Marge Berer above. Gena Corea extended the interrogation of Berer’s place in radical
feminism which had been implicit in others’ emotional framings to also include Trouble
and Strife itself. Referring to the book by male scientists which Berer had described as
‘sane’ and ‘an excellent counterpoint to’ Corea’s writing, Corea responded:
‘Yet the Singer and Wells book praised by Trouble and
Strife advocates a much greater role for the state.  It
advocates  a  state-run  surrogate  mother  “service”
through the formation of a State Surrogacy Board… But
the  article  does  not  criticise  Singer  and  Wells  when
they advocate the formation of boards enlarging state
control  over  women’s  bodies.  Why?  In  a  radical
feminist journal, why?’ (Corea, 1987, issue 11: 6) 
Unlike some other letter writers, Corea attributed the praise of men’s work to Trouble
and Strife rather than only to Berer.  In this  way,  she eschewed the use of  blaming
individual people as a mechanism for reordering how people were placed within the
emotion culture of the movement, but she implied a greater degree of responsibility
for the Trouble and Strife editorial collective as gatekeepers for what were counted as
radical feminist ideas. Within her framing, the relationship that had been ruptured by
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Berer’s piece was not only that between Berer and other feminists – the gatekeeping
decision made by the editors of as significant a radical feminist publication as Trouble
and  Strife had  shaken  the  ground  of  the  movement’s  ideological  and  emotional
integrity:
‘The  men  describe  one  advantage  of  the  State
Surrogacy Board:  “… since the Board would act  as  a
buffer between the couple and the surrogate, it would
make it much more difficult for the surrogate to extort
additional money from the couple.”
Oh  those  greedy,  evil  heartless  women!  Oh
those poor abused men who, in all  good faith, hired
the women’s bodies!’ (Corea, 1987, issue 11: 5) 
Similarly  to  Stevi  Jackson  and  Sara  Scott,  Corea  used  a  sarcastic  rendering  to
emotionally frame misogynistic discourse as the rightful  object of adverse emotion.
Trouble  and  Strife decision  to  publish  Berer’s  praise  of  these  misogynistic  claims,
thereby ratifying it as a legitimate radical feminist stance, ruptured the ordering of the
movement’s  emotion  culture.  Trouble  and  Strife,  in  Corea’s  representation,  had
sanctioned affinity toward men and antipathy toward radical  feminists,  and Corea’s
adverse  emotional  response  (marked  out  as  a  passionate  one  by  her  use  of
exclamation  marks)  illuminated  once  again  the  strongly  held  imperative  in  the
movement’s emotion culture for affinity between radical feminists. Each of the critical
reader letters, as well as the high number of them that  Trouble and Strife received,
reflected the significance of the relationship of affinity within the movement and the
intensity of the adverse response when it was violated. The letter writers used a variety
of strategies to re-establish affinity between radical feminists, displacing Marge Berer
(and contesting the place of Trouble and Strife as a publication) within radical feminism
in order to do so.
The  Trouble and Strife collective had been confronted, with varying levels of
directness, by letter writers, and the rupture in their own relationship with the radical
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feminist readership required repair as well.  Given the substance of  the critiques of
Berer’s piece, it was not possible for the collective to defend it while also maintaining
its  adherence  to  radical  feminist  political  ideology.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to
respond with a disclaimer which excused them from responsibility and showed why
their choice to publish the piece was not a breach of their own relationship with the
readers:
‘Editorial note: The article was written by Marge Berer
and published by T&S. We state on our masthead “we
do not necessarily agree with everything we publish”
(Trouble and Strife Collective, 1987, issue 11: 6) 
No further response to the letter writers was given, but this answer was sufficient to
confirm that the collective still subscribed to the radical feminist political lens that the
readership had advocated, and they did not contest efforts to displace Berer from her
status as an emotionally included radical feminist or come to her defence.
They did, however, also publish letters in support of Marge Berer, which were
much less numerous but not entirely absent. Some readers were pleased that the piece
had been published, and their reaction to Berer’s manner of emotionally engaging with
other radical feminists helps to illuminate the reason for all  of  the emotion culture
productive  work  done throughout  the text  of  the magazine.  One letter  of  support
confirmed Berer’s interpretation:
‘I’m glad  Trouble and  Strife published Marge  Berer’s
article on how feminists are tackling the issues brought
up  by  new  (and  old)  reproductive  technologies.  I’ve
been sorry to see FINRRAGE, the most visible feminist
organisation  interested  in  reproductive  technology,
focusing so exclusively on the scariness of technology.
Telling women to be afraid of technology feeds right
into what men keep trying to tell women – technology
is not a woman’s business.’ (Henry, 1987, issue 10: 10)
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The  movement’s  emotion  culture  was  not  unanimously  agreed,  then,  and  the
continued (re)production of the emotion culture across the text can be seen to have a
purpose – if that reproductive work was not done, the less popular (but not absent)
contrary might become more dominant. Wider acceptance of Berer’s antipathy toward
radical feminists and valorisation of ‘medical men’ might be a stronger presence across
the  text  if  so  much  of  its  content  was  not  preoccupied  with  reproducing  radical
feminists’ relationships with men, other strands of the WLM, and with other radical
feminists, adding purpose and value to the significant amount of emotional framing
that was present in the magazine.
The  ideal  of  sisterhood  and  affinity  was  strong  in  spite  of  some degree  of
difference within radical feminism, and it was manifest even defences of Berer. There
was concern about personal attacks against Berer on the same relational grounds that
there had been objections to Berer’s attacks of the FINNRAGE authors:
‘I was dismayed to find in the Summer issue of T&S11,
yet another letter attacking Marge Berer’s article on
reproductive technology in issue. In all  the issues of
T&S so far, and I have been a subscriber even before
the first issue dropped through my letterbox, I  have
yet to read such a sustained barrage of letters against
any one specific article.’ (Jennings, 1987, issue 12: 2)
The intra-movement relationship of affinity was of significance amongst women with
differing  views  on  science  and  technology,  and  the  expectation  of  affinity  was
maintained even by those who were sufficiently receptive to science to be willing to
permit  of  its  violation  in  relation  to  the  FINNRAGE  authors.  Recalling  her  own
encounters with feminists from FINNRAGE (noting that she herself had a background in
genetic  engineering  of  bacteria),  Jennings  conveyed  that  she  had  experienced  an
adverse response which resembled that to which Berer had been subject:
‘I  was  open-minded  about  the  issue  and  was  really
interested in why my companion was so passionately
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involved in campaigning against RT. My openness was
misinterpreted  as  being  against  the  aims  and
objectives of FINNRAGE and my scientific background
condemned me anyway, no matter what I said, or so I
felt at the time. I was accused of perpetrating similar
splits  among  feminists  around  RT  as  has  happened
with the pornography debate in the States.
I was astounded at this allegation, feeling that I
was attempting to engage a sister feminist in why she
had chosen RT as her political priority whereas I, who
had done laboratory research in  genetic  engineering
and although keenly  interested in this  field,  had not
chosen  it  as  my  political  priority.  It  was  more  an
attempt  at  an  analysis  of  why  one  chooses  one’s
political  priorities,  self-reflective on my part  and was
certainly not an attack on her. However, although this
is  a  personal  anecdote,  I  have  subsequently  met  a
similar response in other women who condemn one as
anti-feminist almost, if one is not as adamantly against
reproductive technologies as they deem appropriate.’
(Jennings, 1987, issue 12: 2)
Jennings’s response showed that the emotion culture was always in a state of potential
flux,  maintaining  an  expectation  of  affinity  but  exhibiting  some  flexibility  where
differences of ideology were beginning to take shape. Radical feminists were united in
seeing their emotion culture as divided into affinity and antipathy groups by ideology
(with radical feminist political ideals being associated with affinity and divergence from
these  being  objects  of  antipathy),  and  though  that  ideology  was  overwhelmingly
consistent, ambivalences and disagreements did occur. The majority were prepared to
defend  the  movement’s  generally  agreed  ideology  and  the  relational  norms  that
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accompanied it, however, and Berer’s status as a radical feminist did not protect her
from backlash when she was seen to have violated the movement. They responded
with attempts at remedy: they were affronted at the breach, they censured Berer for
violating what was a deeply valued relationship within the movement, and they sought
to  reinforce  intra-movement  affinity  and  prevent  ways  of  relating  such  as  those
exhibited by Berer from becoming accepted within the movement.
6.5
Conclusion
Though the ‘feminist sisterhood’ is now an antiquated notion, its grip was still
strong in the 1980s,  and radical  feminists’  view that they had been pushed to the
margins of  the WLM exacerbated their  emotional  reliance on this ideal  in order to
emotionally navigate it. They continued to value compassion toward other women, and
particularly expected this between radical feminists. When they did strongly disagree,
they represented this in the text by using non-confrontational language of ‘surprise’
and ‘curiosity’ in order to demonstrate that they wished to preserve relationships of
affinity  throughout  periods  of  disagreement,  and  more  affronting  expression  was
reserved for their writings about those outside of radical feminism.
Participation  in  this  relationship  of  affinity  was  near-universal,  but  in  one
atypical instance of breach, Marge Berer represented known radical feminists in ways
which closely paralleled other authors’ representations of women from other strands
of the WLM (and which sometimes mimicked even men’s framings of women). From
Berer’s piece alone, it was not clear whether her willingness to do this was a sign that
the relationships within the movement were shifting away from affinity and becoming
more antipathetic, or whether she had simply violated the terms of relations for radical
feminists. The heated response from readers suggested that the latter was the case,
and other radical feminists demonstrated a forceful eagerness to censure Berer for her
violation and Trouble and Strife for their ratification of it, and to re-establish the affinity
and  compassion  which  they  considered  indispensable  to  the  movement’s  internal
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emotion culture. Though there was some degree of support for Berer, even this was
rooted in a commitment to the ideal of sisterhood between radical feminists, showing
that  it  was  a  powerfully  entrenched  ideal  in  the  emotion  culture  in  spite  of  the
ideological ambivalences that had begun to emerge in the movement.
The affinity that subsisted between radical feminists was unique in its emotion
culture. No other group was extended this type of relationship. People who might be
expected to be objects of affinity, like doctors, therapists, and other feminists, were
subject to various types of adverse emotion and antipathy. Radical feminists’ historical
lens on the development of MDRCs and of the WLM set radical feminism itself apart
from  all  other  groups  in  the  minds  of  its  participants,  engendering  a  treasured
relationship  of  affinity  which  was  reproduced consistently  across  the  text,  and the
passion  of  the  adverse  response  to  its  violation  highlighted  more  clearly  how
significantly people in the movement valued this relationship than could have been
done without the presence of a breach. For radical feminists, the success of women’s
liberation from oppression by men was paramount to who was an ally and who an
enemy, and the meting out of emotional relationships hinged on interpretations and
predictions concerning what ideas, practices, and behaviours would benefit women’s
liberation and which would undermine it. Radical feminists’ affinity, then, was not a
partisan attachment to like-identified women, but a considered mode of relation which
was inextricably linked to the movement’s political ideals and which could be severed if





This research has explored the emotional life of British radical feminism in the
late and long 1980s. It set out to describe what the movement’s emotion culture was
like, and how it developed historically during this consequential period. The findings
show  that  relationships  –  within  radical  feminism,  between  it  and  other  feminist
movements, and between radical feminists and men (and their proxies) – were the
central pivot of the movement’s emotion culture. Through explorations of the debates
within radical feminism about medical and psychiatric sciences and care, the analysis
surfaced the movement’s collective emotions, illuminating how they were constituted
in the social  relationships between individuals  and collectives.  Literary ethnography
was used to enable the analysis to draw out emotion from the text in the widely varied
ways  in  which  it  was  represented,  instrumentalising  the  feeling  and  embedded
researcher as a tool of inquiry as well as focusing on the uses of discourses and framing
in the structure of the text. 
The  emotionally-imbued  relationships  of  radical  feminism,  taken  together,
formed a cohesive emotion culture. The three key relationships – with men, with other
feminisms,  and with radical  feminism itself  –  formed a clear  relational  logic  which
guided movement participants' emotions and helped them to use emotions to cohere
as a social movement group. Frames of terror, fear, anger, and annoyance in relation to
medical  and  psychiatric  professionals  through  their  textual  representation
(re)produced radical feminists’ collective emotions toward and relationship with these
figures. The movement’s collective background antipathy toward other strands of the
WLM emerged from the confluence of its ideology and the historical moment of the
1980s, as radical feminists interpreted changes in Britain and in feminism as an erosion
and  depoliticisation  of  the  WLM.  Finally,  the  radical  feminist  intra-movement
relationship of  affinity  regulated  radical  feminists'  ways  of  relating to one another,
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ensuring that their bond would be maintained and that breaches would be rectified
and affinity restored.
At a glance, the emotions emerging in this research might seem to reinforce the
perception that feminist movements are dominated by unpleasant emotions, buoying
stereotypes  about  angry  and  ill-humoured  feminists.  Radical  feminists’  emotions
toward men and other feminisms were adverse ones, producing the impression that
radical feminists spent most of their time embroiled in adverse feeling. However, the
research was intended to explain how emotions  worked in radical  feminism and to
excavate  their  causation;  it  was  not  designed  to  generate  an  account  of  which
emotions were present or dominant in radical feminism and which ones were absent.
The topical focus of the research, which strategically took one of the most ambivalent
and complicated  areas  of  feminist  thought  as  its  entry  point  into  the  movement’s
emotional  life,  led  to  an  over-representation  of  unpleasant  emotions.  It  is  worth
highlighting  that  a  study  drawing  upon  radical  feminists’  extensive  writing  on  the
transformatively  nourishing power of  caring and affectionate  relationships  between
women would paint a picture of a movement dominated by love, compassion, and
kindness. My research findings indicate from what types of sources radical  feminist
collective  emotions  sprung  and  how  historicity  was  involved  in  the  process  –  the
question of which emotions were or were not characteristic of the movement remains
for further research to answer.
One of  the primary conceptual  findings of  the research is  that  emotions,  in
social  movements as  elsewhere,  must be understood by reference to relationships.
Even where the relationship is with the self, emotions must have an object, and how
social actors feel is intimately bound up with how they interpret the relationships they
find  themselves  in  and  what  those  interpretations  signify.  Radical  feminists  were
unique amongst strands of the WLM in their staunch unwillingness to cooperate with
men,  and  they  saw  any  such  cooperation  as  undermining  to  the  success  of  the
movement.  They  similarly  saw  concessions  to  the  individualising  paradigms  of
medicine and psychotherapy as depoliticising, drawing women's attention away from
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the common causes of their ills (including physiological and psychological ones) and
toward their atomistic, individual selves. It was these interpretations that gave rise to
their  collective  emotions.  Freud  could  be  horrifying  for  a  woman  who  had  been
sexually abused, but the horror of a powerful and widely influential figure who could
cast a net of abuse and pathologisation over all women (and girls) was a much more
serious  horror.  The  frustration  and  annoyance  of  an  unpleasant  interaction  with  a
socialist feminist could be irksome, but that their interpretation of radical feminism
should become dominant, leading even those with no familiarity with the movement
to see it as a 'lunatic fringe' and ensuring that the most radical and zealous elements of
the WLM would be those least likely to gain adherents and advance women's liberation
was a source of adverse emotion which diffused entire inter-feminism relationships
with antipathy.  The quality  and intensity  of  radical  feminists'  emotions,  then,  were
produced  not  merely  by  what  they  immediately  experienced,  but  what  those
experiences  led  them  to  expect  of  their  futures  and  of  the  future  of  women's
liberation.
This entails a departure from the dramaturgical account of emotions in multiple
respects. Concepts of emotion rules implicitly, if not explicitly, place emotions inside of
individuals, projecting outward. This theorisation fails to adequately account for the
inseparability of each social actor's emotions from the interpretations and emotions of
others, and does not explain the collectivity of emotions. Research on the emotions of
social  movements  which  uses  this  framework  tends  to  reduce  movement  actors'
emotions to performances and conformity to (or defiance of) rules and norms, failing
to surface the world-making that actors do when they transform relations between self
and  other  through feeling.  The  inward-facing  emotional  framing  done  through
movement-specific  texts  like  Trouble  and  Strife would  have  little  use  if  emotions
toward people who did not read those publications were a matter of performance.
Because their own relationships with men and with other strands of the WLM were
forged through their emotional frames, however, it was highly productive for radical
feminists to consistently reproduce those relationships, even out of the line of sight of
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those  outside  their  own  movement.  Adverse  emotions  toward  men and  antipathy
toward other feminists were not only needed for mobilisation – they were a part of
how radical  feminists  understood what  they themselves were through their  shared
feelings toward what they were not.
Though  the  concept  of  emotion  rules  is  inadequate  on  its  own  to  explain
emotions in movements, the affinity between radical feminists did incorporate a clear
disciplinary element. As with relationships outside the movement, however, this is best
understood as a rule about relationships, rather than about emotions as such. Which
emotions were felt and expressed was of less consequence than how other radical
feminists  were made to  feel  and what  sorts  of  relationships  were created through
feeling. An antipathetic way of relating between radical feminists did not merely feel
badly, it risked fundamentally changing what radical feminists believed they owed to
one another, what set them apart from other feminisms and from men, and thereby
compromised the ideological as well as the emotional integrity of their movement. The
flexibility  with  which  emotions  could  be  felt  was  even clearer  in  radical  feminists'
relationships outside their movement. I have argued that their relationship with men
should be conceived as a toolkit, allowing them to call upon any adverse emotion that
seemed to answer to the immediate demands of their situation while preserving the
adverse relationship that those emotions all enacted. 
This is a distinctive addition to theory on movement emotions which can open
up a new strand of work. Research on movement emotions usually focuses on one or
two specific emotions (e.g., Cadena-Roa, 2002; Goodwin, 1997; Hercus, 1999; Holmes,
2000;  Mizen,  2015;  Ost,  2004;  Perry,  2002;  Sampietro  & Ordaz,  2015),  illuminating
what particular emotions do in movements but overlooking how different emotions
play with and against one another. Even where this multi-emotional play is elaborated
(e.g.,  Gould,  2009;  Kleres  & Wettergren,  2017),  the  different  emotions  tend to  be
organised  along  a  timeline,  showing  why  movement  participants  move  from  one
emotion  to  another.  The  concept  of  emotional  toolkit  enables  theorising  about
different emotions all in play in a movement at the same time and, most importantly in
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the case of my research, for the same purpose. Rather than using some emotions to
manage others, as Kleres and Wettergren (2017) suggest, or transitioning from some
emotions to others due to changing contextual conditions, as Gould (2009) elaborates,
the emotional toolkit shows how movements assemble an array of emotions within
their  emotion culture  which accommodate  fluctuations  in  immediate  situation  and
broader context while maintaining emotional and political consistency.  
My findings add to explorations of the dynamic relationship between a social
movement and its context. Scholars interested in how the personal biographies, social
positionalities,  and  general  lived  experiences  of  movement  participants  affect  the
emotion cultures that develop within movements themselves will  find this research
informative for elucidating how some of those links might work, and to help generate
new research questions in this area. The answers that have emerged have raised still
further questions which highlight the significance of history and context: How might
radical feminism's emotion culture look today if psychotherapy had never been taken
up by feminists? What would the relationship between radical feminists and medicine
be like if most doctors were women? The historical study of movement emotions draws
attention  to  the  many  layers  of  a  movement's  context,  and  hints  at  an  array  of
potentially fruitful areas where future research might dig more deeply.
The project came up against many more fascinating questions than its scope
permitted it to answer, and it wrestled with theories of emotion (and implicitly, affect)
in ways which can be productive for other scholars thinking about where conceptual
boundaries ought to be drawn: between emotion, affect,  and background emotion,
and  between  cognition  and  emotion.  I  have  argued  that  the  temporally  diffuse
antipathy which characterised radical feminism's relationship with other strands of the
WLM can be conceived as a background emotion, but it might alternatively have been
seen as affect or as simply an ordinary emotion. The boundaries between each of these
can be porous, and it is little wonder that researchers continue to debate about them
three  decades  after  the  emergence  of  the  sociology  of  emotions.  These  deep
theoretical questions proved a seductive draw as the research progressed, and as the
247
subfields of emotions and affect in the social sciences continue their presently-ongoing
meteoric rise, this research may be productive as a tool  for thinking through these
issues.
This project addresses itself to the question of how the emotions of specific
feminisms  affect  the  relationships  between  different  feminist  movements,  an  area
which  has  received  little  attention  thus  far.  The  contentious  relationships  between
feminist movements show no sign of cooling, and it would be beneficial for research
taking inter-feminism relationships as a focus to be undertaken. As the ‘archival turn’ in
feminism  continues  and  feminists  endeavour  to  work  on  feminism’s  present  by
rethinking its past, an eye on the historical can have significant impacts on feminist
theory and praxis. While research on feminist history and feminist emotions are both
comparatively  common,  historical  research  on  feminist  emotions  is  substantially
absent, and this may prove a rich area for building a transformed collective memory of
where feminism has been and a renewed vision for where it might go.
As Clare Hemmings (2011) has influentially argued, the ‘political grammar’ of
feminist historiography affects what is available to be imagined of the future as well as
remembered of the past. She highlights the constraints that widely accepted narratives
of feminism's history place upon the questions that can be asked about that history,
and locates much of the sedimentation of these stories in influential sites of academic
knowledge production, proposing that the syntax as well as the semantics of feminist
stories be experimented with. While these are crucial points to make, her account does
have  a  certain  disembodied  quality  (her  discussion  of  the  affectivity  of  texts
notwithstanding). The rearrangement of narratives, signifiers, and historical plot lines is
a powerful mechanism for helping feminists to think the past, the present, and the
future differently, but these signification games also might inadvertently draw stories
away from their anchoring in the concrete, embodied, local, specific, and minute. The
findings  of  my  research  help  to  illustrate  that  even  within  the  relatively  local,
temporally-bounded, and narrow (a single strand of feminism in a single decade in a
single country), feminist movements have been rife with uncertainty, ambivalence, and
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struggle.
Rather  than  replace  or  extend  ‘progress’,  ‘loss’,  and  ‘return’  narratives
(Hemmings, 2011) or generational genealogies and 'waves' (Muller, 2017) with an array
of alternative stories, then, we might regard the grand narrative itself with a greater
degree of  suspicion.  The grand narratives of  feminism rely upon particular  ways of
dividing up time and narrating feminism's pace and tempo as well  as its substance
(Sreekumar,  2017).  In  these stories,  feminism is,  if  not  necessarily  singular,  at  least
heavily simplified so that it can be organised along a timeline. A move away from the
compelling draw of the grand narrative is not a form of ‘progress’ from simplicity to
complexity (a danger that Hemmings rightly warns against), but an emphasis on the
specific for its own sake, letting go of the end goal of producing expansive, cohesive
accounts. The internal tensions and complexities of radical feminism which emerged
from this research, as I mentioned in chapter 1, do not map onto typologies even of
radical  feminism  itself,  and  by  looking  to  retell  this  movement's  story  through  its
collective  relationships  on  the  movement's  own  terms,  more  ambivalent  stories
surfaced which help to trouble familiar stories and raise new questions.
The principal audience for whose sake the research was done is also the least
clearly-defined: feminists. The impetus for the project was to enable feminists who are
not themselves radical feminists to better understand this movement – one which has
largely fallen out of favour and is the subject of many of the most heated feminist
disputes. Radical feminism finds itself  at the heart of ‘no-platforming’ controversies
(the denial of invitations to speak in public venues due to the possible promotion of
discrimination or hate speech), debates about to what extent trans women should be
afforded the rights and protections extended to other women, and struggles over how
best to serve the safety and dignity of people involved in sex work, amongst other
issues facing feminists as the second decade of the 21st century draws to a close. Most
feminists who wish to see radical feminism better understood are themselves radical
feminists who aim to change perceptions of their own movement (e.g., Mackay, 2015).
I, on the contrary, am not one, and have sought to meet this ill-understood movement
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on its  own terms  and  to  share  that  interpretative  understanding  so  that  feminists
across  the political  spectrum can be better  equipped to disagree productively.  The
debates  are  certain  to  remain  turbulent,  but  the  support  of  detailed  historical
background knowledge can be used as a corrective to the straw man fallacies that so
frequently appear on all sides. I began from the premise which all feminist knowledge
producers share: that all knowledge is historically located, positional, and incomplete,
and  that  the  most  productive  thing  that  any  one  researcher  can  do  is  to  create
something that others can use, work upon, critically engage, take apart and reassemble
in better form, and otherwise put to their own ends. My hope is that feminists ‘on the
ground’ will find this research useful for doing feminism better, whatever that might
mean to them, but having completed it, I now release it. What the others make of it is
for them, with their own knowledge, experience, insight, and ingenuity, to decide.
At  the  earliest  conception  of  this  project,  it  proceeded  from a  much  more
presumptuous and less generous place.  Like  many feminists  of  my generation who
have come of age and into feminist consciousness during or after the postmodern turn
and the ‘third wave’,  I  found it  easy to deride and dismiss what seemed to me an
antiquated politics  of  a  feminist  movement which has  in fact  been instrumental  in
bringing  about  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  much  of  my  own  self-satisfied
complacency. My conviction that radical feminists had things all wrong also took shape
early in my feminist life, preceding many of the lived experiences of my adolescence
and adulthood which have  made me all  too  sympathetic  to  the  precept  that  men
oppress  women  by  design  rather  than  out  of  benign  ignorance,  and  ought  to  be
engaged with accordingly. Researching the intimate inner life of radical feminism has
left me a different thinker and a better feminist than I was at the outset. What I have
learned about radical feminism itself is useful, but the more significant benefit to my
feminism is that it has compelled me to make uncertainty my permanent home, always
aware that the urge to hastily dismiss feminist perspectives which seem self-evidently
wrong is likely to proceed from a want of understanding and a craving for cognitive and
emotional  consonance,  rather  than  from  a  robust  apprehension  of  the  realities  at
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stake. This does not mean that feminists ought not to take firmly-held points of view,
nor that we will necessarily change our minds as a result of better understanding one
another’s  perspectives.  What  it  does  mean,  however,  is  that  it  is  necessary  to  be
mindful of the politics of empathy and bearing witness in the way that we practise
feminism. Giving a fair and open-minded hearing to other feminists is not the same
thing as offering it to misogynists, nor does it attend to the same sorts of ends. We
must reflect this crucial difference in our decisions about to whom we extend the time,
attention,  and  emotional  work  of  listening  humbly,  even  where  doing  so  can  be
disorientating,  frustrating,  or  confusing.  Since  undertaking  this  research,  I  have
endeavoured to cultivate in myself and my students the humility that this dissonant
uncertainty engenders, and my hope is that the reading of this text may do the same
for feminists beyond the reach of my classrooms.
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